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A. OVERVIEW  
Homeland security leaders faced with managing a crisis event, such as a terrorist 
attack, will invariably be exposed to tremendous decision-making pressure. Typically, 
these leaders are working within the confines of hierarchically-configured response 
organizations. Crisis response is complex, requiring flexibility and the collaboration of 
multiple homeland security response partners in order to be effective.   
Mission command and the tools used to communicate leader’s intent provide an 
alternative approach to hierarchical leadership norms. Decentralization of mission 
authority and promotion of self-initiative can increase the tempo of decision making and 
execution. The intent of this thesis is to examine the applicability of mission command 
for use in managing homeland security crisis response. Several perspectives are 
considered. First, the origins of mission command and the efforts by a military 
organization to implement this ethos are reviewed. Second, parallels between both the 
military and the homeland security response environments are examined. Finally, 
implementation challenges, implementation examples using the wildland fire experience, 
and the opportunities for implementation within the homeland security enterprise are 
considered.  
B. THESIS PROBLEM SPACE 
Large-scale disasters can overwhelm first responders. Conflicts, man-made 
accidents, and natural disasters chronically shatter the peace and order of societies.1 This 
thesis problem space revolves around the challenges encountered by the homeland 
security enterprise (HSE) in crisis response. Earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires and acts 
of terrorism are crises that the HSE has responded to in recent years; some were managed 
well, others were managed poorly. A report from the National Research Council of the 
National Academies explains:  
1 Arjen Boin, Paul’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public 
Leadership under Pressure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
1 
                                                     
Hurricane Katrina became a national scandal because of the sheer scale on 
which… organizational pathologies manifested. However, Katrina was by 
no means atypical. In one form or another and at varying levels of 
severity, such pathologies are ever-present in the landscape of disaster.2  
These challenges include: “failure to recognize the magnitude and seriousness of 
an event; delayed and insufficient responses; confusion regarding authorities and 
responsibilities….poor organizational, inter-organizational, and public communications; 
failures in inter-governmental coordination; and failures in leadership and vision.”3 
Donahue and Tuohy examine the past decade’s major HSE incidents and identify 
several important lessons that occur repeatedly. According to Donahue and Tuohy these 
lessons pertain to five main areas: command, communications, planning, resource 
management, and public relations. Failing to address these issues may result in the loss of 
lives and property. 4  Common leadership approaches that work well in ordered 
circumstances may be too simplified in a crisis where conditions become complex.5 The 
thesis supposition is that if HSE response organizations can become more decentralized 
and collaborative, they can respond to crisis events more effectively.  
Most emergency response agencies within the HSE employ traditional 
paramilitary organizational models for rank, hierarchy, communication, training, and 
culture. While the HSE has been served well by this model in day-to-day responses, 
research indicates that in crisis management, shared authority, dispersed responsibility, 
and collaborative networking is a better model.6 Terrorist events are usually perpetrated 
by a few individuals leveraging technological advancements and decentralized 
organization against established institutions and nation states. As Nieto-Gomez suggests, 
2 National Research Council, Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions 
(Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2006), 141. 
3 Ibid., 141. 
4 Amy K. Donahue, and Robert V. Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 
(2006): 6.  
5 David J. Snowden, and Mary E. Boone “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review (November, 2007) 1. 1–9 
6 William L. Waugh, and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management,” special issue, Public Administration Review (December 2006): 131.  
 2 
                                                     
hierarchical iterative bureaucracies may be the worst kind of organization to confront 
unconventional or “out-of-the-process” threats.7  
The flexibility of moving from a hierarchical organizational model to one that is 
more collaborative and networked may be helpful in the response to a terrorist event. 
Mission command is a step towards decentralizing a hierarchical command model. Its use 
can result in faster execution, greater flexibility and increased initiative amongst 
subordinate leaders. The focus of this paper is not how an organization operates in 
everyday routines and response, but rather how to augment an organization’s 
effectiveness during times of uncertainty or crisis. Mintzberg points out that dynamic 
environments lead to organic structures; the more complex the environment, the more 
decentralized the organizational structure needs to be.8  
C. RULES GOVERNING HOW PEOPLE RULE 
The “rules governing how people rule”9 in the homeland security enterprise are 
typical of any organization or key leader that utilizes a detailed style of command. These 
rules assume that the emergency response environment is predictable, orderly, and 
certain. Detailed command uses communications that are top-down, explicit, vertical, and 
linear. These characteristics promote a number of rules:  
• Centralization of decision-making authority;  
• Coercion to adhere to rules and policies;  
• Formality and tight-rein;  
• Imposed discipline;  
• Obedience and compliance;  
• Ability drawn from the top of the hierarchy; 
7 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of the Few: A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently 
Disrupted High Tech Homeland Security Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 18 
(December, 2011): 13.  
8 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1983), 137.  
9 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), Kindle edition, 17. 
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• Optimal decisions that may take longer to decide and execute10  
These rules are the hallmarks of directing and transactional leadership styles. This 
thesis examines a change in these rules through decentralization of leadership. Mission 
command is best suited for environments that are dynamic—where firm command and 
control may impede work efforts. Chaos theory provides an explanatory framework for 
these environments where almost anything can happen. Similar to military combat 
environments, crisis response is an environment where, according to Ahlstrand, 
Mintzberg, and Lampel, “irregularity is a fundamental property…. in which ‘small, 
chance, disturbances’ can have large effects. Therefore, managers cannot rely on 
structures, systems, rules and procedures, but must instead be prepared to adapt 
continually in novel ways.”11  
Compared to detailed command, mission command is based on rules that assume 
that the environment, such as the crisis response environment, is chaotic and complex. 
Mission command uses communications that are top-down, horizontal, implicit, and 
interactive. These characteristics reinforce a number of rules:  
• Decentralization of decision-making authority; 
• Informality and loose-rein; 
• Self-discipline rather than imposed discipline; 
• Initiative and spontaneity; 
• Greater collaboration and coordination in order to maintain synchronicity; 
• Acceptable decisions made faster; 
• Ability drawn from all echelons; 
• Increased tempo of operations12 
Delegating and transformational leadership styles are derived from these rules. Mission 
command may be better suited for networked organizations and collaboration. This will 
be examined further in Chapter III.  
10 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command (Field Manual 6-0) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2003), 1-15.  
11 Bruce Ahlstrand, Henry Mintzberg, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through 
the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: The Free Press, 1998), Kindle location 3101–3103. 
12 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 1-15. 
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D. WHAT IS MISSION COMMAND? 
Mission command is a military leadership model best described as a “leadership 
philosophy, a management methodology and a systems approach to embracing 
environmental volatility.”13 In order to gain insight into this philosophy and how it has 
been implemented, the following is a historical look at the military origins of mission 
command.  
Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), a Prussian-German General in the 1800s, is 
largely credited with the implementation of “auftragstaktik.” 14  Mission command is 
based on the principles of auftragstaktik,15 which is the communication of commander’s 
intent; mission-style orders versus explicit-orders; and decentralization of authority as far 
down the organization as possible. In order to be effective, mission command relies on a 
sense of trust, mutual understanding, self-discipline, and initiative at all levels of an 
organization. 16 It is also dependent on organizational doctrine that is principle-based 
rather than rules and policy-based. Furthermore, Moltke recognized that explicit top-
down orders restricted the field commanders’ initiative and the rapid decision-making 
necessary for success in a dynamic battlefield environment. For example, the field 
commander usually has a better understanding of events on the ground, especially when 
headquarters is remotely located (however, technology is closing this gap as will be 
discussed in Chapter III). According to Moltke,  
Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of 
his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for 
orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his 
actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s 
intent.17 
13 Ivan Yardley, and Andre Kakabadse, “Understanding Mission Command: A Model for Developing 
Competitive Advantage in a Business Context,” Strategic Change 16, no. 1-2 (2007): 69.  
14 Stephen Bungay, The Art of Action, How Leaders Close the Gaps between Plans, Actions and 
Results (Boston: Brealey Publishing, 2011), 58.  
15 Ibid., 77.  
16 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2-1–2-5. 
17 Moltke quoted in Werner Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Inner Fuhring: Trademarks of German 
Leadership,” Military Review 82, no. 5 (2002): 4.  
 5 
                                                     
Moltke believed that orders should contain only the necessary information, a 
statement of intent and mission, and that all other detail reduced the subordinate’s 
freedom to act. An immediate benefit of this reframing of authority is that the leader has 
the time and space to think strategically, and not micromanage the mission.18 Moltke’s 
command style and headquarters was said to be the antithesis of Napoleon’s bustling, 
constantly moving headquarters. According to Van Creveld, “The calmness enabled 
Moltke to spend the period of mobilization lying on a sofa and reading a book - which 
forms a strange contrast with the frenetic over-activity that so often characterized 
Napoleon’s headquarters.” 19  He was one of the most successful military field 
commanders of the nineteenth century, leading the Prussian army to victory over the 
Austrians in 1866 and the Prussian-German Army over the French in 1871.20 Moltke’s 
implementation of auftragstaktik was to set the stage for German command philosophy 
up to this day. German “Sturmtruppen” or Stormtrooper tactics in World War I and the 
Blitzkrieg tactics during World War II were influenced by mission command. 
Elements of mission command have been recognized by the United States Army 
and Marine Corps for years and both have established mission command as official 
doctrine.21 More recently, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, has advocated that mission command be institutionalized in the armed services. 
According to Dempsey, “Understand my intent. I challenge every leader in the Joint 
Force to be a living example of mission command. You have my trust.”22 While the 
degree to which the Army has been able to implement mission command has been 
questioned, the six principles that are being used to educate and train Army personnel are 
useful in providing an analysis framework. The Army’s six principles of mission 
command are: 
18 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British and 
Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 39.  
19 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 115.  
20 Daniel Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), i. 
21 Marius S. Vassiliou, The Evolution towards Decentralized C2 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analysis, 2010), 10.  
22 Martin Dempsey, Mission Command (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Institute Center, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers/cjcs_wp_missioncommand.pdf, 8. 
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• Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.  
• Create shared understanding. 
• Provide a clear commander’s intent. 
• Exercise disciplined initiative. 
• Use mission orders. 
• Accept prudent risk.23 
These principles will be used to examine the two case studies in this paper. 
E. DEFINITIONS 
The terms that are used hereafter may differ from other recognized definitions. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following terms are defined for the reader. 
(1) Homeland Security Enterprise  
Homeland security enterprise (HSE) refers to the various federal, state, and local 
agencies that are tasked with emergency response to all-hazards incidents. In addition to 
the 22 federal agencies that work under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the 
homeland security enterprise consists of 18,000 law enforcement agencies, 30,000 fire 
departments, and multiple public health, hospital, and other response organizations.24 
The term “response” includes actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, 
stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs following an incident (and aligns 
with the National Response Framework definition). 25  Response also includes the 
execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery.  
(2) Homeland Security Crisis Response  
Homeland security crisis response refers to the efforts and actions of emergency 
response organizations to all-hazard events that challenge the organizations in some form 
23 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2. 
24 Brian A. Reaves, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,” U.S. Department 
of Justice Bulletin (July 2011): 2; Hylton J. G. Haynes, and Gary P. Stein, U.S. Fire Department Profile, 
2013 (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2014), iii.  
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1913-25045-
9359/final_esf_4_firefighting_20130501.pdf, 1. 
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or fashion. Crisis refers to an undesirable or unexpected situation that is usually time 
intensive and requires urgency in response. In addition, threat and uncertainty are also 
key components of crisis.26 Though a crisis is experienced at a local level, it may involve 
state or federal assistance due to the complexity of the incident. Moreover, a crisis may 
range from a fairly simple incident that has political or strategic repercussions, such as a 
shooting that causes civil unrest, or it may involve a much larger catastrophic incident. A 
catastrophic incident is defined as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, 
that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions.”27 
(3) High-Risk Environments  
High risk environments refers to those situations or surroundings that contain a 
threat of danger or potential loss to those that operate within them. Typically, the 
professions that operate in these environments are exposed to physical risk and can range 
from warfighting to firefighting or law enforcement. Additionally, high-risk 
environments can be characterized as regularly exposing the individuals that work in 
them to hazards, threats and challenges.28  
F. SIMILARITIES IN MILITARY AND HOMELAND SECURITY CRISIS 
RESPONSE ENVIRONMENTS 
The military and homeland security crisis response environments have much in 
common from a response or engagement perspective. The chaotic nature of a rapidly 
developing emergency incident has parallels to military encounters with enemy forces. 
Likewise, the movement and coordination of various resources at an emergency incident 
is similar to the coordination of military assets. Decision making under duress is a 
necessity in both homeland security crisis response and military engagement 
26 Boin et. al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 2. 
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 1. 
28 Douglas Paton, and John M. Violanti, Working in High Risk Environments (Springfield, IL: Charles 
C. Thomas, 2011) 7. 
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environments. The tempo of decision making in both of these environments is also 
similar. Klein comments on the similarities:  
We have studied tank platoon leaders, battle commanders engaged in 
operational planning…. We studied urban fireground commanders and 
wildland fireground commanders (with over 20 years of experience) as 
they conducted actual operations…. Many of the decisions we examined 
were made under extreme time pressure. In some domains more than 85 
percent of the decisions were made in less than one minute.29  
Fighting large forest fires (or any prolonged emergency incident) and military 
operations have other characteristics in common, such as massive movements of 
personnel and machinery, tactical aerial support, physical exhaustion and danger, or long 
periods of combat and stress until the “foe” is vanquished.30  
The detonation of an improvised, suitcase-size (10-kiloton) nuclear device in an 
urban center may cause in excess of 45,000 deaths and severely damage urban 
infrastructure for a half mile in all directions. In a sobering report from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, National Laboratory scientists estimate that the 
radiation fallout from such a detonation in the city of Washington, D.C., may extend for 
10–20 miles depending on weather conditions and plume direction. 31  An incident 
management team that is assigned to the “right of boom” of such an event will be thrust 
into an environment filled with decision-making pressures. The U.S. Army War College 
defines these chaotic environments as ones of “volatility, uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity (VUCA).”32  
One of the assumptions in a scenario involving the detonation of a nuclear device 
is that a significant federal response will not arrive at the scene for 24 hours and the full 
29 Gary Klein, “Strategies of Decision Making,” Military Review 69, no. 5 (May 1989): 57.  
30 Carl C. Wilson, “Fatal and Near Fatal Forest Fires: The Common Denominators,” The International 
Fire Chief 43 (1977): 9.     
31 Bob R. Buddemeir et al., National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the 
Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism, November 2011, accessed January 2, 2015, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/ncr.pdf  
32 John S. Richard, The Learning Army, Approaching the 21st Century as a Learning Organization 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 1. 
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response may take up to 72 hours.33 Another consideration is that the command and 
control infrastructure of the jurisdictional agencies may be disabled or impaired. 
Additionally, command and control may need to be provided by jurisdictions outside the 
affected areas.34 Furthermore, coordination of disparate response agencies adds to the 
complexity, especially in large urban regions with myriad jurisdictional boundaries. 
Mission command supports responders in their attempt to navigate this complexity by 
pre-negotiated decision-making authority through the understanding of the leader’s 
intent.  
Psychological stress is another factor prevalent in both military and the homeland 
security crisis response environments. Military and emergency responder populations 
have experienced higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder in the aftermath of 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and the response to the World Trade Center 
Disaster, respectively.35 Exposure to repeated events of carnage and trauma has an effect 
on behavioral health. Evidence of higher rates of depression, self-medication through 
drugs and alcohol, and increased suicide rates are being recognized in both of these 
communities. 36  Despite the exposure to mayhem, leaders of organizations in these 
environments are held to an even higher standard with respect to controlling emotions 
and displaying a sense of calm. In addition, they must show resilience under stress or risk 
losing the confidence of their subordinates. New York Fire Department Battalion Chief 
33 National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for 
Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 2010), accessed February 20, 2015, 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/planning-guidance-for-response-to-nuclear-detonation-2-edition-
final.pdf, 11. 
34 David Pasquale, and Richard Hansen, “Implications of an Improvised Nuclear Device, Detonation 
on Command and Control for Surrounding Regions at the Local, State and Federal Levels” (paper 
presented at the Institute of Medicine’s Forum, Washington, DC, January 2013).  
35 Amy Berninger et al., “Longitudinal Study of Probable Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 
Firefighters Exposed to the World Trade Center Disaster,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 53 
(2010): 1177; William P. Nash, and Patricia J. Watson, “Review of VA/DOD Clinical Practice Guideline 
on Management of Acute Stress and Interventions to Prevent Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of 
Rehabilitation Research and Development 49, no. 5 (2012): 638.  
36 Nash, and Watson, “Review of VA/DOD Clinical Practice Guideline,” 638; Janet A. Wilmoth, 
“Trouble in the Mind,” National Fire Protection Association Journal 43, no. 3 (June 2014).  
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John Salka describes the demeanor of chief officers at the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001:  
Even as civilians were descending from the upper floors with horrible 
burns and bodies were slamming into the plaza outside, these leaders were 
very calm and measured as they discussed information, contingencies, and 
strategy. They knew that every firefighter who passed by the command 
post on the way to one of the tower stairwells would be looking to them 
for strength. Their calm decisive manner gave those men and women the 
confidence to push their fears away and focus on their mission.37 
Both military and homeland security environments have also been influenced by 
the advances in technology and the increased electronic connectivity enjoyed by society 
as a whole. Military conflict and emergency events are broadcast more rapidly and to a 
wider audience due to the Internet and electronic social applications. Greater public, 
media, and political scrutiny adds complexity for those that are already operating in a 
chaotic setting. Moreover, information overload can be the result of sifting through a 
deluge of social media reports in order to gain situational awareness.38 Not only that, but 
the need to make sense of greater amounts of information and intelligence has created a 
complex world for incident managers and military leaders alike.39  
G. COMPLEX AND NON-LINEAR ENVIRONMENTS 
Storr postulates, “The relevance of mission command to the twenty-first century 
can be considered from several directions. First, it is a sensible response to an 
environment, which is seen as increasingly complex.”40 Linear environments are those 
that can be described as stable and predictable, and non-linear and complex environments 
37 John Salka, First In, Last Out: Leadership Lessons from the New York Fire Department (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2005), 61. 
38 Starr R. Hiltz, and Linda Plotnick, “Dealing with Information Overload When Using Social Media 
for Emergency Management: Emerging Solutions,” Proceedings of the 10th International Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management Conference, Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013, 824. 
39 Thom Shanker, and Matt Richtel, “In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly,” New York 
Times, January 16, 2011, accessed November 18, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; JinKyu Lee et al., 
“Group Value and Intention to Use: A Study of Multi- Agency Disaster Management Information Systems 
for Public Safety” Decision Support Systems 50 (2011): 404, DOI:10.1016/j.dss.2010.10.002.  
40 Jim Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission 
Command,” Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 125.  
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are those that do not follow simple rules or expectations. According to Beyerchen in 
Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War, nonlinear systems may 
display erratic behavior. For example, he describes a small change in a system causes a 
disproportionately large output or a large change in a system causing a disproportionately 
small output.41  
Comfort and Kapucu have examined the problem of inter-organizational 
coordination at the World Trade Center Attack on September 11, 2001. Their research 
describes the difference between routine and extreme operating environments 
encountered by public response agencies, which, as already explained, can be quite 
stressful. This comparison illustrates the difference between linear and non-linear 
systems in theory and the difference between organized hierarchy and complex adaptive 
systems in practice. 42  Comfort and Kapucu determine, “Under cumulative stress, 
hierarchical organizations tend to break down and personnel are hindered by a lack of 
information, constraints on innovation and an inability to shift resources and action to 
meet new demands quickly.”43 Complex adaptive systems are self-organizing and have 
the ability to “reallocate resources and action to meet the changing demand of the 
environment.”44 Mission command promotes faster and more effective learning cycles 
and therefore lends itself to greater levels of adaption in a complex environment.45 
In Coping with Bounds; Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs, the 
author refers to military historian Martin van Creveld and his identification of 
requirements for an organization to improve performance in a nonlinear or complex 
environment. These requirements include:  
(a) the need for decision thresholds to be fixed as far down the hierarchy 
as possible, and for freedom of action at the bottom of the military 
41 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International 
Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992–1993): 59–90.  
42 Louise K. Comfort, and Naim Kapucu “Inter-Organizational Coordination in Extreme Events: The 
World Trade Center Attacks, September 11, 2001,” Natural Hazards 39 (2006): 310, DOI:10.1017/s11069-
006-0030-x  
43 Ibid., 312. 
44 Ibid., 314. 
45 Australian Army, Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (Canberra: Australian Army, 2009), 36. 
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structure, (b) the need for an organization that will make such low-
decision thresholds possible by providing self-contained units at a fairly 
low level, (c) the need for a regular reporting and information-
transmission system working from both the top down and from the bottom 
up.46  
These requirements for a complex environment align with the principles of mission 
command.  
Comfort and Kapucu reinforce the synchronization necessary during extreme 
events. Their findings indicate, “Achieving coordinated action among a disparate group 
of actors (response agencies) depends fundamentally on their access to timely, valid 
information and their capacity for information search, exchange, absorption and 
adaption.” 47  Storr further suggests that mission command offers a remedy to 
synchronization challenges in the networked world:  
Self-synchronization (of diverse response elements) involves the 
broadening and deepening of such a developed form of mission command 
throughout every level and across every functional area of a combined, 
joint force. The paradox, therefore, is that while many will fret that the 
information age spells the end of mission command, it actually creates 
conditions where such a command philosophy is the essential bedrock for 
success.48 
Though directed at the military environment, Storr’s observations may as well be 
addressing the homeland security crisis response environment and warrant further 
investigation. This thesis will examine the use of mission command by organizations in a 
military and homeland security-like setting. The next section provides an outline of the 
scope of this thesis.  
H. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II will consist of a literature review. This review will focus on military 
mission command, implementation of mission command principles by the two 
46 Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs 
(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 73.  
47 Comfort, and Kapucu, “Inter-Organizational Coordination,” 310. 
48 Storr, “A Command Philosophy” 128. 
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organizations highlighted in the case studies, and potential application in the homeland 
security crisis response environment. Review of literature will be conducted in the 
following areas: mission command and its origins, military implementation, challenges to 
implementation, decision making in military and homeland security crisis response 
environments, homeland security implementation, and areas of research that remain 
unknown or unexplored. 
In Chapter III, mission command will be examined from an issue-specific point of 
view. Psychological, technological, and organizational system perspectives will be 
considered in order to clarify conflicts or alignments with mission command philosophy. 
These perspectives are not addressed in the case studies and, therefore, will be considered 
individually. 
1. Two Case Studies 
In Chapter IV and V, a qualitative approach using case study methodology will be 
employed to examine two organizations that have utilized mission command precepts: 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the United States Forest Service (USFS). Both of 
these organizations operate in high-risk environments as a part of their work missions; 
while crisis response is a potential, it is only required on an occasional basis. The IDF 
and USFS both utilize the principles of mission command but rarely refer to the concept 
as such, choosing terms such as decentralization, empowerment, intent, and trust instead. 
Both organizations have embraced the concept of mission command due to 
organizational needs: speed, flexibility, and limited resources. In the case of the IDF, 
defense of the state of Israel and the immediacy of threats dictate organizational doctrine. 
The need for leadership and situational awareness in order to prevent fatalities is a prime 
motivator on the part of the USFS. Both organizations operate in environments that have 
been traditionally hierarchical where rank, unity of command, and deference to authority 
are commonplace. 
The two case studies differ in that the organizations operate in different settings—
the IDF in a military context and the USFS in a natural hazard context. Both have 
adversaries but the IDF must operate against a human foe that is intent on defeating it, 
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while the USFS must operate against a natural foe (fire) that has no motives and can be 
very unpredictable. The two organizations differ in the amount of time they have been 
using the principles of mission command; the IDF has been using it since inception in 
1948 and the USFS only since 2003. They both have had varying degrees of success. 
Finally, the two organizations differ in culture. For example, participation in the IDF is a 
requirement of all citizens and therefore much embedded in Israeli life. On the other 
hand, firefighting in the USFS is an occupational choice undertaken by only a few of the 
U.S. citizenry. 
The two case studies will be examined by assessing the following questions:  
1) What was the leadership philosophy prior to the implementation of 
mission command principles?  
2) What was the reason for the organizational change?  
3) How did the organization go about moving to mission command?  
4) What were the challenges and costs?  
5) What were the benefits?  
6) What conclusions can be drawn regarding implementation of mission 
command within these organizations?  
In addition, a comparison of each organization will be conducted utilizing the Army 
framework of the six principles of mission command. A feature of the case studies is the 
recognition of institutional stories or lore as a component of organizational narrative.49  
2. Other Thesis Elements    
In Chapter VI, the findings from the case studies will be summarized in order to 
identify the benefits and challenges of mission command implementation. In addition, 
patterns, internal and external influences, and causality will be examined. By using a 
military case study, where mission command has been used historically, and a wildland 
firefighting case study, which has relevance as a homeland security response 
organization, it is hoped that reasonable conclusions can be drawn for organizations that 
operate within the homeland security environment.  
49 Yiannis Gabriel, “Turning Facts into Stories and Stories into Facts: A Hermeneutic Exploration of 
Organizational Folklore,” Human Relations 44, no. 8 (1991): 857.  
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In Chapter VII, recommendations, a plan for implementation, and a conclusion 
will be presented. A recommendation of whether or not mission command is useful to an 
organization in the HSE will also be provided as policy implications would impact 
organizational culture, training, discipline, and operational procedures. Remaining 
questions and issues might involve measurement of performance in utilizing mission 
command, impacts of network-centered technology on mission command, and increased 
organizational liability associated with lower decision-making authority. A plan or set of 
recommendations will provide practical steps that can be taken by an HSE organization 
to better prepare for crisis response. A conclusion will then summarize the key findings 
and recommendations. 
3. Summary 
In this chapter, the thesis problem space was defined as the challenges 
encountered by the homeland security enterprise (HSE) in crisis response. The thesis 
supposition is that if HSE response organizations can become more decentralized and 
collaborative, they can respond to crisis events more effectively.  
The “rules governing how people rule” or the established norms of the HSE were 
examined and the proposal of an alternate leadership methodology, mission command, 
was offered. The origins of mission command, the relationship of mission command to 
auftragstaktik, and the successful implementation by the Prussian military in the 1800s 
was reviewed. In addition, definitions were provided for phrases that appear repeatedly in 
the thesis. Furthermore the reasons why military mission command may have 
applicability in the homeland security crisis response environment were discussed, and 
the similarities between these two environments was detailed. Finally, the outline for the 
thesis was noted by reviewing each chapter and the focus of research in general. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review was conducted with a focus on military mission command 
and its potential application in the homeland security crisis response environment. An 
inductive line of inquiry was utilized as a framework for the review. Specifically, if 
mission command has had credible success in a military environment and decision 
making in both the military and homeland security crisis response environments share 
similar attributes, then mission command may have usefulness during homeland security 
crisis response. Vandergriff points out that the best way to implement mission command 
is to examine how others have done it through case studies.50 Therefore, case studies of 
two organizations that have implemented principles of mission command were chosen to 
refine the literature review. Finally, three questions were devised: 1) What is mission 
command and has it been successfully utilized? 2) What are the challenges to 
implementation of mission command? 3) Could mission command be useful in homeland 
security crisis response?  
With this approach, research of applicable literature was conducted using 
resources such as the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library. The documents 
reviewed focused on leadership, mission command, Israel Defense Forces, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Prussian military history, homeland security 
crisis response, commander’s intent, and auftragstaktik. 
A. LITERATURE ON MISSION COMMAND   
The literature on mission command is extensive and yet there are variations in 
how mission command is described. For example, definitions of mission command range 
from the organizational (e.g., a system, model, doctrine, or technique) to the sociological 
50 Donald Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the 
U.S. Army Make it Work?” The Land Warfare Paper Series, February 2013, Association of the United 
States Army, accessed February 21, 2015, 
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Pages/default.aspx, 11. 
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(e.g., a philosophy, lifestyle, or culture).51 Bungay maintains that mission command is 
based on the principles of auftragstaktik, a German military term that loosely translates as 
task or mission-focused execution as compared to befehlstaktik or execution of direct 
orders.52 Nelson’s delineation of auftragstaktik captures the nuance, namely that:  
…auftragstaktik was an extraordinarily broad concept, holistically 
embracing aspects of what today would be called a theory of the nature of 
war, character and leadership traits, tactics, command and control, senior-
subordinate relationships, and training and education. In addition these 
aspects were organically consistent, mutually reinforcing, and inseparably 
interwoven.53  
Mission command is the English interpretation of the term auftragstaktik, the translation 
of which might explain some of the variations in description and application by non-
Germanic militaries.  
Six principles have been chosen by the U.S. Army to describe mission command 
in current doctrinal publications. Each of these principles will be used as a framework for 
further evaluation of the organizations in the case studies. These six principles are: 1) 
build cohesive teams through mutual trust; 2) create shared understanding; 3) provide a 
clear commander’s intent; 4) exercise disciplined initiative; 5) use mission orders; and 6) 
accept prudent risk.54 These principles could be viewed as a series of steps that build on 
one another (although the fourth and fifth steps could be switched). As an example with 
the third principle, “provide a clear commander’s intent,” Shattuck and Woods examined 
how remote supervisors (leaders or commanders) impart their presence by 
communicating their intent.55 Their research examined the communication of intent in 
51 Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion,” 11; Shamir, Transforming Command, 3; Jochen 
Wittmann, Auftragstaktik, Just a Command Technique or the Core Pillar of Mastering the Military 
Operational Art (Göttingen, Germany: Miles Verlag, 2012), 15; Bungay, The Art of Action, 58. 
52 Stephen Bungay, “The Road to Mission Command: The Genesis of a Command Philosophy,” The 
British Army Review 137 (summer 2005): 26.  
53 John T. Nelson, II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters 17, no. 3 (1987): 
27.  
54 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command. 
55 Lawrence Shattuck, and David Woods, “Communication of Intent in Military Command and 
Control Systems,” in The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, ed. Carol 
McCann and Ross Pigeau, 279–292 (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000).  
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military command and control systems by simulating commander orders and gaging 
subordinate actions when event anomalies occurred. Results of their simulation indicated 
that even though there are specified methods to communicate intent within the military, 
subordinate leaders were able to match their commander’s intent only 34 percent of the 
time. 56  Explanations for the results are discussed in terms of a path versus state 
framework, flexibility versus synchronicity, language ambiguity, and leader 
communication as a means of imparting presence. 
Stewart argues that commander’s intent can be contrasted as either problem 
bounding or problem solving. 57  Problem bounding directives, a quality of mission 
command, are less detailed by a factor of three to one than problem solving directives 
which are issued by commanders in a more hierarchical, top-down organization. 58 
Shamir, Stevens and Smith, and Storr all provide comparisons of mission command with 
more authoritative or hierarchical styles of command.59 These authors are advocates for 
mission command; however, Shamir and Storr both express concern that there are 
organizational obstacles that must be overcome in order for mission command to be 
effective.  
The U.S. Navy embraces “command by negation,” a style of leadership that 
shares most of the attributes of mission command, namely decentralization and initiative 
at the lowest levels of the organization. Command by negation was born out of the 
difficulty that naval vessels had in communicating during battles at sea or when traveling 
around the world. On-scene commanders are expected to take all available action to 
complete a mission until “reined in” by a senior commander.60 On an individual leader 
56 Ibid.  
57 Keith Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?” Canadian Military 
Journal 9, no. 4 (2009): 50–59.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and 
the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (October 
2010): 645–672; Patrick Stevens, and Mark Smith, A Proposed Framework for Managing Catastrophic 
Incidents (Franktown, CO: Mission-Centered Solutions, 2011), 17; Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the 
Information Age,” 128.  
60 Larry Legree, “Will Judgement Be a Casualty of Network-Centric Warfare?” U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings 139, no. 10 (October 2004): 54–57.  
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level, Marquet describes a type of mission command philosophy, technique he calls 
leader-leader and that was utilized to transform a poorly performing crew assigned to a 
nuclear submarine into the most improved ship in the Pacific Fleet.61 Through discussion 
and practice, he created an environment where the need to give orders was minimized 
and subordinates prefaced every action with statements such as “I intend to . . ., I plan on 
. . ., I will . . ., and We will . . .”62 The impact of this change in protocol was to shift 
passive followers into “thinking obedience” through empowering thought and language; a 
prime objective of mission command. 
B. LITERATURE ON MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION 
Prussian military efforts to implement auftragstaktik and in particular, the success 
of General Helmuth von Moltke (as described in Chapter I) in institutionalizing its 
precepts are documented in a number of resources. 63 Multiple references provide an 
understanding of the underlying reasons the Prussian military moved towards a more 
decentralized command structure based on the work of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and 
others.64 Their influence after the defeat of the Prussian military by French forces in 1806 
changed the perception of warfare in the nineteenth century by the acknowledgement of 
the complexity of conflict and the need for nimbleness.  
Contributions to the literature by the Israel Defense Forces with regard as to how 
to implement mission command include articles on history, policy, benefits, and 
limitations. For example, Pressfield and Grossgold examine IDF operations and 
command ethos based on experiences from the Six Day War in 1967.65 Moreover, they 
61 L. David Marquet, Turn the Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders (New 
York: Penguin Group, 2012). 
62 Marquet, Turn the Ship Around, 83.  
63 Bungay, The Art of Action, 58.  
64 Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Inner Fuhring,” 4; Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War; Gordon Craig 
The Battle of Koniggratz (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964); Otto Friedrich, Blood and 
Iron: From Bismark to Hitler, The Von Moltke Family’s Impact on German History (New York, Harper 
Collins, 1995); Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars 1864–1871 (New York, Palgrave, 2001). 
65 Paul S. Grossgold, The 1967 Arab Israeli War: An Operational Study of the Sinai Campaign 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994), 11; Steven Pressfield, The Lion’s Gate: On the Front Lines of the 
Six Day War (New York: Penguin Group, 2014), 227. 
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both describe the culture of military life in the IDF and the need for rapid deployment 
against a foe that could invade from multiple directions. In addition, Anglim and Eiton-
Meyer examine the origins of mission command and how the IDF command policy 
evolved.66 They both focus on the history of the Special Night Squadrons led by British 
officer Orde Wingate under the governance of British Palestine. The tactics used by these 
squadrons later influenced the decentralized command ethos of the IDF.  
Furthermore, Shattuck and Marcus discuss the limitations of IDF’s decentralized 
operations in regards to synchronicity and coordination.67 Both of these issues can be 
problematic when operating under a less controlled command structure. Shattuck points 
out the coordination problems that General Dayan experienced in the Sinai Campaign of 
1956 by granting too much independence to subordinates, while Marcus cites the 
informal culture of the IDF as a double-edged sword that can cause important historical 
lessons to be ignored. Jones reviews the benefits of IDF’s networked strategy against 
insurgencies during asymmetric operations.68 His observations validate the success of a 
decentralized command approach against opponents who operate under informal 
command and rules of engagement. The literature regarding the IDF’s experience with 
the principles of mission command will be examined further in the case study presented 
in Chapter IV.  
C. LITERATURE ON CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION  
For all that mission command offers, there is literature that points out a number of 
challenges to full implementation. For example, Wittman, Muth, and Shamir question the 
ability of militaries to successfully implement mission command, advocating that it is 
66 Simon Anglim, “Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squadrons: A Feasible Policy for Counter-
terrorism?” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no 1 (2007): 34; Aaron Eiton Meyer, “The Zionism of Orde 
Wingate: A Complex Origin,” accessed August 12, 2014, 
http://www.covenant.idc.ac.il/en/vol3/issue1/The_Zionism_of_Orde.html 
67 Lawrence G. Shattuck, “Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence,” Military Review 90, no. 2 
(2000), 68; Raphael D. Marcus, “Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah 
Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF,” The Journal of Strategic Studies (2014): 
22. DOI 10.1080/01402390.2014.923767   
68 Seth G. Jones, “Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30 (2007): 296.  
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more than just a command technique.69 In particular, Muth and Shamir both express 
doubt as to whether the U.S. military can fully implement mission command due to 
cultural norms such as the notion that officer seniority ensures superior decision-making 
capabilities and the promotional system discouraging taking risk, creativity, and 
innovation. 
Other challenges may preclude organizations from successful implementation of 
mission command such as: partial adoption of principles and hybrid implementation, 
organizational intransigence, promotion of network-centric technology platforms without 
addressing micromanagement, and cultural differences. Trust, cohesion, and tolerance are 
more esoteric qualities that are crucial to mission command, yet are organizationally 
difficult to promote or measure. 
Storr and Stewart both illustrate further obstacles to implementation to mission 
command including: unproven validity to peace time operations, increased risk and legal 
liability, and increased costs due to additional training for junior officers and personnel.70 
Benson and Fontenot claim that due to misinterpretations of mission command within the 
U.S. Army, a “cult of command” has surfaced and that cohesive thinking or groupthink 
has manifested. Rather than producing an environment where open discourse and critical 
feedback is encouraged, the Army’s adoption of mission command has led to a dark side, 
where commander centric ideas and cohesion of command staff has produced 
“groupthink.” Benson and Fontenot propose that a solution is not to abandon the 
philosophy of mission command but to ensure that commanders do not act cavalierly 
under the guise of initiative.71 Silva discusses the importance of trust between superior 
and subordinate calling it the “cornerstone of mission-oriented command.”72 Trust that 
the leader and organization support one’s actions is necessary for the subordinate who is 
69 Wittmann, Auftragstakt; Jorg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the 
German Armed Forces (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2011); Shamir, Transforming 
Command, 202. 
70 Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age,” 125. 
71 Gregory Fontenot, and Kevin Benson, “The Conundrum of Mission Command,” Army Journal 63, 
no. 6 (June 2013): 28–35.  
72 John L. Silva, “Auftragstaktik: Its Origin and Development,” Infantry Magazine 79, no. 5 (1989): 
6–9.  
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expected to act in the face of uncertainty. Trust that the subordinate will exercise 
judgment and creativity within the bounds of the leader’s intent is necessary for the 
superior. Micromanagement, groupthink and liability concerns are elements that will 
negate the mutual trust identified as a principle of mission command.  
D. LITERATURE ON DECISION-MAKING IN MILITARY AND CRISIS 
RESPONSE ENVIRONMENTS 
The literature regarding the complexity of military operational environments is 
extensive. Two authors, Van Creveld and Czerwinski provide insight on the nature of 
command in war and helpful descriptions of complexity theory.73 Van Creveld concludes 
that in military conflict there is a need for decision parameters to be fixed as far down the 
organizational hierarchy as possible, the need for lower level leaders to have the 
resources available in order to make those decisions, and the need for top-down and 
bottom-up information transmission. 74  While these two sources may be a bit dated, 
nonetheless their observations remain relevant and indeed seem to align with more recent 
literature regarding decentralized command and control and “edge organizing.” 75 
Mintzberg provides support of increased decentralization of an organization as the 
operating environment becomes more complex.76  
Klein posits how experienced leaders working under time constraints make 
decisions in emergency response settings. 77  On behalf of the U.S. Army, Klein, 
Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco interviewed 26 experienced fire ground officers about 
decisions made under conditions of extreme time pressure and where the consequences of 
the decisions could affect lives and property.78 Their conclusion was that under duress, 
decision making is a recognition-primed process rather than a process of comparing 
73 Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, 73.  
74 van Creveld, Command in War, 270.  
75 Vassiliou, The Evolution towards Decentralized C2, 3; Ad L.W. Vogelaar, “Leadership from the 
Edge: A Matter of Balance,” Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 13, no. 3 (2007): 27–42.  
76 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 138.  
77 Klein, “Strategies of Decision Making,” 57. 
78 Gary A. Klein, Roberta Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco, Rapid Decision Making on the 
Fire Ground, technical report 796 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, 1988), 1.  
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options. Experienced decision makers were not looking for a best option but rather one 
that works, a process that Klein calls “satisficing.”79 Other shared characteristics between 
the military and crisis response environments were discussed in Chapter I. The inductive 
line of reasoning for this thesis is based on the premise that these environments share 
decision-making constraints.  
Communicating a decision or sharing understanding can be difficult in the 
military and crisis response environments. Lee et al. maintain that getting the relevant 
information to the right person at the right time during a crisis is a challenge.80 As Klein 
noted and Lee et al. reinforce, these operating environments are complex. According to 
Lee et al., “Response to disasters, whether natural (e.g., floods, earthquakes) or human 
induced (e.g., terrorist attacks) is a complex process that involves severe time pressure, 
high uncertainty, and many stakeholders, which results in unpredictable information 
needs.”81 Boin et al. provide relevant insights regarding crisis management and identify 
five critical tasks that must be addressed by leaders. These tasks include sense-making, 
decision making, meaning making, terminating (the crisis), and learning. In addition, 
helpful references to decentralization of organizations, high-reliability and critical 
decision making are reviewed.82 Other non-military references, such as those by Sinek, 
Waterman, and Brafman and Beckstrom, shed light on the advantages and disadvantages 
of decentralized organizations. 83 These authors are focused on the business genre of 
organizational effectiveness in changing environments. Sinek explores organizational 
motivation as it pertains to the leader’s communication of intent.84 The other authors 
79 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, “Rapid Decision Making,” 19. 
80 Lee et al, “Group Value and Intention to Use,” 404.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Boin et. al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 10. 
83 Simon Sinek, Why Start With Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action (London: 
The Penguin Group, 2009); Robert H. Waterman, Adhocracy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1990); Ori Brafman, Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations (New York: The Penguin Group, 2006). 
84 Sinek, Why Start with Why. 
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examine organizational flexibility and the ability to pivot in order to meet new 
demands.85  
In The Starfish and the Spider, Brafman and Beckstrom discuss the impact of a 
world connected by the Internet and the new rules of the game. These rules include: 
chaos reigns in this new paradigm, but opportunities are the result; people have a 
fundamental desire to share and contribute to their community; and the organizational 
imperative to flatten or be flattened.86 The chaos theme is reiterated by Peterson, who 
sees similarities in the fog and friction experienced by decision makers in both the 
emergency response and military environments. 87  His research also concerns the 
applicability of technology as a means of enhancing awareness and decision making. 
Complex environments, decision making, and networking are themes that are applicable 
to the homeland security environment and will be revisited later in this thesis. 
E. LITERATURE ON HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION 
As mentioned, there is a dearth of literature concerning the usefulness of mission 
command and critical decision making during homeland security crisis response. In 
contrast, the literature abounds regarding the limits and deficiencies of homeland security 
crisis response. For example, Boin and McConnell conclude that during homeland 
security crisis management, first responders must be trained to “act independently and 
effectively in dire circumstances.”88 They note that “top-down” organizational response 
may be appropriate only in the acute phases of a crisis when expediency encourages a 
“centralization reflex” or the shifting of authority upwards. As the crisis becomes more 
complex, “top down” control becomes less effective. In addition, Boin and McConnell 
offer several strategies for promoting resilience, including training responders to know 
when plans need to be implemented and when plans are rendered useless and therefore 
85 Waterman, Adhocracy; Brafman and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider.  
86 Brafman, and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider. 
87 Michael Peterson, “From the Battlefield to the Homeland: Building the Case for Network-Centric 
Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2007), 96.  
88 Arjen Boin, and Allan McConnell, “Preparing for Critical Infrastructure Breakdowns: The Limits of 
Crisis Management and the Need for Resilience,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15, no. 
1 (March 2007): 55.  
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discarded.89 Comfort and Kapucu examine a similar theme regarding the complexity of 
inter-organizational coordination in response to extreme events.90 They conclude that 
“auto-adaption,” or a form of mutual adjustment and learning process among 
organization elements or organizations in a system, will improve response to an extreme 
event such as the World Trade Center terrorist attacks.  
Lagadec proposes that homeland security crisis managers are being pushed into 
unknown territory due to “megashocks,” or events that are unexpected and have great 
impact, those such as Hurricane Katrina, the World Trade Center attacks, and Hurricane 
Sandy. These events can cause systemic meltdowns and confrontations with the 
unknown, which crisis responders struggle to overcome. Lagadec advocates a rethinking 
of how crises are managed in order to better prepare for future events. To that end, he 
describes an operational tool kit, or framework, that provides crisis responders with a 
series of imperatives, which are: anticipating, detecting, reacting, inventing, and 
mobilizing. 91  Waugh and Streib take a somewhat different approach and examine 
whether command and control systems are appropriate for dealing with catastrophic 
disasters. 92  They suggest that a collaborative process may be more appropriate for 
managing emergencies rather than a traditional command and control approach. 
Furthermore, they note the paradox that “…emergency response requires meticulous 
organization and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous.”93 
The literature on the implications of an improvised nuclear device (IND) 
detonation in an urban area does not offer much reassurance regarding response 
orderliness and efficiency. A couple of sources, Pasquale and Hansen and the 2009 
Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, estimate the casualty figures 
from an improvised nuclear device detonated in an urban setting to be in the tens of 
89 Boin, and McConnell, “Preparing for Critical Infrastructure Breakdowns,” 55. 
90 Comfort, and Kapucu “Inter-Organizational Coordination,” 312.  
91 Patrick Lagadec, Navigating the Unknown: A Practical Lifeline for Decision Makers in the Dark 
(Bordeaux: Editions Preventique, 2013), 2. 
92 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership,” 131, 132.  
93 Ibid., 132. 
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thousands and that local emergency response capabilities would be severely impaired.94 
The literature regarding this scenario will serve to illustrate a national homeland security 
concern and will be discussed further in this thesis. 
Peterson, mentioned previously, suggests a technological solution to response 
inadequacies using the net-centric (or network-centric) concept that the military has 
embraced and applying it to the homeland response environment. He defines network 
centricity as systems or systems of systems that connect sensors, decision makers, and 
responders. By implementing a network-centric capability in the homeland security 
response realm, information sharing, the ability to self-synchronize, the speed of 
command, decision making, and, ultimately, response effectiveness will be enhanced.95 
These are all objectives that the implementation of mission command is intended to 
achieve, albeit from a non-technical standpoint. However, Vandergriff warns that 
network-centric technology combined with mission command does not imply that the 
harder steps of organizational change in the areas of culture, training, education, and 
personnel systems can be ignored.96 His comments are directed at the military (the U.S. 
Army in particular) and provide an alternate perspective to organizational implementation 
of mission command.  
The wildland fire community provides both management and resource capabilities 
to homeland security all-risk incidents, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and search and 
rescues. While not a member of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security organization 
on paper, the federal wildland fire service is a part in practice. The National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group book Leading in the Wildland Fire Service expresses the 
fundamental leadership concepts of the wildland fire service and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service (USFS) in particular.97 Mission command concepts such as 
94 Pasquale, and Hansen, “Implications of an Improvised Nuclear Device;” National Security Staff, 
Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 10. 
95 Peterson, “From the Battlefield to the Homeland,” 151.  
96 Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion” 4. 
97 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service (Boise, ID: National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2007), accessed February 21, 2015, 
http://www.fireleadership.gov/documents/LeadingWFS_Pub.pdf 
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leader’s intent, trust, initiative, and bias for action are explored through description and 
real-life vignettes. How the USFS came to adopt these military concepts will be explored 
in Chapter V of this thesis.  
The Leading in the Wildland Fire Service document serves as the basis for a 
series of six leadership courses that are a component of the Federal Wildland Fire 
Leadership Development Program. This program is the only known adaption of mission 
command principles by an organization in the homeland security enterprise. Other urban 
fire departments, such as the city of San Diego Fire Department, have utilized this 
program for an all-hazards setting.  
In the case of the USFS, the writings of Norman Maclean and John Maclean have 
served to document several fatal wildfire episodes and to provide a measure of insight as 
to the reasons these events occurred.98 These stories are one person’s view of an episode, 
but by most accounts are free of organizational bias and are well researched. In addition, 
the wildland firefighter community has embraced the Macleans as de-facto historians, 
their narratives provide a sometimes more nuanced view than that of official reports.  
F. AREAS THAT REMAIN UNKNOWN OR UNEXPLORED 
Further review of the literature on mission command and its usefulness during a 
crisis revealed two research gaps. The lack of literature in these areas will be addressed in 
this thesis. One of the gaps was the absence of any historical examples describing the 
success or failure of mission command implementation in homeland security crisis 
response. An exception is Vogelaar and Kramer’s examination of mission command in 
Dutch peace support missions. 99  According to them, “The study was based on a 
secondary analysis of interviews with soldiers of different ranks (from private to 
lieutenant colonel) that were deployed in peace support operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.” 100  Their analysis of these peacekeeping operations, a role that is not 
98 Norman Maclean, Young Men and Fire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) 
99 Ad L.W. Vogelaar, and Eric-Hans Kramer, “Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions,” 
Armed Forces and Society 30 (2004): 409–430.  
100 Ibid., 413. 
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normal for the Dutch military, examined the extent to which mission command principles 
were implemented in a non-conflict environment. In addition, the authors note that peace 
support operations require “thinking commanders” rather than “rule-following 
commanders” which in turn requires delegation of responsibility and authority. 
Furthermore, they conclude that the Dutch military encountered difficulties in 
implementation of mission command owing to hierarchical military norms and the 
tendency for leaders to centralize control in conditions of uncertainty and high political 
scrutiny.101 This tendency to micromanage is a theme that will be explored further later.  
As previously stated, the USFS has taken steps towards implementation of 
mission command principles and significant literature is available regarding their reasons 
for implementation, but there is little on performance. 102 Leadership failure on fires 
where multiple personnel were overrun and perished is a driving force in the 
development of a leadership program by the USFS, and the literature in this regard 
consists of investigative reports and journal articles. This insight should prove useful in 
understanding why organizations are motivated to change and to identify the obstacles to 
mission command implementation. The lack of literature regarding improved leadership 
performance will be discussed further as well.   
The second research gap is the lack of literature addressing how to measure the 
effectiveness of mission command. There are a few sources that discuss similar topics. 
For example, Peterson offers five measures of effectiveness for a network-centric 
response in homeland security emergency incidents, which may be helpful as a 
measurement tool. These effectiveness measures are information sharing, situational 
awareness levels, ability to self-synchronize, speed of command and decision-making, 
and overall response mission effectiveness. 103  The training cost associated with 
implementing mission command is another measure of effectiveness that could be 
101 Ibid., 426. 
102 TriData Corporation, Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness Study: Phase I Identifying the 
Organizational Culture, Leadership, Human Factors, and Other Issues Impacting Firefighter Safety 
(Arlington, VA: TriData Corporation, 1996), https://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/phase1.pdf, 
128.  
103 Peterson, “From the Battlefield to the Homeland,” 152.  
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employed; however, research on training cost is lacking. Stewart alludes to the significant 
investment in time and resources associated with establishing a culture of mission 
command. This investment is required in order to train personnel to “… the high 
standards required to operate within such a paradigm.”104  
G. SUMMARY  
The objective of the literature review was to describe the breadth, usefulness, and 
validity of sources in regards to three questions: 1) What is mission command and has it 
been successfully utilized? 2) What are the challenges to implementation of mission 
command? 3) Could mission command be useful during homeland security crisis 
response? The literature addressing questions one and two is extensive. Historical and 
anecdotal references abound regarding command philosophy and mission command; 
however, there is little empirical research to support these findings.105 Complexity and 
organizational theory literature support the concepts of mission command and the 
military experience is reasonably well documented. A renaissance of mission command 
implementation is occurring within the U.S. military and the supporting body of literature 
is growing.106 Literature regarding the challenges the Israel Defense Forces and other 
militaries have with regard to implementation of mission command provides helpful 
insight and objectivity.  
However, the literature is sparse concerning the third question regarding the 
usefulness of mission command in homeland security crisis management. While, there is 
some literature regarding the efforts by the USFS and the federal wildland firefighting 
community towards leadership development using the principles of mission command, 
the literature on performance results is lacking. Despite this lack of research, an inductive 
line of reasoning may provide a reasonable conclusion. The argument is this: if a style of 
leadership known as mission command has had credible success in a military 
104 Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?” 52. 
105 Ibid., 51. 
106 Dempsey, Mission Command, 8; Douglas Pryer, “Growing Leaders Who Practice Mission 
Command and Win the Peace,” Military Review 93, no. 6 (2013): 31–41; Demetrios Ghikas, “Taking 
Ownership of Mission Command,” Military Review 93, no. 6 (2013): 23–30.  
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environment and decision making in both the military and crisis management share 
similar attributes, then mission command may have usefulness during homeland security 
crisis response. Certainly, there are opportunities for further research in this regard and in 
the measurement of the effectiveness of mission command. This thesis will contribute to 
that research. 
The next chapter will examine mission command from an issue specific point of 
view. The frameworks of psychological, network centricity and incident command 
system will be considered in order to clarify conflicts or alignments with mission 
command philosophy. These perspectives are not addressed in the forthcoming case 
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III. MISSION COMMAND AND ISSUE SPECIFIC 
PERSPECTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Psychological, technological, and organizational frameworks are crucial in 
understanding how any leadership dynamic works. In this chapter, mission command will 
be examined through the lens of these three frameworks. In the psychological framework, 
the impacts of mission command principles are gauged from an environmental, leader, 
and subordinate context. For example, how do followers react to the empowering nature 
of mission command? The technology framework will examine the push by the military 
and the homeland security enterprise toward network-enabled command and control 
(another term for “net-centric” discussed in Chapter II). In the organizational framework, 
an assessment of mission command in terms of the Incident Command System will be 
conducted. Each of these perspectives clarifies both the challenges and benefits that arise 
when mission command principles are practiced. These perspectives are not presented in 
the case studies that are to follow in Chapters IV and V and therefore will be scrutinized 
independently. The conclusions of this chapter will be incorporated in the analysis 
portion (Chapter VI) of this thesis. 
B. MISSION COMMAND AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Military and crisis response environments cause similar psychological impacts on 
individuals that must operate within them. As was discussed in Chapter I, these 
environments are parallel in nature due to the type of conditions encountered therein. 
These environments can be unpredictable, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, 
and ambiguity (VUCA). Also mentioned in Chapter One I was the elevated incidence of 
post-traumatic stress disorder among members of both the military and emergency 
response communities. This section is a consideration of psychological influences on 
individuals required to operate in a high-risk work environment within the framework of 
mission command principles. Perspectives from an environmental, leadership, and 
subordinate viewpoints will be addressed.  
 33 
1. The Psychological Impacts Caused by the Environment 
Response to infrequent crisis events compels organizations to operate in a mode 
that is abnormal and thereby stressful and physically demanding on those who respond. 
Consider the example of the improvised nuclear-device detonation within an urban city 
discussed in Chapter I. Jurisdictional emergency response forces would face a situation 
unlike any that they have faced before and they may have only theoretical concepts and 
untested operating procedures from which to draw during the event. The responders who 
are able to react may be unable to communicate with higher command, dispatch centers, 
or surrounding resources due to the effects of the blast wave or flash radiation. In 
addition, radiation contamination poses an invisible threat to the health and well-being of 
those who respond. Millions of people not initially affected by the detonation would 
attempt to evacuate the region. 107  In addition, panic would be an issue as would 
responder concern for their own families. Response support systems and organizational 
norms may be irrelevant or inadequate.  
Even events that are not so catastrophic such as a Mumbai-style terrorist attack or 
the Boston Marathon Bombing will test a response organization. Bigley and Roberts 
suggest: 
…one of the most enduring ideas in organizational theory is that 
bureaucracies—characterized by structural features such as 
standardization, specialization, formalization, and hierarchy—enable the 
steady, efficient functioning organizations require to compete successfully 
under stable operating conditions, but they also severely limit the 
flexibility organizations need to cope effectively with complex, 
ambiguous, and unstable task environments.108  
The stakes are high in crisis response, and indecision or inadequate action by 
responders cause continued threats to life and property. In short, the crisis response 
environment, much like the military one, forces individuals and organizations to operate 
107 Charles Meade, and Roger C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 5. 
108 Adler, Goldonftas, and Levine as quoted in Gregory A. Bigley, and Karlene H. Roberts, “The 
Incident Command System: High Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments” 
Academy of Management Journal 44, no.6 (December 2001): 1281.  
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in an abnormal mode and one that is psychologically stressful and potentially 
overwhelming.  
The need to communicate and cooperate with other agencies in a crisis places 
added pressures on response organizations. As discussed in Chapter I, most emergency 
response agencies within the HSE are based on paramilitary organizational models that 
are effective for day-to-day emergencies but may not be as effective when faced with 
extreme events. The devastating nature of crisis events requires widespread response 
from multiple agencies. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks in 
2001, there were 456 organizations involved in the response operations. 109 Research 
indicates that shared authority, dispersed responsibility, and collaborative networking are 
a better models for effective management under these conditions. 110  Operational 
circumstances dictate that hierarchically-organized response agencies would be 
compelled to function in an emergent multi-organizational network. 
Pfeifer points out that hierarchical norms may be difficult to overcome, which 
causes “stovepipe situational awareness” where information travels within a single 
response agency and is withheld from others because of organizational bias. This 
organizational bias was seen in both the New York Police and Fire Departments at the 
response to the World Trade Center Towers after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001;111 however, both agencies have made progress in this regard through training in 
the Incident Command System.  
2. The Psychology of Mission Command from the Perspective of the 
Leader  
Those tasked with leadership responsibilities during crisis response face 
tremendous decision-making pressure and can be overwhelmed in the process. The 
potential for harmful consequences as a result of wrong decisions adds significant 
109 Comfort, and Kapuca, “Inter-organizational Coordination in Extreme Events,” 318. 
110 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership,” 131. 
111 Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the 
World Trade Center,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al., 207–215 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).  
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burden. Civilian suffering and subordinate danger can be the result of an error in 
judgment by a leader. The tempo of crisis events dictates that decisions must be made 
quickly, and they may be based on partial information. Kapucu points out that in the early 
stages of a complex crisis environment: “….the main reason for stress is the lack of 
information and knowledge.”112  
Time constraints are a factor also. Klein studied the decisions made by fire service 
leaders at fire incidents and found that most decisions were made in less than a minute 
due to the time pressure and “…critical decisions were frequently measured in 
seconds.”113 Shifting some of this burden of decision making through the use of mission 
command principles may serve to ameliorate the pressures experienced by an on-scene 
commander. Yardley and Kakabadse posit further: “Mission command is inherently a 
risk-taking management methodology which empowers individuals to analyze directives, 
question their relevance as the situation unfolds and to make executive decisions when 
required.”114 This initiative and empowerment works to decentralize the decision-making 
pressure and thus assist the beleaguered, and often times remotely located, command 
structure.  
A key component of mission command is trust. Leaders must trust subordinates to 
act within the intent that has been communicated. This means that the leaders will need to 
frame direction with intent, namely: the task, purpose, and end state of the operation must 
be communicated—not how an operation is to be accomplished. Leaders must ensure that 
subordinates are trained and prepared to “lead-up” in the absence of direction. 
Disciplined innovation and initiative by subordinates must be supported and encouraged. 
Mistakes made in the process of earnest attempts to meet intent should not be ridiculed 
and penalized; rather, they should treated as learning opportunities for better operation in 
the future.  
112 Naim Kapucu, The Network Governance in Response to Acts of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 26. 
113 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, “Rapid Decision Making,” 1.  
114 Yardley, and Kakabadse, “Understanding Mission Command,” 74. 
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This may require leaders to re-evaluate their perception of themselves and their 
role in relation to followers. Traditional views of leaders in an authoritative and dominant 
role and followers as passive and compliant must be reassessed for trust to be 
engendered.115 Hollander further describes this change in relationship, “An alternative 
view, more in keeping with a participative ethos, sees the leader-follower relationship 
within a mutual identification motif” where the relationship is marked by influence from 
the subordinate as well as the leader.116 
a. Micromanagement 
Micromanagement works against the trust and delegation needed for mission 
command to be successful in an organization. According to Serrat, delegation of authority 
can be facilitated or hindered by the organizational structure  
…where people have broad purviews, for instance, in flatter, egalitarian 
organizations, delegation is the norm; hierarchical organizations, on the 
other hand, can signal the nature and strength of boundaries and favor the 
emergence of silos, the habitat micromanagers thrive in.117  
In high-pressure environments, increased performance monitoring may distract from the 
tasks and lead to failures.118 In addition, micromanagers themselves may suffer from 
psychological pathologies or simply be unaware of their habits. Drexler explains, “Many 
helicopter bosses feel the need to hover in order to monitor efficiency, or to keep things 
on track, especially if an employee has erred in the past.” He points out that this tendency 
for micromanaging is more often driven by the bosses’ own insecurities rather than the 
employee’s work performance.119 
115 Edwin Hollander, “Leadership, Followership, Self and Others,” Leadership Quarterly 3, no.1 
(1992): 47.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Olivier Serrat, The Travails of Micromanagement (Washington, DC, Asian Development Bank, 
2010), 3.  
118 Marci S. DeCaro et al., “Choking under Pressure: Multiple Routes to Skill Failure,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 140, no. 3 (August 2011): 391.   
119 Peggy Drexler, “Managing Up: When Your Boss is an Obsessive Micromanager,” Forbes 
Magazine (June 2013): 1, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peggydrexler/2013/06/13/managing-up-when-your-
boss-is-an-obsessive-micromanager/  
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Toxic leadership also destroys the trust required to ensure that the mission 
command ethos functions properly. Walter Ulmer notes that toxic leaders, as loosely 
defined by the faculty and students of the U.S. Army War College, are those that:  
are focused on visible short-term mission accomplishment … provide 
superiors with impressive, articulate presentations and enthusiastic 
responses to missions… [but] are unconcerned about, or oblivious to, staff 
or troop morale and/or climate … [and] are seen by the majority of 
subordinates as arrogant, self-serving, inflexible, and petty.120  
Eight to 10 percent of all U.S. Army colonels and general officers are deemed 
toxic leaders according to surveys from the Army War College conducted over a 15-year 
period.121 Furthermore, Ulmer posits that a mission command culture could be strangled 
by this percentage of toxic senior leaders in the force. He offers that one remedy to the 
issue is the greater use of command climate surveys by subordinates to identify toxic 
leaders.122 While the number of toxic leaders in the homeland security enterprise is not 
known, no organization is immune. 
b. Stress Effects 
The effects of increased stress on work performance can be positive or negative, 
depending on the individual. According to Kowalski-Trakofler, Vaught, and Scharf, “For 
some individuals, heightened stress elevates their performance. Others are vulnerable to 
the negative impacts of stress, which results in diminished performance.”123 In addition, 
factors typical of the high-risk work environment may heighten the stress level of a 
leader, including sleep deprivation, long work hours and physical extremes (such as 
exertion, heat, cold, weather, standing, or simply operating in a non-office setting).  
Another consideration regarding intent-based direction is the impact of stress on 
communication. Dietrich and Silberstein posit that when individuals engaged with 
120 Walter F. Ulmer, “Toxic Leadership: What Are We Talking About?” Army Magazine 62, no. 6 
(June 2012): 48.  
121 Ibid., 52. 
122 Ibid., 50. 
123 Kathleen Kowalski-Trakofler, Charles Vaught, and Ted Scharf, “Judgment and Decision Making 
under Stress: An Overview for Emergency Managers,” International Journal of Emergency Management 1, 
no. 3 (2003): 281.  
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difficult problems in a complex cognitive environment or psychomotorical activity, 
verbal communication tends to diminish. 124  An analysis of airplane cockpit crews 
described by Dietrich and Silberstein indicates that communication becomes very short 
and rudimentary under time pressure and danger. An accelerated rate of speech can 
manifest in addition to the clipped communication. Dietrich and Silberstein provide an 
anecdotal example of the communicative behavior of an air traffic controller, who 
comments that under time-pressure: “I talk faster, a lot faster—I talk so fast that they 
have to slow me down because they don’t understand me anymore.”125  
Stress can affect group performance as well, leading to a decrease in social 
behavior, such as assisting others, according to Driskell, Salas and Jolinston. In a study 
described by Driskell, Salas and Jolinston individuals became focused inwardly and were 
less likely to help or assist others when exposed to loud ambient noise. Individual 
attention tends to become more restrictive or narrowed under stress, and similar effects 
were found in groups or teams. 126 Sexton and Helmreich propose that language is a 
coping mechanism because it helps lessen and manage the causes and effects of stress. 
They also note that better performing cockpit crews were found to communicate more 
overall and crew performance was more closely related to the quality of crew 
communication than the technical abilities of pilots or heightened physiological 
awareness. Furthermore, Sexton and Helmreich also observe, “It was the ability of crews 
to communicate that kept their errors from snowballing into undesirable outcomes.”127  
c. Camaraderie 
Camaraderie (or comradery) is an integral component of leadership and essential 
for the mutual trust that mission command requires. Leaders who truly care about the 
124 Dagmar Silberstein, and Rainer Dietrich, “Cockpit Communication under High Cognitive 
Workload,” in Communications in High Risk Environment, ed. Rainer Dietrich, and Tilman von Meltzer 
(Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 2003), 9.  
125 Ibid. 
126 James E. Driskell, Eduardo Salas, and Joan Jolinston, “Does Stress Lead to a Loss of Team 
Perspective?” Journal of Performance in Extreme Environments 5, 1 (2000): 70.  
127 J. Bryan Sexton, and Robert L. Helmreich, “Analyzing Cockpit Communications: The Links 
between Language, Performance, Error, and Workload,” Journal of Performance in Extreme Environments 
5, 1 (2000): 63.  
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growth and development of those who serve underneath them place subordinate needs 
and comforts before their own (e.g., officers eat last), and they share the hardships and 
sacrifice alongside of their followers, which sets the tone for fellowship. This sense of 
community can be likened to a familial relationship where a parental figure loves their 
children. Indeed, many close-knit organizations can be compared to a family where the 
ties that bind are stronger than organizational ones. In the case study of Chapter VI, the 
camaraderie found in the Israel Defense Force is characterized by leaders acting as an 
older brother or sister toward a subordinate. This relationship manifests as a caring, 
interest, and a belief or trust in the ability of others. Major C. A. Bach captures this 
notion in his farewell instructions given to the student-officers at the Second Training 
Camp at Fort Sheridan in 1917: 
…paternalism is essential to leadership,… I do not now refer to that form 
of paternalism which robs men of initiative, self-reliance, and self-respect. 
I refer to the paternalism that manifests itself in a watchful care for the 
comfort and welfare of those in your charge.128 
Kirkland and Jackson describe the social isolation that military leaders often 
experience especially when decisions must be made that require fairness and impartiality 
or placing subordinates in harm’s way. As they explain, camaraderie is a factor that can 
mitigate this isolation and small military units are psychologically just like families. 
Strong bonds are created by a shared work experience that involves a separation from 
family and home, physical danger and hardship, and reliance on each other for 
survival.129 Pozner and Kouzes define this camaraderie in another sense: the  
...best kept secret of successful leaders is love: staying in love with 
leading; with the people who do the work; with what their organizations 
produce; and with those who honor the organization by using its products 
128 Shipstead, “Leadership: Address by Maj. C. A. Bach, Giving Farewell Instructions to the 
Graduating Student Officers of the Second Training Camp at Fort Sheridan, Wyoming, in 1917,” 
November 27, 1942, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/bach.pdf  
129 Faris R. Kirkland, and Moss A Jackson, “Psychiatric Support for Commanders,” in Military 
Psychiatry: Preparing in Peace for War, ed. Franklin D. Jones (Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center Borden Institute, 2000), 180. 
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and services. Leadership is not an affair of the head. Leadership is an 
affair of the heart.130  
Townsend and Gebhardt acknowledge that effective leadership must embrace emotional 
elements such as love (which causes many people to fidget). They also quote Major C. A. 
Bach, who remarks that by practicing caring leadership: “you are breathing life into what 
would be otherwise a mere machine. You are creating a soul in your organization that 
will make the mass respond to you as though it were one man. And that is esprit.”131 This 
esprit de corps is an indicator of organizational morale and motivation. Sharpe and 
Creviston posit that of all the influences on inter-organizational trust, esprit de corps has 
the most influence. They note, “The establishment of organizational trust is critical to the 
successful implementation of mission command.”132  
To reiterate, mission command is dependent on mutual trust, and this trust is best 
fostered through camaraderie. Leaders who demonstrate caring, compassion, and belief in 
the abilities of others create a sense of security among a group. This trust enables the 
initiative and prudent risk-taking that a mission command ethos is intended to encourage.  
3. The Psychology of Mission Command from the Perspective of a 
Subordinate 
Subordinates must be willing and prepared to accept responsibility in leading-up 
in their chain of command if a mission command model is to be successful. Junior 
personnel not only need to have high awareness of tactics, techniques, and procedures 
within their given specialty, but they need to think “one or two levels up” in order to take 
the initiative as the opportunity arises.133  
130 James M. Kouzes, and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge, How to Make Extraordinary 
Things Happen in Organizations, 5th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012), 345.  
131 Patrick L. Townsend, and Joan Gebhardt, Five Star Leadership: The Art and Strategy of Creating 
Leaders at Every Level (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 111. 
132 James D. Sharpe Jr., and Thomas E. Creviston, “Understanding Mission Command,” Army 
Sustainment 45, no. 4 (July–September 2013): 12. 
133 Keith Stewart, “The Evolution of Command Approach” (paper presented at the 15th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, June 2010). Santa Monica, CA, 
http://dodccrp.org/events/15th_iccrts_2010/papers/192.pdf 
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Subordinate self-leadership has been seen as a primary mechanism for facilitating 
empowerment; however, self-leadership may not be appropriate for all followers. 134 
Organizational culture, inexperience, concern about litigation or failure, and peer 
pressure may be reasons why certain subordinates are not willing or able to assume 
greater responsibility under a decentralized organizational model. As much as the 
leaders’ trust of subordinates is a key component of mission command, subordinate trust 
in the leader and the organization is equally important.  
Kirkland describes a German officer’s perception of the relationship between 
officer and subordinate in the context of mission command: “The psychological 
consequence of auftragstaktik (mission command) for both junior and senior German 
military officers was a sense of security.”135 According to Kirkland, the result was was 
that the leader and subordinate got to know how each other thought and to anticipate how 
each other thought if necessary. 136  Similarly, the leader “imparting presence” to a 
subordinate is a concept described by Shattuck and which is critical in the 
communication of intent.137  
Nelson further describes the benefits of this superior-subordinate relationship as 
experienced in the German military: “Though empowering and trusting subordinates 
always entailed risk for the superior, the supportive climate and candor of auftragstaktik 
assured German commanders that they would know accurately the condition of their 
subordinate units.”138 This knowledge would also guide commanders as to how best to 
develop the ability of each subordinate. Nelson continues: “Though responsible for 
everything their subordinates did or failed to do, commanders were secure knowing they 
could trust their own superiors to practice auftragstaktik and support them.”139  
134 Jeffery Houghton, and Steven Yoho, “Toward a Contingency Model of Leadership and 
Psychological Empowerment: When Should Self-Leadership Be Encouraged?” Journal of Leadership and 
Organizational Studies 11, no. 4 (summer 2005): 65.   
135 F. W. von Mellenthin as quoted in Faris R. Kirkland, “Self-Care, Psychological Integrity, and 
Auftragstaktik,” November, 1996, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE97/Kirkland97.htm 
136 Ibid. 
137 Shattuck, “Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence,” 77. 
138 John T. Nelson II as quoted in Kirkland, “Self-Care, Psychological Integrity, and Auftragstaktik.”  
139 Ibid. 
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This trusting environment is described by Shalley and Gilson, who note that 
subordinate creativity takes time to develop. They point out that subordinates who are 
risk-adverse will tend to want stay with routine norms rather than commit errors. 
Encouragement to take risk is the key to creativity, according to Shalley and Gibson.140 
Zhang and Bartol posit that subordinate creativity is influenced by “empowering 
leadership’ and linked to three mechanisms: psychological empowerment, creative 
process engagement, and intrinsic motivation.”141 They explain:  
empowering leadership as the process of implementing conditions that 
enable sharing power with an employee by delineating the significance of 
the employee’s job, providing greater decision-making autonomy, 
expressing confidence in the employee’s capabilities, and removing 
hindrances to performance.142  
Houghton and Yoho distinguish between the cognitive state of psychological 
empowerment and a process of self-leadership. Their description of how this process is 
enabled (with reference to Manz and Sims) includes leaders setting the example and 
encouraging follower self-leadership through several methods. These methods include: 
“…self-leadership strategies, personal responsibility, individual initiative, self-
confidence, self-problem solving and psychological ownership of work tasks and 
duties.”143  
4. Mission Command and Psychology Summary  
The psychological influences of mission command are useful to understand if this 
military leadership model is to be applied to environments such as homeland security 
crisis response. The military and crisis response environments share many attributes, 
including decision making under complex conditions. Those tasked with leading during 
140 Christina Shalley, and Lucy L. Gilson “What Leaders Need to Know: A Review of Social and 
Contextual Factors that can Foster or Hinder Creativity,” The Leadership Quarterly 15, no. 1 (2004): 36.  
141 Xiaomeng Zhang, and Kathryn Bartol, “Linking Empowering Leadership and Employee 
Creativity: The Influence of Psychological Empowerment, Intrinsic Motivation and Creative Process 
Engagement” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 1 (2010): 107.  
142 Ibid., 109. 
143 Houghton, and Yoho, “Toward a Contingency Model,” 70; Charles C. Manz, and Henry P. Sims, 
The New Superleadership: Leading Others to Lead Themselves (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2001). 
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crisis response face tremendous decision-making pressure, which can be overwhelming 
and contributes to psychological stress. The perspectives from the leader, subordinate, 
and environment were examined; trust is the primary ingredient in creating an 
empowering climate in which mission command will be successful. Challenges to trust 
such as micromanagement, toxic leadership, risk aversion and culture must be overcome. 
A mission command ethos offers much in enhancing organizational effectiveness through 
greater trust, cohesion, innovation, and nimbleness. From a psychological standpoint, 
mission command principles support an empowered organizational work force. 
C. MISSION COMMAND AND NETWORKED-ENABLED COMMAND AND 
CONTROL 
“The ubiquitous nature of data and technology, which transforms every soldier 
and pilot into a node in a network-centric environment, is irreparably changing existing 
leadership models,”144 according to Rosenburg.145 What are the implications of network-
enabled command and control programs on a mission command style of organizational 
leadership? In this section, networked-enabled command and control (NEC2) will be 
examined from a military and homeland security response perspective. Additionally, two 
applications of NEC2 will be reviewed and the implications of such capabilities will be 
reviewed from the lens of mission command principles.  
Speaking trumpets were a tool used by nineteenth century fire commanders to 
give direction over the din of the fireground and to provide cadence to firefighters 
working the hand-pump engines. Today, speaking trumpets, mostly referred to as 
“bugles,” are only used by the fire service as collar or hat pieces to indicate rank.146 
Modern day incident commanders utilize radio, telephone, Internet, and other 
technologies to coordinate actions and convey intent. Emergency response agencies have 
long benefited from the technological advancements made by the military. Handi-talki 
portable radios, geographic positioning systems, and the command and general staff 
144 Barry Rosenburg, “Technology and Leadership,” Armed Forces Journal (July 2007), accessed 
March 15, 2014, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/technology-and-leadership/  
145 Ibid. 
146 Michael Ward, Fire Officer: Principles and Practice (Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett 
Learning, 2014), 9.  
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concept of the Incident Command System are just some of the advancements that have 
been borne of the battlefield and are now applied to the emergency response field.  
1. Current Technical Capabilities 
Recent advancements in technology promise to aid leaders in these work 
environments by enhancing decision-making, communication and accountability. An 
overarching concept, NEC2, and two applications (Command Post of the Future and Next 
Generation Incident Command System) will be examined next. The term “network” can 
infer a number of capabilities, including physical components (e.g., radios, terminals, and 
routers) and databases (where information is manipulated and shared). The following 
assessment is focuses on two other capabilities that networks provide: the cognitive, 
which includes sense-making, situational awareness, and decision-making tools; and the 
sociological, which includes organizational, leadership, and synchronization attributes.147 
Furthermore, the implications of NEC2 on mission command are discussed with 
emphasis on two disadvantages: micromanagement and information overload.  
2. Network-Enabled Command and Control 
NEC2 is a Department of Defense concept (akin to the term “net-centric” 
discussed in Chapter II) designed to provide leaders with greater network access to 
information and to share solutions. NEC2 includes systems that provide a common 
operating picture and is intended to “…be leader-centric and networked-enabled to 
encourage initiative and decision-making at the lowest appropriate level.”148  
As illustrated in Figure 1, heterarchical or networked organizations as compared 
to hierarchical organizations organizations are less stratified. NEC2 creates this network 
capability and provides greater connectivity between nodes in an organization as 
compared to a more traditional hierarchical organizational structure. According to the 
147 Timothy M. Bonds et al., “Army Network-Enabled Operations” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2012), 24.  
148 U.S Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integrations, Command and Control Implementation Plan, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integrations, 2009), 5.  
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U.S. Department of Defense, the advantages of NEC2 from a command and control 
perspective include the following:  
1) Self-synchronization, or doing what needs to be done without 
traditional orders; 2) Improved understanding of higher commander’s 
intent; 3) Improved understanding of the operational situation at all levels 
of command; 4) Increased ability to access the collective knowledge of all 
coalition forces (or unified response agencies) to reduce the ‘fog and 
friction’ commonly referred to in descriptions of fighting.149  
 
  Hierarchical            Heterarchical or Networked (NEC2) 
Figure 1.  Hierarchical and Heterarchical Organizational Structures150 
There are multiple Department of Defense programs related to operational 
network centricity, and there will be more to come in the future as technology advances. 
All the U.S. military branches employ network-centric technology applications and 
improvements are on-going. 151  As mentioned previously, there are many military 
technology applications that become adapted and available to the emergency response 
community. A closer look at a military application called the Command Post of the 
Future is next.  
149 Clay Wilson, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 3. 
150 Bjørn T. Bakken et al., The Pros and Cons of Network Centric Organization: An Empirical 
Investigation, paper presented at the 11th International Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium, Cambridge, UK, September 2006, 
http://dodccrp.org/events/11th_ICCRTS/html/papers/140.pdf, 5. 
151 Wilson, “Network Centric Operations,” 32. 
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a. Command Post of the Future 
One example of the military NEC2 concept is the Command Post of the Future 
(CPOF). CPOF is an information sharing system that has been developed by General 
Dynamics for use by the U.S. Army. 152  The visual-analytic.eu website describes the 
system as, “Visual-analytic methods allow decision-makers to combine their expertise 
and background knowledge with the enormous storage and processing capacities of 
today’s computers to gain insight into complex problems.”153 
CPOF utilizes collaborative software and has been operationally utilized by the 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent of the technology is to provide commanders 
with the capability to gain situational awareness of the battlefield; collaborate with 
superiors, peers, and subordinates using near-live data; and communicate commander’s 
intent. According to the U.S. Army: “It [CPOF] allows commanders and their staff the 
ability to achieve enhanced operational effectiveness by enabling broad human 
collaboration.” 154  CPOF was originally conceived by the U.S. Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and it has since spawned developments by the U.S. 
Navy and the armed forces of Great Britain, Australia, and Sweden. A conceptual 
drawing of ROLF 2010, Sweden’s version of the CPOF, is shown in Figure 2.155 
152 General Dynamics, C4 Systems, “Command Post of the Future (CPOF),” accessed February 4, 
2014, http://www.gdc4s.com/commandpostofthefuture(cpof) 
153 Visual Analytics, “What is Visual Analytics?,” accessed February 4, 2014, http://www.visual-
analytics.eu/faq/ 
154 U.S. Army, Program Executive Office Command Control Communications, “Tactical Mission 
Command,” accessed January 12, 2015, http://peoc3t.army.mil/mc/tmc.php 
155 Brent Brehmer, “ROLF 2010: A Swedish Command Post of the Future,” in Decision Making in 
Complex Environments, ed. Malcom Cook, Jan Noyes, and Yvonne Masakowski (Burlington, MA: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2007), 131.  
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Figure 2.  Conceptual Image of Swedish Armed Force’s Command Post of 
the Future156 
The centerpiece of the CPOF is the shared, three-dimensional “electronic 
sandtable,” depicted in the center of Figure 2, the concept of which has yet to be realized. 
As suggested in the rendering, the electronic sandtable provides a holographic terrain or 
urban landscape showing resource positioning and the ability to visualize various courses 
of action. In essence, the sandtable is a real-time view of the events in the field of action. 
The visualization of adversary movement and interactive capability would assist leaders 
in decision making and communication of direction. An interactive electronic sandtable is 
not yet fully developed for the military; however, announcements regarding DARPA’s 
work on urban photonic sandtable displays indicate that the technology is advancing.157  
Public domain images of current CPOF utilization by the military shows 
individuals working off on computer monitors or flat screens. The U.S. Army is looking 
to move to the next generation of CPOF with Command Post Web, a web version of 
156 Ibid, 131.   
157 Dolly Rairigh Glass, “Seemingly ‘Sci-Fi’ Technology Becoming Reality,” Team Orlando, Joint 
Training Integration and Evaluation Center, accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://www.teamorlando.org/seemingly-sci-fi-technology-becoming-reality/ 
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CPOF that provides similar capabilities to users with access to the Army’s tactical 
network. This will allow users to access a greater variety and size of mapping data and 
mapservers. 158  The Army’s efforts towards network-enabled command and control 
through the CPOF demonstrate the focus of military technology. The next application, the 
Next-Generation Incident Command System, is illustrative of efforts in the homeland 
security response community.  
b. Next-Generation Incident Command System 
A CPOF-style application for the emergency response environment is becoming a 
reality. The Next-Generation Incident Command System (NICS) was developed by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratories in conjunction with 
the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. NICS, a Department of 
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate funded research project, is a 
web-based command and control system that enables collaboration among various 
response agencies, non-governmental organizations, and different levels of government. 
NICS facilitates real-time situational awareness for widely dispersed responders on all-
risk emergency incidents and planned events. Additionally, NICS has preparedness, 
planning, response, and recovery applications.159 The features of NICS are displayed in a 
demonstration video, accessible through an MIT website, and shows the ability of an 
incident commander to make map-based annotations and assignments on a portable tablet 
or mobile data computer, which is then accessible to others electronically.160 
3. Disadvantages and Pitfalls  
Despite all that networked-enabled command and control systems offer, there are 
concerns raised by skeptics regarding the implications of enhanced connectivity on 
158 Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Detailed Geospatial Map Data provides Soldiers with Greater 
Technology, in Less Time,” Army Times, March 27, 2013, accessed February 4, 2014, 
http://www.army.mil/article/97324/ 
159 Paul Breimeyer, “Next Generation Incident Command System” [tech notes], Lincoln Laboratory, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011, accessed February 4, 2014, 
http://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/technotes/TechNote_NICS.pdf 
160U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln 
Laboratory, “Next Generation Incident Command System,” 2011, accessed March 14, 2014, 
https://public.nics.ll.mit.edu/nicshelp/videolibrary.php   
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leadership from a socio-technical aspect. These concerns generally fall into the category 
of information overload and the temptation to micromanage. These will be discussed in 
greater detail later. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that there are other 
disadvantages such as reliability, vulnerability, and cost, which are not reviewed in this 
work.  
a. Information Overload  
As was discussed in Chapter I, the need to make sense of greater amounts of 
information and intelligence has created a complex world for incident managers and 
military leaders alike.161 Klein, Moon, and Hoffman stipulate that there is a limit to the 
amount of information that enables sensemaking, after which, degradation of 
performance is possible. 162  Networked-enabled command and control systems with 
decision support capabilities should have features that will assist in filtering out some of 
the “noise.” An electronic sandtable, as portrayed in the ROLF 2010 depiction in Figure 
2, may cause a decision maker information overload; however, it seems logical that any 
effective technology would have the ability to mute certain features to avoid this issue.  
Shattuck and Miller provide further insight into this filtering process using a 
dynamic model of situated cognition.163 Their model suggests that technological systems, 
human perception, and cognition processes act to filter or focus on environmental data. In 
addition, their model also suggests that the data flows through several processing phases 
(e.g., detection, localization, perception, comprehension) and lenses (e.g., individual 
traits, guidelines, and experience) through which data is shaped before it becomes a 
projection of the decision maker. This model illustrates the potential for critical 
161 Shanker, and Richtel, “In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly;” Lee et al., “Group Value 
and Intention to Use,” 404.   
162 According to Klein, Moon, and Hoffman, “Sensemaking is a motivated, continuous effort to 
understand connections (which can be among people, places, and events) in order to anticipate their 
trajectories and act effectively.” Gary Klein, Brian Moon, and Robert R. Hoffman, “Making Sense of 
Sensemaking 1: Alternative Perspectives,” IEEE Intelligent Systems 21, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 71, 72.  
163 Lawrence G. Shattuck, and Nita Lewis Miller, “Extending Naturalistic Decision Making to 
Complex Organizations: A Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition,” Organization Studies 27, no.7 (2006): 
4. 
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information to be missed or wrongly categorized when data is processed or filtered, 
which can prove disastrous for a decision maker.164  
In addition, technology will be a potential distraction for leaders that are not 
disciplined in regards to information needs or are unfamiliar with system capabilities. 
McLennan et al. address the need for information processing competencies as a 
requirement for effective incident command decision making and recommend 
“developing effective means of preventing working memory capacity being exceeded in 
spite of the high mental workloads likely to be associated with emergency incident 
command operations.”165 One way to do this is to actively filter out the unimportant bits 
of information and retain the important ones. Moreover, McLennan et al. postulate that 
effective incident commanders do this by asking for specific information, delaying 
receipt of less important information, and cutting off subordinates with peripheral 
information or requests, wrote things down, and drew sketches. In contrast, less effective 
incident commanders were overwhelmed with information.166  
b. Micromanagement  
The ability of leaders to have information and influence down to the lowest levels 
of an organization raises the concern of micromanagement. An example of the potential 
for micromanagement comes from the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s hide-out in Abottabad, 
Pakistan in 2011, also known as “Operation Neptune Spear.” An iconic image showed 
the President of the United States and his cabinet watching the video feed and chat-line of 
the raid in the White House basement.167 Although only a live feed of the military raid, 
the technology is such that leaders halfway around the world can and have provided 
direction to forces in-theater. This could easily lead to a situation where the distant leader 
micromanages, much to the detriment of the subordinates actually on scene. As 
164 Ibid., 4. 
165 Jim McLennan et al., “Human Information Processing Aspects of Effective Emergency Incident 
Management Decision Making,” in Decision Making in Complex Environments, ed. Malcom Cook, Jan 
Noyes, and Yvonne Masakowski (Burlington, MA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 149.  
166 Ibid., 145. 
167 Mark Bowden, “The Hunt For ‘Geronimo’” Vanity Fair, November 2012, accessed March 14, 
2014, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/11/inside-osama-bin-laden-assassination-plot 
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McLennan et al. caution, “proposed new Command and Control information/ 
communication systems should be viewed skeptically if they seem likely to simply 
present a commander with more information and allow him or her to be more readily 
interrogated and micro-managed by superiors.”168 
Technology is such that a commander has the ability to control events on a 
battlefield (or emergency incident) right down to the individual on the ground or pilot in 
the cockpit. “There is a real danger of the 5,000-mile long screwdriver that lets a 
commander stick his hand in where it doesn’t belong,” said Dan Kuehl, a retired Air 
Force lieutenant colonel who is director of the Information Strategies Concentration 
Program at the National Defense University. Kuehl continues: “The technology allows 
that possibility. Technology exists for the president in a bunker in the White House to 
watch a screen in an airplane and tell the pilot, ‘No, no don’t hit that—hit this instead.’ 
Do you want that type of micromanagement? I think not.”169 The issue then becomes a 
human question rather than a technological one since there is such a fine line between 
leaders interjecting themselves into a tactical operation (the antithesis of mission 
command) versus holding back and allowing the subordinates to make their own 
decisions.170 
With the rise of each new technology, the geographic distance between tactical 
units and commanders can be increased. This decentralization through technology is 
supposed to encourage initiative and speed of action. Yet, as Gray states, these very same 
technologies also push a trend “towards centralization of command, and thus towards 
micromanagement”171 
168 McLennan et al., “Human Information Processing Aspects,” 149. 
169 Rosenburg, “Technology and Leadership.”  
170 Ibid., 2.  
171 Chris Gray as quoted in Peter W. Singer, “Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils 
of Battlefield Micromanagement,” Air & Space Power Journal 23, no. 2 (June 2009): 79.   
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4. Mission Command and Networked-Enabled Command and Control 
Summary 
The implications of NEC2 on mission command leadership are greater situational 
awareness, faster decision making at lower levels, and increased flexibility and initiative. 
The military and the emergency response environment share similar attributes, and it is 
useful to examine the NEC2 advancements being made by the military. In addition to the 
advantages of NEC2, there are other socio-technical impacts on leadership that should be 
considered. Two of these impacts are information overload and micromanagement; both 
of which are issues more closely related to human factors than technology. English, 
Gimblett, and Coombs express caution, stating, “There is certain risk in placing too much 
reliance on network-centric concepts without addressing the human requirements that 
should drive any change.”172  
NEC2 technology should be seen from a mission command framework as a 
neutral tool. Positive benefits may outweigh the bad, but leadership is the key. Training 
and education of leaders and the use of these technologies must address the potential for 
information overload and micromanagement. Ultimately, net-centric technologies can 
either enhance effective leadership or enable bad. 
D. MISSION COMMAND AND THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
Mission command and the homeland security organizational framework known as 
the Incident Command System are examined in this section in order to assess 
compatibility. In addition, characteristics of the Incident Command System and the 
reasons why it was developed are considered. Organizational structure is discussed in 
terms of both mission command and the Incident Command System with the need for 
increased collaboration at crisis events as an underlying theme. Finally, the challenges 
and benefits of operating within these two frameworks are reviewed.       
172 Allan English, Richard Gimblett, and Howard Coombs, Networked Operations and 
Transformation (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 143. 
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1. Incident Command System Characteristics 
The Incident Command System (ICS) is one component of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). As of 2004, all response organizations in the United States 
are expected to utilize ICS to structure their inter-organizational efforts for all 
responses—regardless of the incident’s cause, size, or complexity.173 The ICS is based 
on several principles, including a modular organizational structure, a manageable span of 
control, and a hierarchical “chain of command.”174 The incident commander (IC) is the 
first position to be assigned under ICS and often as a result of a self-declaration of the 
first supervisor to arrive on the scene of an incident. The IC is responsible for the 
establishment and expansion of the organization, depending on the requirements of the 
situation. The DHS document National Incident Management System states, “As incident 
complexity increases, the organization expands from the top down as functional 
responsibilities are delegated.”175  
An argument can be made that while the ICS organization is identified by the 
incident commander in a “top down” fashion, the functional needs drive organizational 
implementation in a “ground-up” process. This flexibility and scalability are hallmarks of 
ICS and why a look at the origins of ICS is helpful.  
2. Incident Command System Origins 
The 1970 wildfire siege in California had a devastating impact. During a two-
week period, more than 770 wildfires raged, 576,000 acres were burned, 722 homes were 
destroyed, and 16 lives lost. 176  The response to this conflagration was massive and 
involved multiple federal, state and local fire agencies, law enforcement, animal control, 
and emergency medical providers. On September 28, 1970, midway through the 13-day 
fire siege, the massive deployment of personnel was said to be 19,500 personnel from 
173 Jessica Jenson, and William L. Waugh, “The United States’ Experience with the Incident 
Command System,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 22, no. 1 (March 2014): 6.  
174 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 47, 49.  
175 Ibid., 47.  
176 Clinton B. Phillips, California Aflame: September 22–October 4, 1970 (Sacramento, CA, 
California Division of Forestry, 1971), 5. 
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500 separate departments and agencies. 177  The complexity of coordinating such a 
response became apparent, and communication difficulties caused confusion. As a result, 
a group of representatives from the federal, state, and local firefighting agencies was 
formed, the Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). The intent of FIRESCOPE was to address the deficiencies 
that included: lack of a common organization, poor on-scene and interagency 
communications, and inadequate resource management. The two major components to 
come out of the FIRESCOPE efforts were the Incident Command System (ICS) and the 
Multi Agency Coordination System (MACS).178 These systems are the antidote to the 
problems of managing such a large response.  
3. Hierarchical to Heterarchical 
How would the hierarchical format of the ICS impact mission command? While 
ICS may be hierarchical in nature, its genesis and design were intended to transcend 
organizational hierarchies. The principles of mission command were intended to provide 
a framework for when traditional hierarchies became ineffective. Thus, the ICS and 
mission command are similarly aligned and not incongruent. It should be noted that 
currently mission command is not acknowledged within the ICS position training 
courses. 
Unified command, common objectives, common terminology, and a singular 
planning process are all attributes of ICS that move a response effort more towards the 
heterarchical (or networked) rather than the hierarchical mode. Moynihan notes, “the 
traditional model for public services assumed that a single organization would deliver 
services in a particular functional area.”179 However, this model is changing because of 
the scope of crisis events and the need to coordinate diverse response organizations from 
different levels of government.  
177 Ibid., 24. 
178 FIRESCOPE, “Some Highlights of the Evolution of the Incident Command System As Developed 
by FIRESCOPE,” March 26, 2003, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.firescope.org/firescope-
history/Some%20Highlights%20of%20the%20Evolution%20of%20the%20ICS.pdf 
179 Donald P. Moynihan, Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations 
(Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2005), 6.  
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As experienced in the various California fire sieges or in other all-hazard 
responses, such as the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attack, emergency services are 
provided by multiple organizations acting in collaboration rather than by a single 
organization. Goldsmith and Eggers conclude that these networks are the new shape of 
the public sector, and public employee roles are shifting those of doers to those of 
facilitators and collaborators. 180  Agranoff’s description of this new shape is helpful: 
“Networks are a non-hierarchical approach to management, reliant on horizontal 
relationships, information, expertise, and trust to direct a self-organizing process.”181 In 
the crisis response realm, these new organizational shapes are ad hoc in nature. They are 
formed for a specific purpose, ever-changing in size to meet the needs of an incident or 
situation, and temporary. This adhocracy, or a “form of organization that cuts across 
normal bureaucratic lines to capture opportunities, solve problems and get results,” is 
described by Waterman and is why the ICS was designed.182 Furthermore, Moynihan 
states, “…the ICS model brings clarity to the questions of structure and authority by 
imposing hierarchy on a network.”183  
Mission command does not diminish the need for hierarchy. Supervisors still 
control the actions of subordinates, albeit from a different approach.184 In addition, the 
ICS model does not address the manner in which direction is given, nor does it stipulate 
either authoritative or intent-based formats. Mission command would enhance the 
effectiveness of an organization using the ICS model. Although the ICS would have no 
impact on an organization using mission command principles, risk-taking is a challenge 
that needs addressing and is discussed in the next section.  
180 Stephen Goldsmith, and William D. Eggers, Governing by Network (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institute, 2004), 7 
181 Robert Agranoff as quoted by Moynihan, Leveraging Collaborative Networks, 7.  
182 Waterman, Adhocracy, 1.  
183 Ibid., 26. 
184 John T. Nelson, Where to Go from Here? Considerations for the Formal Adoption of 
Auftragstaktik by the U.S. Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
1986), 10.   
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4. Implementation Challenges and Benefits 
A challenge that arises when considering a mission command ethos within the 
ICS organization paradigm is the issue of risk management. The treatment of risk within 
the ICS is controlled through the communication of written and verbal directives, staffing 
of safety officer positions, and continual focus on safety issues by command and general 
staff during the operational planning cycle. In addition, the safety officers are authorized 
to stop any hazardous operation or tactic on behalf of the incident commander. 
Furthermore, crew leaders are admonished during briefs to adhere to safety principles and 
they in turn provide safety information when briefing their subordinates and peers.  
This attention to safety pervades the ICS process and can be traced to a “zero-
tolerance” mentality by the emergency response community toward harm of personnel. 
While the risk management process was devised to better address personnel safety in an 
inherently dangerous environment, the zero-tolerance thinking still exists and may 
preclude prudent risk-taking. The experience of the United States Forest Service in this 
regard and its efforts to build a learning culture will be discussed in the case study of 
Chapter V. This aversion to personnel harm in a high-risk environment may hinder the 
innovation and creativity upon which mission command is based.  
While the ICS model can operate using authoritative direction or intent-based 
direction, mission command can bring greater flexibility and effectiveness to the ICS. 
Mission command can be practiced by leaders at all levels of the ICS organizational 
including command staff, general staff, supervisors, unit leaders, and crew bosses. 
Leaders’ intent and mission style orders can be discussed at the section or unit level while 
giving direction, at operational briefings and at planning meetings, and documented in the 
ICS 202 or “Incident Objectives” as a part of the incident action plan. Shared 
understanding and mutual trust can be created between leaders and subordinates, and it 
ideally should be built between organizations and stakeholders. This can be accomplished 
through cooperator and community meetings that work well to provide information and 
receive feedback from the community impacted by the incident. This serves to generate 
an overall shared situational awareness that is necessary for mission command to be 
effective.  
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5. Mission Command and the Incident Command System Summary 
The ICS is an organizational tool that is prevalent throughout the homeland 
security enterprise. Its use may not be fully implemented by certain jurisdictions and 
disciplines on a day-to-day basis, but it is commonly used on incidents that are 
widespread and involve multiple operational periods. The principles of mission command 
are compatible with those of ICS: flexibility and increased collaboration across agency 
boundaries. Challenges to implementation of mission command with ICS might arise out 
of a conservative approach to harm of personnel in an inherently dangerous work 
environment, such as homeland security crisis response. Risk management is the current 
approach of the federal wildland firefighting enterprise that may encourage the 
innovation and creativity, which is primal to mission command. Increased flexibility and 
effectiveness can be the result of applying mission command principles, and there are a 
number of opportunities within the ICS operational cycle for leaders to communicate 
intent and foster leadership amongst subordinates.  
E. MISSION COMMAND AND ISSUE SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVES 
SUMMARY  
In this chapter, mission command was examined from psychological, 
technological, and organizational perspectives. A review of each of these frameworks 
reveal that there are certain challenges and benefits that become evident when mission 
command principles are entertained. High-risk environments are psychologically 
stressful, and trust between subordinate and leader is the biggest challenge regarding the 
effectiveness of mission command. An empowered, innovative, and effective workforce 
is the benefit of a mission command ethos. Technology and the trend toward network-
enabled command and control systems are providing leaders with enhanced awareness 
and greater decision-making tools. These capabilities should only enhance the 
effectiveness of mission command through greater situational awareness, faster decision 
making, and greater access to information at the lowest echelons of an organization. 
Greater technological connectedness can be a temptation to micromanage, which is to the 
antithesis of mission command. From an organizational standpoint, mission command is 
compatible with the ICS, albeit challenges such as risk taking may need to be addressed; 
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however, by and large, the psychological, technical, and organizational challenges can be 
overcome and the benefits of mission command achieved using these frameworks. 
A contextual framework to further examine mission command will be provided 
through case studies. The next two chapters examine a pair of organizations, Israel 
Defense Forces (Chapter IV) and United States Forest Service (Chapter V), both of which 
have utilized mission command principles; however, they both have different reasons for 
their leadership ethos and differing results in implementation. A retrospective case study 
of each of these organizations will be conducted using the six principles of mission 
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IV. IDF AND MISSION COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are “one of the Middle East region’s most battle-
ready armies, a force that has fought in four major engagements since 2006 and has 
experience in securing a few of the most problematic borders on earth.”185 These recent 
engagements against insurgencies are the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the Gaza War in 
2008–2009, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and the 2014 Israeli-Gaza Conflict. 
Prior to 2006, the IDF fought in a number of engagements against standing armies such 
as that of Egypt. These conflicts include the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1956 Suez War, 
the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 First Lebanon War. The 
IDF has been mobilized in every decade since the inception of the state of Israel and 
often two or three times in a decade.  
With multiple conflicts both internally and externally to draw from, the Israeli 
military experience provides examples of both success and failure in meeting 
organizational objectives. Israeli security requirements are unique based on the location, 
size, and proximity of its landmass to surrounding Arab territories and countries. The 
contentious border locations and physical security requirements are additional factors to 
the challenges facing the IDF. 
In this chapter, the IDF experience is examined in terms of leadership ethos, 
commander’s intent, communication, and initiative. The implementation of mission 
command principles by the IDF is illustrated through examples from Palestine when it 
was under British governance, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 2002 Operation Defensive 
Shield in the West Bank. The challenges of mission command in a military context are 
discussed with several examples. In addition, asymmetric warfare is reviewed because 
military operations are increasingly focused on decentralized insurgencies rather than 
185 Armin Rosen, Jeremy Bender, and Amanda Macias, “The Most Powerful Militaries in the Middle 




                                                     
conventional conflicts. Also, the IDF’s approach to organizational doctrine and the need 
for flexibility in a changing environment is discussed. How mission command is utilized 
by the IDF is explored using the U.S. Army’s six principles as a framework. Finally, a 
comparison is made between the IDF military environment and the U.S. homeland 
security response environment.  
B. ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES 
The military prowess of the IDF between 1948 and 1973 was formidable, inviting 
comparisons to the German military and blitzkrieg warfare during World War II.186 
Rapid mobilization and deployment of conventional ground and air forces against 
threatening forces resulted in swift victories for the State of Israel. Tensions between 
Israel and Arab neighbors have been the primary cause of the wars and uprisings. The 
nature of these conflicts, the relatively small size of Israel, and the shared borders with 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon create a security condition 
that is unique in the world.187 The IDF has both national and international protection 
responsibilities. Morag notes, “In Israel, the military plays a very wide-ranging role in 
homeland security. This varies from counterterrorism operations in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip to organizing and overseeing national preparedness and response efforts.”188 
These responsibilities and the constant threat environment are strong influences in IDF 
doctrine and leadership ethos. 
The principles of mission command are utilized by the IDF to encourage speed, 
flexibility, and initiative amongst subordinate leaders. Van Creveld notes these qualities 
as  
… individual daring (heaza), maintenance of aim (dvekut bamatara), 
improvisation (iltur) and resourcefulness (tushia), all of which still remain 
186 Shamir, Transforming Command, 82. 
187 Pressfield notes, “The State of Israel is the size of New Jersey.” Pressfield, The Lions Gate, 4.  
188 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2011), 212. 
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the key elements of the fighting doctrine that the IDF systematically 
inculcates into, and demands of, troops and commanders at every level.189  
The doctrine of the IDF is to determine the outcome of war rapidly and decisively and to 
take the fight to the enemy’s territory as quickly as possible.190 This case study will 
examine the mission command philosophy of the Israel Defense Forces with an eye for 
potential application in the United States’ homeland security enterprise. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION COMMAND IN BRITISH PALESTINE 
BEFORE WWII 
The IDF was officially established in 1948, shortly after the founding of the State 
of Israel. The IDF incorporated pre-state Jewish paramilitary organizations, including the 
Haganah, Palmach, Irgun, and Lehi.191 These organizations provided protection to Jewish 
settlements, which were subject to increasing Arab attacks in northern Palestine while 
under the governance of British Palestine. In 1938, a British officer named Captain Ord 
Wingate was assigned to establish the Special Night Squads (SNS), a counterterrorism 
force made up of British soldiers and Jewish Settlement Police (Notrim).192  
Eventually, the SNS was heavily populated by members of Haganah, who saw the 
new force as an opportunity for military training. Anglim notes that two future military 
and political leaders of Israel—Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon—were members of 
Haganah and participated on SNS missions.193 The SNS operated semi-independently in 
small teams using stealth methods, such as ambushes, to disrupt insurgent operations. 
Anglim describes Wingate’s methods:  
With small sub-units, operating semi-independently in hostile areas by 
night, over rigid control from the center may prove counterproductive. 
Consequently, Wingate applied what might, anachronistically, be 
identified as “mission command,” (or displays of initiative)… Another 
189 van Creveld, Command in War, 115. 
190 Israeli Defense Forces, “Doctrine,” accessed August 12, 2014 http://www.idf.il/1497-
en/Dover.aspx  
191 Israeli Defense Forces, “History of IDF,” accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.idf.il/1503-
en/Dover.aspx 
192 Ibid. 
193 Anglim, “Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squadrons,” 34.  
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aspect of “mission command” is emphasis upon personal leadership and 
tactical awareness. These are difficult to quantify, but it is notable that a 
number of SNS officers and squadsmen were to rise to senior rank in the 
British and Israeli Armies, both forces placing a high premium on these 
qualities.194 
Wingate practiced mission command by ensuring that the intent of operations was well 
understood by his subordinates. Gal notes that Wingate would plan in detail and ensure 
that the intent was understood by all. Wingate would then give “full delegation of 
authority to subordinate commanders, always allowing improvisation in accordance with 
the changing conditions of battle” according to Gal.195  
In addition, Wingate gave mission-type orders, where general instructions were given 
(typically, short operational orders) but the method of execution was left up to the 
subordinate leaders. .196 Wingate also held a prophetic vision, of which he would remind 
others prior to mission deployments. According to Atkins, he would inspire his squads 
with the reminder that: “‘You are the first soldiers of the Jewish army,’ … and he would 
(then) declaim to them passages from the Bible describing the country they would pass 
through and prophesying their victory.”197  
Though successful in quieting attacks by Arab gangs in northern Palestine, 
Wingate and his methods were not without controversy. For example, Boot writes that 
in the British Army he was looked upon as a “cantankerous wild man,” who risked the 
British reputation of fighting fairly and was seen as putting the interests of Jews before 
his own country.198 Wingate’s sanity was the subject of debate by some officers.199 
Even so, Wingate went on to guide other unconventional forces in Ethiopia and Burma 
194 Ibid. 
195 Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 5. 
196 John Atkins, A Model for Modern Nonlinear Noncontiguous Operations: The War in Burma, 1943 
to 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, KA: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 18.  
197 Michael B. Oren, “Orde Wingate: Friend under Fire,” Azure Online, no. 10, Winter 5761 (2001), 
accessed January 30, 2015, http://azure.org.il/include/print.php?id=279 
198 Max Boot, “What Wingate Wrought,” The Weekly Standard 18, no. 16 (December 31, 2012), 
accessed January 29, 2015 http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/what-wingate-
wrought_690836.html?page=3 
199 Ibid., 4. 
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during World War II. He was later promoted to major general and awarded three 
Distinguished Service Orders for outstanding command “under fire.” 
Wingate’s reputation among the Israelis is distinct. Eiton-Meyer explains, 
“Wingate had a profound impact on the molding of Israeli military doctrine. Defense, 
when fighting a numerically superior enemy, meant offense, and offense meant fighting 
deep inside enemy territory where the opposition was most vulnerable.”200 An excerpt 
from a course on the Haydid Learning Center website states: 
The State of Israel owed no small thanks to the man universally known as 
“Hayedid”—the Friend. Indeed, the Jewish people could have asked for no 
better friend than Orde Wingate, who appeared and disappeared like a 
whirlwind in the lives of the Palestinian Jews, but forever left his mark on 
the people he loved and on the development of the state he so longed to 
see.201 
These efforts demonstrate the considerable influence an individual can have on an 
organization through the use of mission command principles. Trust, the bedrock of 
mission command, must be built and maintained. Additionally, vision and intent must be 
communicated in order to allow effective operations under adverse conditions. While the 
methods of the SNS under Orde Wingate might be controversial, the use of a mission 
command ethos for intent, flexibility, and trust provides an example for leaders within the 
homeland security enterprise. Independence of action by first responders may be 
necessary during a crisis response, such as an active shooter or earthquake. This 
independence of action is better guided through knowledge and understanding of the 
leader’s intent.   
D. MISSION COMMAND AND THE IDF 
The IDF has consistently embraced a mission command philosophy where rapid decision 
making, innovation by forces on the ground, and independence of action within the limits 
of leader’s intent are the result. Speed and flexibility are primary aims due to the nature 
200 Eiton-Meyer, “The Zionism of Orde Wingate: A Complex Origin.” 
201 Doran Geller, “Orde Wingate and the Development of the Special Night Squads,” Haydid Learning 
Center, July 2012, accessed January 26, 2015, http://www.haydid.org/wingate.htm Course lecture, Pioneers 
of Israel, World Zionist Organization.  
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and proximity of enemy threats. Van Creveld highlights this ethos as explained by IDF 
General Rabin in 1960: “‘commanders and headquarters (of armored forces) must be able 
to gather intelligence, process it, prepare orders, and issue them while on the move.’”202 
Hesitation or waiting for further orders is not tolerated within the IDF and may be 
harmful in battle. Instead, according to Van Creveld, commanders must operate with 
general information and in coordination with others. In the absence of orders from 
superiors, Van Creveld notes: “An armored commander should be so trained as to make 
him as little dependent on his superior as possible in deciding how to act.”203 
1. 1967 Six Day War 
The 1967 Six Day War is illustrative of the IDF command philosophy and a 
situation in which Israel went into action against a larger and better equipped foe. When 
Egypt mobilized into the Sinai Peninsula with the intention of destroying Israel, the IDF 
was deployed. Egypt’s military strength prior to the conflict consisted of seven divisions 
totaling almost 100,000 troops, 1000 tanks, and accompanying artillery.204 Facing the 
Egyptians were 45,000 Israeli troops and 450 tanks formed into three divisions (ugdhas), 
which were named for their commanders: Tal, Yoffe and Sharon.205 All three of these 
divisions reported to Brigadier General Yeshayahu Gavish, they but often operated 
autonomously. 206  Grossgold describes the IDF ethos from the perspective of a 
subordinate leader who operated under its principles where “Adherance to mission is one 
of Zahal’s (Israeli military) bedrock principles.” 207  Furthermore, he describes this 
mindset from the perspective of Captain Aharon, an IDF tank company commander: 
“Aharon had lost touch with higher authority during the hard fight down the length of the 
202 van Creveld, Command in War, 198. 
203 Ibid.  
204 Ibid.  
205 “Six Day War/Egyptian Front,” Six Day War, accessed September 14, 2014, 
http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/southernfront.asp 
206 Grossgold, “The 1967 Arab Israeli War,” 11. 
207 Ibid., 5. 
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Rafah North position, but, like all Israeli sub-unit commanders, he had been fully briefed 
on his brigade’s intermediate and long range objectives.”208 
Pressfield quotes the perspective of Danny Matt, an IDF paratrooper brigade 
commander: “A combat commander under Ariel Sharon is granted broad independence 
of action. Sharon tells you what to do but not how to do it.”209 A third perspective comes 
from Yael Dayan (the daughter of Moshe Dayan), a second lieutenant in the IDF assigned 
as a correspondent with Ugdha Sharon, according to Pressfield:  
Sharon’s eyes light with a smile that I have seen no one resist. Of course 
the Israeli soldier will make up his own mind, and do whatever he wants. 
This is as it should be. The reason we will thrash the Egyptians is because 
they can’t do the same. They can’t improvise.210 
General Moshe Dayan further contrasts the differences in command philosophy; 
“the Egyptians are ‘schematic in their operation’ and their command headquarters are in 
the rear, while we ‘are used to acting with great flexibility and less military routine.’”211 
The Sinai Campaign of the 1967 Six Day War was finished in two days (see 
Figure 3). With a massive air strike that caught many Egyptian jets still parked at 
airbases, the Israeli military focus turned to the ground campaign, which effectively 
destroyed two Egyptian divisions and crippled the others. Jacobs writes that during this 
campaign, the Israelis “…launched a three pronged assault at Egyptian strongholds in the 
northern and central Sinai. Contrary to Egyptian expectations that the Israelis would 
strike deep and bypass fortifications, the Israelis attacked headlong”212 Jacobs points out 
that this move caught the Egyptians by surprise and forced their retreat through the Mitla 
Pass where advance elements of the IDF were waiting. This action was the Egyptians 
208 Ibid. 
209 Pressfield, The Lion’s Gate, 227.  
210 Ibid., 63. 
211 Dan Horowitz, “Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army,” 
Policy Sciences 1, no 1 (1970): 191.  
212 David M. Jacobs, “Great Warrior: Moshe Dayan,” Air Command and Staff College Air University, 
1984, accessed August 16, 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a145280.pdf, 16.   
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undoing, according to Jacobs, who notes that as a result, “the Israelis destroyed or 
captured more than eight hundred tanks in the Sinai.”213 
 
Figure 3.  Conquest of Sinai, June 7–8, 1967214  
The speed and flexibility of the IDF was the result of a philosophy based on the 
principles of mission command. While Egyptian forces were tightly controlled through 
layers of organizational hierarchy (even adding layers in the days prior to the Six Days 
213 Ibid.   
214 “Six Day War, Conquest of Sinai,” U.S. Military Academy, Department of History, accessed on 
March 7, 2015, 
http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Arab%20Israel/arab%20israeli%20map%2042.jpg 
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War), the IDF forces were more nimble, operating with “independence of action” and 
minimal direction as an expectation.215 Similarities are seen in the emergency response 
environment where formal hierarchies and tightly controlled plans may become irrelevant 
in a crisis.  
Grant and De Waard examined the communication patterns of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and offer ways that hierarchical organizations can become more networked and 
agile, which are characteristics that have been used successfully by the IDF when formal 
plans are no longer valid. They mention the work of Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and 
Hollingshead, who studied the response failures during Hurricane Katrina and had this to 
say: “Despite the existence of … formal plans, extensive training, and bureaucratic 
structures, when the authority structure breaks down, as occurred during Katrina, so do 
the formal plans.”216 Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead note that the performance 
of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was a bright spot during Katrina. The USCG was able 
to operate effectively despite the breakdown in authority due to the ability of “operational 
commanders to act relatively autonomously…(which was) seen as the main reason for 
their success in the field.217 Organizations like the Coast Guard, which operates in a 
seafaring environment, tend to have doctrine that supports more independent operations.  
E. THE IDF COMMAND PHILOSOPHY 
The IDF “was never too keen on developing military theory or publishing written 
doctrine.” 218  In the historical examples cited, the IDF command philosophy is 
decentralized and is reflective of organizations with weak central doctrines. Marcus notes 
that the manifestations of this type of philosophy are the emphasis on:  
215 George W. Gawrych, Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-
Israeli Wars (research survey no. 7) (Fort Leavenworth, KA: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College), 76.  
216 Tim Grant, and Erik de Waard, “Reconciling Hierarchical and Edge Organizations: 9/11 
Revisited” (paper presented at the 19th International Command and Control Technology Symposium, 
Alexandria, VA, June 2014), accessed January 30, 2015, 
http://dodccrp.org/events/19th_iccrts_2014/post_conference/papers/114.pdf 
217 Ibid.   
218 Shamir, Transforming Command, 82. 
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“bottom-up” and “horizontal” innovation (rather than “top down” 
directives)... many informal networks between officers to communicate; a 
lack of ‘ownership’ of ideas; commanders who have training in the need to 
flexibly respond to battlefield surprise; and a non-punitive, collaborative 
learning culture.219  
Shamir reinforces these views as he explains, “Bottom-up innovation is most likely in a 
qualitatively-superior military like the IDF, with its versatile, flexible organizational 
structure, and informal hierarchies that promote mission command principles. 
Decentralized command-and-control also promotes officer initiative, autonomy, and risk-
taking.”220 
The use of mission command principles by the IDF from 1948–1973 and the de-
emphasis on formalized doctrine help explain the flexibility and agility that became its 
trademark. Alberts writes about the value of flexible doctrine to an organization in a 
world that is becoming network centric and transformational. He explains: “Doctrine 
should be viewed as fluid and helpful, not static and restrictive…..Historically, doctrine 
has been a distillation of best practice and lessons learned, which over time were clearly 
documented to form the basis for the initiation of new recruits.”221 Alberts observes that 
the one constant that organizations can count on in the future is incessant change and 
“…the entire notion of doctrine needs to be changed from one of publishing “the way” it 
should be done to a dynamic process of learning and sharing best practice.”222  
Foundational doctrine frames the organizational vision and intent that governs the 
rules and policies (or lack of) that follow. As Smith posits, “Rules tell you what to do, so 
your judgment skills atrophy.” 223  The essence of mission command is “thinking 
obedience” such that the collective creativity of the organization is released. 
Organizational doctrine and the search to define it is a theme that will be revisited in the 
219 Marcus, “Military Innovation: Lesson Learning in the IDF,” 24.  
220 Shamir as quoted in Marcus, “Military Innovation: Lesson Learning in the IDF,” 24.  
221 David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program Publishing, 
2002) 121, 122. 
222 Ibid.  
223 Mark Smith, “The First Pulaski Conference: How We Did It” (synopsis paper from the USDA 
Forest Service First Pulaski Conference, Alta, Utah, 2005), 5. 
 70 
                                                     
next chapter. The IDF experience in this regard provides an example for U.S. homeland 
security organizations and is a reminder of the role that doctrine plays in organizational 
operation.  
F. THE IDF THROUGH THE FRAMEWORK OF MISSION COMMAND 
PRINCIPLES 
Six principles of mission command from the U.S. Army will be used to assess the 
IDF. These principles were introduced in Chapter I and consist of the following: 1) build 
cohesive teams through mutual trust; 2) create shared understanding; 4) exercise 
disciplined initiative; 5) use mission orders; 6) accept prudent risk.224 They are the basis 
on which the U.S Army has chosen to introduce the concepts of mission command and to 
guide their commanders and staffs in the exercise of this philosophy. As a measure of 
how an organization implements such a philosophy, these principles provide a common 
framework in which to evaluate the case studies in this chapter and the next.  
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust 
The unique position of the IDF in Israeli society encourages cohesion and mutual 
trust. All Israeli adults must serve in the military, which has a prominent role in the State 
of Israel. Those who have completed their required service are expected to serve in the 
reserves (miluim) until age 45. Reservists are expected to train with their units 20–30 
days each year. The concepts of mission command and “just culture” influence 
cohesiveness and trust.225 Catignani mentions how camaraderie is perceived in the IDF 
culture and that one of the most important values is the: “…concept of achavatt 
lochameem (combatant’s brotherhood) which fulfills the IDF’s tenet of 
224 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2. 
225 James Reason describes a “just culture” as an atmosphere of trust within an organization in which 
people are encouraged or rewarded to provide essential safety information but in which they are also clear 
about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. James Reason, “A 
Roadmap to a Just Culture: Enhancing the Safety Environment” Global Aviation Information Network, 
September 2004, accessed January 24, 2015 at: http://flightsafety.org/files/just_culture.pdf, 4. 
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comradeship…Such trust is developed through shared experiences of mutual support 
found in a characteristic family unit.”226  
Additionally, Kaplan points out the cohesion that service in the IDF creates:  
The IDF cuts across ethnic (edah), religious and socio-economic 
boundaries. Israelis from all walks of life meet in the army, and are forced 
to find a way to live together. Thus, the army is a major source of lasting 
friendships and contacts, many of which are renewed periodically during 
reserve service.227 
Leadership by example also encourages trust and team building. For example, the 
Israel Air Force (IAF) operating ethos requires earnest self-assessment after flight 
operations in order to learn. Lieutenant Giora Romm was an IAF fighter pilot during the 
Six Day War in which he was credited with downing five enemy aircraft. He describes 
this candid debriefing process where each squadron met in the briefing room to reflect on 
the day’s operations. Squadron commanders would start off critically assessing their own 
performance before other pilots; candor was encouraged. According to Romm, “If you 
had screwed up, you admitted it, and took your medicine. Ego meant nothing. 
Improvement was everything.” 228  Humility shown by a leader can encourage trust-
building and helps build the team. 
2. Create Shared Understanding 
Human interaction through collaboration and dialogue enhances shared 
understanding, minimizes misunderstandings, and determines operational progress. The 
IDF culture encourages a tutorial relationship between commanders and subordinates. 
Deference to authority is less formal than, for example in a U.S. Marine Corps unit, 
which is very rigid and formal. Hostility or abusive communication in order to motivate 
is not tolerated even in the more specialized units, such as the paratroopers. Fairness and 
226 Sergio Catignani, “Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces,” Parameters 
34, no. 3 (autumn 2004): 111.  
227 Jonathan Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel,” The Jewish Agency For Israel, accessed 
January 22, 2015, 
http://jafi.org/JewishAgency/English/Jewish+Education/Compelling+Content/Eye+on+Israel/Society/9%29
The+Role+of+the+Military+in+Israel.htm  
228 Pressfield, The Lion’s Gate, 15. 
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compassion are in evidence even during the training regimes for new soldiers. Kaplan 
describes the informal relationship between leader and the led: “Only the highest officers 
are referred to as ‘commander’ and everyone else is literally on a first name basis, as in 
other sectors of Israeli society.”229 Though orders are not questioned when the situation 
demands rapid action, Kaplan notes: “Most orders are given as directions, and 
disagreement and discussion of such directions are not uncommon. Soldiers in command 
are expected to be able to explain their orders. Once given however, orders are 
followed.”230  
While the military training can be grueling and demanding, Israeli commanders 
are seen as big brothers (or sisters). This reframing of hierarchical authority creates a 
more open atmosphere where trust and information sharing is valued. 231  In this 
atmosphere, commanders gain valuable insight as to the morale and needs of their 
subordinates while also sharing their own vision and intent. Interaction between IDF 
units is less adversarial as a result of this collaboration and dialogue. Marcus discusses 
the greater understanding and lesson sharing that occurs between units as a result of the 
IDF’s intimate nature.232 
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent 
Commander’s intent is a key feature of mission command and IDF leaders convey 
their intent by keeping directive orders simple and strategic. Common understanding and 
expectations have been developed between military personnel due to multiple conflicts 
and engagements over the years and the familiarity has bred from facing adversity 
together. Mission command depends on trust and the culture in which the organization 
exists. Marcus captures the IDF culture and how creativity is encouraged: “The non-
punitive mentality of challenging assumptions in the IDF, heavily influenced by Jewish 
229 Kaplan, “The Role of the Military in Israel,” 1. 
230 Ibid.  
231 Adam Harmon, Lonely Soldier: The Memoir of an American in the Israeli Army (New York: 
Presidio Press, 2006), 21. 
232 Marcus, “Military Innovation: Lesson Learning in the IDF,” 24. 
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cultural attributes of questioning and debate, encourages creative thinking and helps 
further processes of bottom-up innovation.”233  
Commander’s intent serves to provide guidance to subordinates even after the 
conditions of the environment have changed. General Talik (Tal) commanded the IDF 
armored corps during the 1967 Six Day War. As described in Pressfield’s The Lion’s 
Gate, a subordinate of Talik and an IDF 7th Armored Brigade operations officer, Yosi 
Ben Hanan, describes General Tal’s message to his division officers on the eve of the war 
regarding the operational plans. Tal, according to Ben Hannan, is satisfied that the plans 
are well known by all but warns that once the battle begins everything will change and 
the plans “…will be out the window. Nothing, Tal says, will happen according to those 
plans. The lines of assault will change; the direction of enemy’s movements will 
change…This is way things work in war.” 234 Ben Hannan reiterates General Talik’s 
intent: “One thing must take place as in the plans: the principle upon which these plans 
were made. Every man will attack. Every unit will push forward as fast as it can….Keep 
moving toward El Arish.”235 
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative 
Initiative is encouraged in the IDF, especially in the absence of orders or when 
conditions have changed. Gobry describes this culture:  
The autonomy that the IDF gives to its soldiers is famously enormous. Up 
and down the chain of command, soldiers are told what to do, not how. 
Initiative is rewarded. During the Six-Day War, for its invasion of Sinai, 
the IDF had drawn up no battle plans after taking the crucial gateway city 
of El Arish, less than halfway down the main road through Sinai and base 
of the 7th Egyptian Armored Division. Given the scale and speed of their 
success, IDF units pushed past all the way to the Suez Canal–this was not 
done on orders of anyone, but simply by the initiative of local 
commanders who, having kept their earlier objectives, kept advancing. 
233 Ibid., 24. 
234 Pressfield, The Lion’s Gate, 180. 
235 Ibid. 
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They did not sit down and wait for word from central command. From the 
platoon up to the brigade level, this is the famous IDF culture.236 
In order to encourage subordinate initiative, an understanding between leader and 
followers must develop. Initiative will flourish if the command structure is supportive 
and subordinates feel like they have the backing of their leaders. This support is 
communicated through interactions, experience and the expression of leader expectations 
and values. Israeli military leader Moshe Dayan was supportive of his subordinates even 
in the face of setbacks. Pressfield comments on this:  
Nothing elicited Dayan’s respect more than valor under fire, or inspired 
his love more than sacrifice for a comrade in arms. He could forgive 
anything from a fighter who seized the initiative in the face of danger. He 
protected Sharon after Mitla. He loved Meir Har-Zion and Katcha 
Cahaner. His passion was not limited to commanders of brigades and 
divisions. He cared as much for the lieutenants and sergeants and private 
soldiers.237  
Confidence in subordinates is also crucial in the encouragement of initiative. 
Subordinates must know that they will not face discipline or embarrassment if mistakes 
are made in the process of acting within the leader’s intent. If subordinates feel that their 
leadership has their best interests at heart, they will tend to want to reciprocate that trust. 
Pressfield describes Moshe Dayan’s expectation that subordinates act with initiative by 
quoting him: “I would not be assigning you this task if I did not have complete 
confidence that you can do a better job than I can.”238 
5. Use Mission Orders 
Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be 
attained, not how they are to be achieved. The directives should be formulated to provide 
subordinates the maximum freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish the 
236 Pascal E. Gobry, “Seven 7 Steps the US Military Should Take to Be More Like the IDF,” Forbes 
Magazine, August, 2014, accessed January 22, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pascalemmanuelgobry/2014/08/25/7-steps-the-us-military-should-take-to-be-
more-like-the-idf/ 
237 As Israeli paratroopers, Sharon, Har-Zion, and Cahaner were involved in controversial reprisal 
operations. Pressfield, The Lion’s Gate, 98. 
238 Ibid., 98. 
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mission. Directives are made with the assumption that in a dynamic environment, 
conditions will change and explicit orders lose validity. Centralized authority also 
requires consent and communication and thus a loss of time and information. The more 
centralized and hierarchical the organization, the longer decisions tend to lag behind the 
events on the ground. Additionally, during decisive battlefield moments, communication 
channels get jammed and messages are lost. Not only are messages jammed or lost, but 
the headquarters component of the organization may simply become overwhelmed by too 
many messages or requests. In the meantime, resources conditioned for explicit direction 
hold fast and opportunities are missed. Mission orders allow flexibility of action but do 
not negate the need for vertical and horizontal communication.239   
Directives under mission command also rely on a certain culture of 
understanding, as demonstrated by the IDF. German World War II General von 
Mellenthin explains that mission command depends on shared experiences, doctrine, and 
training. He describes this cohesiveness between commander and subordinate during war: 
“The better they know each other, the shorter and less detailed the orders can be. To 
follow a commander or an order requires that it is also thought through on the level from 
which the order was given.” 240 Subordinates should anticipate how their commander 
would react in a given situation. This results in coordinated improvisation since all of the 
subordinates are drawing inferences from the same senior leader.   
6. Accept Prudent Risk 
Since military environments are often characterized as uncertain, volatile, 
complex, and ambiguous (and deadly), consideration of risk becomes an important factor 
in decision making. Keithly and Ferris state that risk taking is derived from initiative. 
They advocate that the difference with risk taking in auftragstaktik or mission command 
239 Horowitz, “Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy,” 198. 
240 William DePuy, Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military 
Doctrine (Munich: Bundeswehr University, 2004), 90; William Depuy, “Generals Balck and von 
Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine,” paper presented at Conference on 




                                                     
is the importance of making an independent decision when conditions dictate. In addition, 
they note that a risk adverse organizational attitude will prevent initiative. According to 
Keithly and Ferris, even decisions that are wrong but made in the earnest attempt to meet 
the commander’s intent are acceptable under mission command. They advocate, “The 
aggregation of successes on the part of commanders exercising battlespace initiative, so it 
is reasoned, will overcome the occasional setbacks.”241  
Initiative does not mean reckless actions. General Mordechai Gur (noted by Van 
Creveld) identifies three principles that must balance in order for the IDF’s command 
system to work and which shape the leadership ethos. These principles are: “1) a clear 
definition of the objectives to be attained; 2) thorough planning; and 3) a proper order of 
priorities. This third condition implies the recognition that, whatever one’s priorities are, 
some things are going to suffer neglect.” Gur advises that innovation must be balanced 
with teamwork and discipline.242  
Gur further describes this balance, “Innovation during execution itself; discipline 
and improvisation- these are the three basic elements that make-up the IDF’s command 
system, even if the latter two sometimes contradict each other.”243 Van Creveld notes 
that the balance between planning, discipline, and improvisation may change from one 
military to the next.244 Furthermore, this balance may change within the same force 
depending on the situation and need. 
G. COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENTS 
In Chapter I, the similarities between the military and homeland security response 
environments were noted. High-risk work conditions, critical decision making, stress, and 
danger were some of the common attributes. Additionally, time constraints and the need 
241 David M. Keithly, and Stephen P. Ferris “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and 
Combined Operations,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (autumn 1999): 126.  




                                                     
for flexibility were two others. A study of the IDF illustrates these attributes but what are 
the differences between these environments? 
Obviously, there are decision-making differences between the military and 
homeland security response environments. As compared to firefighting, for example, the 
enemy adversary in a battle has intentions and organization. A military leader must 
anticipate the response of a human foe, which is more complex as compared to a fire 
officer dealing with a natural disaster.245 Yet, law enforcement must anticipate a criminal 
mindset. Human-caused crisis events such as the 9/11 World Trade Center Attacks or the 
Boston marathon bombings will challenge the entire homeland security enterprise in a 
manner that is similar to engaging an enemy combatant. Enemy subterfuge is factor that a 
military leader must consider. In the same fashion, human-caused homeland security 
events may involve deception, secondary devices, or additional hazards to first 
responders, all of which compounds the complexity.   
Based on the IDF’s military mission and organizational make up, certain facets of 
its experience with mission command would not be applicable to the homeland security 
enterprise in the United States. The IDF is a fairly homogeneous entity with mandatory 
service required of all citizens and a reserve duty obligation required until age 45. 
Moreover, it is also one of the most battle-tested militaries in the world.246 Finally, the 
IDF is a highly visible component of Israeli life and culture.  
In comparison, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is divided into 
22 separate agencies with widely varying missions. The majority of emergency 
responders in the U.S operate at the local or state levels—independent of DHS. For 
example, there are 30,000 fire departments and 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the 
245 Berndt Brehmer, “Dynamic Decision Making in Command and Control,” in The Human in 
Command, ed. Carol McCann, and Ross Pigeau (New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 
242.  
246 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The State: Israel Defense Forces (IDF),” March 2009, accessed 
September 15, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/pages/the%20state-
%20israel%20defense%20forces%20-idf-.aspx 
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U.S.247 From the DHS perspective, it would be difficult to generate a mission command 
ethos across such a wide spectrum of agencies, levels of government, and legal mandates. 
The ability of a single organization like the IDF to implement change notwithstanding, 
other challenges to the implementation of mission command principles are discussed in 
the next section.  
H. MISSION COMMAND CHALLENGES FROM THE IDF EXPERIENCE 
The implementation of mission command by the IDF is not without challenges. 
Several of these challenges are described further in order to give insight for a homeland 
security organization that is considering the implementation of these principles. 
1. Synchronization 
Synchronization refers to the coordination of resources through shared awareness, 
communication, and planning in regard to time, space, and understanding. Van 
Bezooijen, Essens, and Vogelaar discuss synchronization as used in the military 
environment as the process of: “…coordinating, or orchestrating units on the battlefield.” 
This process creates a synergy that “…is what distinguishes synchronization from mere 
coordination.”248  
In addition, they examine the concept of self-synchronization as it relates to 
complex environments and how it relates to network centricity; two themes discussed in 
previous chapters. Through interviews of experienced military personnel, Van Bezooijen, 
Essens, and Vogelaar find that that commander’s intent is the one factor that influences 
self-synchronization, according to all of the interviewees.249 
247 U.S. Department of Justice, “Local Police/Bureau of Justice Statistics,” accessed September 15, 
2014; http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=71; U.S. Fire Administration, “Fire Departments 
Registered/National Fire Department Census Quick Facts,” accessed September 15, 2014, 
http://apps.usfa.fema.gov/census/summary.cfm#a  
248 Bart J. A. van Bezooijen, Peter J. M. D. Essens, Ad L. W. Vogelaar, “Military Self-
synchronization: An Exploration of the Concept” (paper presented at the 11th International Command and 
Control Technology Symposium, Cambridge, UK, September 2006), accessed January 30, 2015, 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/11th_ICCRTS/html/papers/065.pdf  
249 Ibid.  
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The IDF experience shows that mission command and the increased latitude given 
to subordinates to innovate should not come at the cost of synchronization. As Shattuck 
explains, problems will arise if subordinate efforts are not synchronized:  
During Israel’s 1956 Sinai Campaign General Moshe Dayan stated: “To 
the commander of an Israeli unit, I can point on a map to the Suez Canal 
and say: There’s your target and this is your axis of advance. Don’t signal 
me during the fighting for more men, arms, or vehicles. All that we could 
allocate you’ve already got, and there isn’t anymore. Keep signaling your 
advances. You must reach the Suez in 48 hours...”250  
Lateral communication between subordinates is crucial especially when innovation is 
necessary due to a change in conditions or a plan that is no longer valid. From a 
commander perspective, Dayan’s degree of control influence over his subordinates 
became negligible because of the changing conditions. Some brigades stood by while 
others engaged in battle.251   
Shattuck observes, “In retrospect, Dayan realized his mistake. He wrote that the 
heavy emphasis on improvisation and flexibility and the absence of a strong controlling 
hand meant that ‘our capacity for misadventure [was] limitless.’” 252 The greater the 
flexibility given to subordinates, the greater the need for them to coordinate with their 
peers. Shattuck concludes, “When senior commanders provide their subordinates with 
flexibility at the expense of synchronization, battlefield activities are coordinated only by 
coincidence.”253 
2. Mission to Detailed Command 
Certain events need closer leader oversight and coordination depending on 
complexity, timing, subordinate experience and trust. As Von Lossow (1977) points out, 
250 Shattuck, “Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence,” 68.  
251 Ibid.  
252 Ibid. 





                                                     
“‘Order-type tactics’ are not antithetical to auftragstaktik but can complement a mission-
style command philosophy.”254 During the 1967 Six Day War, the Egyptian fortified 
positions at Abu Agheila was a key objective, as it had been in the 1956 campaign. This 
required General Ariel Sharon to design a plan that was more prescriptive in nature. 
Luttwak and Horowitz elaborate:  
Sharon’s division [at Abu Ageila]. . . fought a meticulously planned set-
piece battle whose delicate combination of fire and movement would have 
delighted any staff officer addicted to sand tables and war games. Sharon 
combined heliborne paratroopers, foot infantry, tank battalions and 
concentrated artillery fire in a concentric attack totally unlike anything the 
Israeli Army had ever done before. The conduct of the battle was rigidly 
centralized, unplanned movements were ruled out, and there was very 
little scope for command initiative except at the very top.255 
Initiative and flexibility under mission command should not be at the expense of 
synchronization and, where necessary, detailed planning. Marcus observes that the IDF’s: 
“informal organizational culture and action-oriented ethos acted as a double-edged 
sword, often resulting in tactical audacity and operational ingenuity, while also 
occasionally resulting in nonconformity with protocols, lax discipline in training, and 
short-term thinking.”256 
3. Preparedness 
After the Yom Kipper War of 1973, the IDF found itself in action against the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and others in southern Lebanon. After the First 
Lebanese War, the IDF was increasingly drawn into low-intensity conflicts. It was during 
this time that the quality of officer education declined. According to Shamir: “…the 
Lebanon War marked a departure from that practice (decentralization)… Commanders on 
the scene were often visited by senior officers who tended to make decisions on the 
254 Walter von Lossow, “Mission-type versus Order-type Tactics,” Military Review 57, no. 6 (June 
1977): 89. 
255 Edward N. Luttwak, and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli Army: 1948–1973 (London: Allen Lane, 
1975), 290. 
256 Marcus, “Military Innovation: Lesson Learning in the IDF,” 22. 
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spot.”257 The 1982–2000 South Lebanon Conflict ended up with the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces.258  
The effectiveness of mission command is dependent on the preparedness and 
training of subordinates to lead. Preparing subordinates to assume greater responsibility 
in their efforts to act within their leader’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, and accept 
prudent risk requires training and financial investment. Stewart remarks that 
decentralization of authority requires extensive training and education of subordinate 
personnel. Subordinate personnel not only need to be technically competent within their 
assigned responsibility, but they need to think “one or two levels up” in preparation to 
take the initiative as the opportunity arises. Stewart notes, “They need the ability to 
diagnose situations, and to formulate, implement, and monitor the plans they devise for 
dealing with those situations within commander’s intent.”259 The U.S. Army Doctrine 
Reference Publication (ADRP-6) comments regarding mission command, “Commanders 
at all levels need education, rigorous training, and experience to apply these principles 
effectively.”260  
4. Blame and Litigation 
According to Storr, a further threat to mission command is litigation and the 
blame culture.261 Concern that mistakes made by soldiers or first responders in the “heat 
of battle,” even if made in good faith and intent, will erode the trust needed for 
subordinates to practice initiative. This risk adversity and zero defects mentality are even 
more pronounced in civilian endeavors where the tolerance for injury and harm is less 
than in the military realm. This concern will be discussed in the USFS case history in the 
next chapter, but the IDF is not immune from this challenge.  
257 Shamir, Transforming Command, 93. 
258 Ariel Cohen, “Knowing the Enemy,” Hoover Institute, October 2007, accessed August 17, 2014, 
http://www.hoover.org/research/knowing-enemy 
259 Stewart, “The Evolution of Command Approach.”  
260 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 1-4.  
261 Storr, “A Command Philosophy,” 125.  
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In the low-intensity conflicts that the IDF has faced in the West Bank, Gaza, and 
along the Lebanese border, the rules of engagement have been modified due to political 
and media scrutiny. General Krulak’s article entitled “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership 
in the Three Block War” describes the enormous responsibilities and pressures which are 
placed on young military leaders in conflicts of the twenty-first century.262 In discussing 
the First Lebanon War from 1982–1993, Shamir suggests a number of reasons why the 
IDF moved away from mission command principles. World-wide attention and scrutiny 
caused a centralization of authority. “Fear of prosecution for carrying out ambiguous 
orders led to risk aversion, the rosh katan (shirking of responsibility) syndrome. Often 
soldiers and junior commanders failed to perform missions of questionable legality.”263 
Storr (2003) mentions the corrosive effect of litigation on leaders and that this potential 
will cause leaders to be highly conservative, to plan in great detail, and to allow 
subordinates little freedom of action.264  
5. Asymmetric Warfare 
The IDF’s capability for conventional warfare has been proven. The question 
arises of whether the IDF and a mission command ethos is appropriate for 
unconventional or asymmetric warfare. In 2002, the Second Intifada was initiated by 
Palestinian extremists conducting suicide attacks, including the attack in Netanya on 
March 27 that killed 30 at the Park Hotel. In response, Israel launched Operation 
Defensive Shield, which targeted Palestinian controlled cities in the West Bank, 
including the town of Nablus on April 5–8, 2002. The decentralized network of the 
insurgents in Nablus was met by IDF in a similar manner. Shamir explains, “‘swarming’ 
techniques, denoting a multidirectional and highly synchronized deployment of many 
small groups against a single objective relying on mission command”265 were conducted 
262 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines 
Magazine 83, no. 1 (January 1999), accessed August 18, 2014, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm 
263 Shamir, Transforming Command, 94. 
264 Storr, “A Command Philosophy,” 125. 
265 Shamir, Transforming Command, 134. 
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by IDF forces. The battle culminated in the old town casbah, where after suffering many 
killed and captured, the Palestinian insurgents surrendered.  
Jones examined Operation Defensive Shield in an article entitled; “Fighting 
Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel.” He concluded that defeating 
networked organizations would require networked strategies.266 As discussed in Chapter 
III, network centric technology is compatible with (or can enhance) mission command 
principles if the tendency for micromanagement can be controlled. Training, assessments 
and correction measures can identify and curb this tendency. Flexibility is another key to 
combating guerilla tactics as Jones describes:  
Israeli military doctrine has also incorporated a significant amount of 
flexibility and adaptability. In situations where there’s a major discrepancy 
between IDF doctrine and what a commander sees during an operation, the 
commander generally has the flexibility to disregard doctrine. This allows 
IDF brigades to become ‘learning organizations’ that are capable of 
adapting in the middle of combat operations. Flexible doctrine is critical 
because Palestinian groups have been able to innovate on the battlefield… 
In short, IDF training has prepared commanders and soldiers for both 
major combat and counterinsurgency operations, and IDF doctrine has 
been flexible enough to allow for learning on the battlefield.267 
I. IDF AND MISSION COMMAND SUMMARY 
The IDF experience provides an inside look at the benefits and challenges of 
mission command principles. The IDF command philosophy was illustrated through 
examples from British Palestine, the 1967 Six Day War, and the 2002 Operation 
Defensive Shield. The challenges to implementation of mission command were discussed 
with attention given to synchronization, flexibility in moving towards a more directive 
command mode, blame and litigation, and preparedness. Asymmetric warfare was also 
reviewed since military operations are increasingly directed at decentralized insurgencies 
and not at conventional combat. The simplicity of IDF doctrine and the need for flexible 
doctrine that embraces learning and sharing in the face of change was discussed. Finally, 
a comparison between the military and crisis management environments was reviewed. 
266 Jones, “Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups,” 281.   
267 Ibid., 296.  
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While there are some differences, there are many common attributes between these two 
environments. If mission command is to be applied by an organization in the homeland 
security response enterprise, the lessons of the IDF can provide insight. These lessons 
and the application of mission command by an emergency response organization will be 
discussed further in the analysis portion of Chapter VI.  
The case study in the next chapter will examine one of the federal wildland 
firefighting agencies: the United States Forest Service (USFS). Like the IDF, the USFS is 
tasked with operating in a high-risk environment as a part of its work mission. As noted 
in Chapter I, the two organizations differ in the amount of time they have been using the 
principles of mission command and the results they have experienced. The reason why 
the USFS has shifted towards the principles of mission command will be addressed as 
well as the challenges and benefits. The Army framework, consisting of the six principles 
of mission command, will be used to examine how these principles are applied by the 
USFS. Finally, any conclusions that can be drawn regarding implementation of mission 
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V. USFS AND MISSION COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Forest Service (USFS) under the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture is the largest of the federal wildland firefighting agencies with a permanent 
and seasonal force of 10,050 firefighters.268 This force manages wildfires on the national 
forests and other federal government lands throughout the United States, but mostly in 
the fire-prone western states and Alaska. Smokejumpers and “hot-shot” crews are two of 
the elite organizational resources that deploy to fires from bases throughout the nation.  
The work is grueling and dangerous; it is oftentimes in steep terrain, using hand 
tools, chainsaws, and bulldozers to cut control lines that separate fire from fuel. Yet, the 
allure and challenge fosters dedication to the profession as the following quote from the 
Wildland Firefighting Foundation indicates:  
These firefighters are highly trained men and women, younger and older 
who love being in the outdoors, working in the natural environment and 
sleeping under stars often obscured by smoke… they have the feel of the 
Old West about them, the rawness, the problem-solving, the flexibility, the 
enjoyment of facing problems that may not have clear-cut solutions on 
fires that are not predictable. They enjoy the excitement created by the 
flames, the sense of purpose and helping, but know they’re dealing with 
Nature, capricious at best, and a killer at worst.269  
Operating in this high-risk and complex environment can be deadly. For example, 
34 wildland firefighters were killed in 2014,270 and entrapment by fire is the leading 
cause of multiple fatalities on incidents.271 These fatality fires are seminal events in the 
wildland firefighting community. Unlike the military experience where organizational 
268 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, “The U.S. Forest Service: An Overview,” 2008, 
accessed January 31, 2015, http://www.fs.fed.us/documents/USFS_An_Overview_0106MJS.pdf, 9 
269 Wildland Firefighter Foundation, “Wildland Firefighters and Their Families,” accessed February 
1, 2015  https://wffoundation.org/  
270 Alan Neuhauser, “As Wildfires Worsen, Calls for Change in Tactics,” U.S. News and World 
Report, November 5, 2014, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/05/as-wildfires-worsen-calls-for-change-in-tactics 
271 National Interagency Fire Center, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/Fatalities-by-Year.pdf 
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improvement is driven by the need to win wars, progress in the wildland firefighting 
community is driven by the battles lost—fatality fires.  
In this chapter, the USFS experience is examined through the framework of 
mission command principles. Three fatality wildfires: the Mann Gulch, the South 
Canyon, and the Thirtymile, will be discussed in regards to leadership and the efforts to 
learn lessons from them. Patterns, internal and external influences, and causality will be 
scrutinized as in the previous chapter. In addition, the efforts by the USFS to implement 
leadership training and define doctrine will be explored. USFS organizational culture and 
other challenges to the implementation of mission command will be reviewed. The USFS 
under the Department of Agriculture is not a member of the homeland security enterprise 
on paper but is often deployed to assist in all-hazard events through the National 
Response Framework and the Emergency Support Function #4 for firefighting.272 The 
USFS experience and example will provide insight regarding the implementation of 
mission command principles by a homeland security response organization.  
B. MANN GULCH FIRE OF 1949 
Foreman Wag Dodge was in charge on the fateful day in 1949 when 13 
smokejumpers under his supervision were overrun by fire. The events of the Mann Gulch 
Fire are captured in Norman Maclean’s book, Young Men and Fire in which the ad-hoc 
nature and Dodge’s unfamiliarity with the crew is described. None of the crew had 
worked on a previous fire under Dodge’s supervision. “Dodge has a characteristic in 
him,” Walter Rumsey, one of three survivors, told the Board of Inquiry. “It was hard to 
tell what he is thinking.”273 Useem notes, “Wagner Dodge was a boss of few words, a 
person who neither expected much information from his people nor gave much in 
return.”274  
272 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.  
273 Maclean, Young Men and Fire, 64. 
274 Michael Useem, The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their 
Lessons for Us All (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1998), 55. 
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The smoke jumper crew had deployed by parachuting out of an aircraft and hiking 
down Mann Gulch towards the river to where the fire was burning on the south side of 
the drainage. About a half mile down the canyon, Dodge noticed that the fire had crossed 
the gulch below their position and was burning their way, and he ordered the crew to turn 
around and run, but the fire spread quickly on the grassy incline. The fire caught 13 of the 
smokejumpers almost at the point where the crew landed via parachute. Rumsey and 
Robert Sallee managed to escape through a rocky crevice at the top of the ridge. Dodge 
escaped death by lighting a small fire and then lying down in the ashes of the widening 
safe area in order to let the main fire pass over.275 
The crew leader’s unusual tactic must have seemed strange to the others because 
none of the crew members joined Dodge or attempted a similar action. They kept moving 
in an attempt to outrace the advancing flames. In the subsequent inquiry, Sallee 
commented on Dodges actions: “We thought he must have gone nuts.”276 Useem offers 
further explanation:  
Without revealing his thinking when it could be shared, Dodge denied his 
crew members, especially those not familiar with him, an opportunity to 
appreciate the quality of his mind. They had no way of knowing, except 
by reputation, whether his decisions were rational or impulsive, calculated 
or impetuous. Later, when the quality of his mind did display itself in a 
brilliant invention—the escape fire—his thinking was still too much of a 
cipher to those whose trust he urgently required.277  
Based on the Army’s principles of mission command, several components were 
missing in the events surrounding the Mann Gulch fire. Two of these principles, building 
cohesive teams through mutual trust and creating shared understanding, could have 
averted the tragedy had they been practiced. Further examination of USFS 
implementation of the principles of mission command will follow in this chapter.  
275 Maclean, Young Men and Fire, 75. 
276 Useem, The Leadership Moment, 56. 
277 Ibid., 56. 
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C. SOUTH CANYON FIRE OF 1994 
A lack of leadership was a factor in the deaths of 14 firefighters who were 
overrun when the South Canyon wildfire blew-up on July 6, 1994.278 An ad-hoc group of 
13 federal firefighters made up of smokejumpers and hot-shot crew members were 
constructing fire line downhill in the area of head-high vegetation known as Gambel Oak. 
Some firefighters were confused about who was making the decisions on strategy and 
tactics. 279  Furthermore, most had not been briefed and none were aware of an 
approaching cold front.280 Putnam describes the situation:  
All the ingredients were in place for a catastrophe: Three local crews 
(BLM, USFS, Helitack), the Prineville crew split into two groups, (smoke) 
jumpers from five different bases led by two somewhat randomly selected 
“Jumpers-in-Charge” were thrown together and asked to perform as a 
team under increasingly unstable conditions. Neither leadership roles nor a 
cohesive organizational structure stabilized before the blowup.281 
Suddenly, the winds shifted sending a wall of fire 100 feet high in the direction of 
the descending group. The 13 attempted to retreat back up the path they had hewn 
towards the safety of the ridge. One made it to the top of the ridge and over to the other 
side, surviving the wave of fire. The other 12 lost the race and were overrun by the 
flames and perished on the side of the ridge.282  
278 The South Canyon Fire was the designated name of the incident. Storm King Mountain is a 
prominent landmark in the vicinity and the subsequent news reports after the tragedy adopted the name. A 
blow-up is defined as “a sudden increase in fire intensity or rate of spread strong enough to prevent direct 
control or to upset control plans. Blow-ups are often accompanied by violent convection and may have 
other characteristics of a fire storm.” “Fire Terminology,” accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/nwacfire/home/terminology.html  
279 South Canyon Interagency Investigation Team, Report of the South Canyon Fire Accident 
Investigation Team (Glenwood Springs, CO: Accident Investigation Team, 1994), accessed March 9, 2015, 
http://www.iaff.org/hs/lodd_manual/LODD%20Reports/South%20Canyon,%20CO%20-
%2014%20LODDs.pdf, 28.  
280 Ibid., 26. 
281 Ted Putnam, “The Collapse of Decisionmaking and Organizational Structure on Storm King 
Mountain,” in Findings from the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop (Missoula, MT: 
Missoula Technology and Development Center, U.S. Forest Service, 1995), accessed March 9, 2015, 
https://www.iaff.org/hs/LODD_Manual/Resources/USFS%20Findings%20from%20the%20Wildland%20F
irefighters%20Human%20Factors%20Workshop.pdf, 56.  
282 In addition to the 12, two helicopter (helitack) crew personnel perished as a result of the blowup, 
but at another location on the fire. John N. Maclean, Fire on the Mountain (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, 1992), 138. 
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Clear authority, leader’s intent, and shared understanding were missing in the 
events leading up to this tragedy. Similarly to the Mann Gulch example, if the principles 
of mission command had been practiced at the South Canyon fire, the fatalities may have 
been averted. While mission command may be perceived as a lessoning of authority 
through distributed leadership, the need for local leadership becomes even more 
important. The preparation for successful mission command-like operations becomes 
critical. Trust, preparation, subordinate development, and intent are all qualities and 
actions that should be developed before the crisis. Implementation of mission command 
principles by the USFS will be discussed later.     
The resulting South Canyon accident investigation cites the “can do” attitude of 
the firefighters and their violation of the firefighting safety rules as factors in the 
tragedy.283 Ted Putnam, one of the United States Forest Service investigators, refused to 
sign the report; he was frustrated that the investigation failed to fully examine the human 
dynamics such as decision making under stress. 284  Similarities between the 
circumstances surrounding the entrapment at South Canyon and the 1949 Mann Gulch 
fires were noted by Putnam and caused many to question whether the real causes had 
been addressed.285 While the Mann Gulch fire spurred the adoption of a number of safety 
directives in 1957, none of them focused on human factors.286 However, further federal 
fire agency introspection arose from additional reviews of the South Canyon Fire.  
Was there a causal element that had been missed? A human or organizational 
explanation as to why this accident occurred? The Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness 
Study explains:  
Following the soul searching, multiple-agency investigations, and special 
conferences on safety stimulated by the 1994 South Canyon incident that 
283 The “Ten Standard Firefighting Orders” and “Eighteen Watchout Situations” are rules of 
engagement for fighting wildland fire. Written with firefighter safety as the priority, these orders and 
watch-outs are taught to most wildland firefighters across the nation at federal, state, and local levels. The 
orders and watch-outs are listed at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/safety/10_18/10_18.html 
284 Jennifer A. Thackaberry, “Discursive Opening and Closing in Organizational Self-Study,” 
Management Communication Quarterly 17, no. 3 (2004): 328, DOI: 10.1177/0893318903259402  
285 Putnam, “The Collapse of Decisionmaking,” 55. 
286 Maclean, Young Men and Fire, 221. 
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killed 14 firefighters, a new idea arose: that the usual things sought in 
fatality investigations were not sufficient. There were likely to be 
organizational cultural problems, leadership issues, human factors 
problems, and possibly other issues that were underlying the firefighter 
safety problems.287  
The year after the entrapment, Putnam articulated his concerns in a “landmark” 
paper entitled “The Collapse of Decisionmaking and Organizational Structure on Storm 
King Mountain.” 288  In the paper, Putnam points out that “stress, fear, and panic 
predictably led to the collapse of clear thinking and organizational structure” during the 
the South Canyon incident. He also warned that “the lesson is clear: studying the human 
side of fatal wildland fire accidents is overdue.”289 
D. THIRTYMILE FIRE OF 2001  
In 2001, disaster struck again when the Thirtymile Fire on the Okanogan National 
Forest in Washington trapped 16 firefighters. Of these 16, four firefighters perished in the 
burnover after an unattended campfire blew-up, which cut off their escape route. All of 
these firefighters were operating as a part of an ad-hoc crew (named the Northwest 
Regulars #6) and did not normally work together as they were from different districts. 
Ellreese Daniels was in charge of the crew and was also the designated incident 
commander of the fire. Daniels and part of the crew had travelled up the Chewuch River 
Canyon to extinguish some spot fires from the growing fire. He was described as being 
“supernice guy, but he does not have a command personality. He’s soft spoken. He never 
wanted to lead. Ellreese is a follower. But they put on the pressure, and he couldn’t find a 
way to say no.”290  
 As the fire intensified along the road, the crew was cut off by a “wall of flames” 
and was forced to retreat to an area that appears to have less fuel loading due to a rock 
scree on one side of the road and a Chewuch River sand bar on the other. The fire, 
287 TriData Corporation, Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness Study, Phase II (Arlington, VA: Tri 
Data Corporation, 1997), 1. 
288 Putnam, “The Collapse of Decisionmaking,” 54. 
289 Ibid. 
290 John N. Maclean, The Thirtymile Fire (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 49. 
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described as sounding like a “freight train” or a “tidal wave,” made a run at the crew’s 
location and the crew was forced to deploy their fire shelters. Part of the crew chose to 
seek refuge in the rock scree away from the rest of the crew on the road. Daniels 
purportedly tried to tell the people on the rocks to come down to the road. After the fire 
front passed, four of the six crewmembers that deployed on the rock scree were found 
dead due to inhalation and asphyxia of the superheated products of combustion.291        
The ensuing accident report cites a significant finding, “leadership, management, 
and command and control were all ineffective due to a variety of factors, such as the lack 
of communication and miscommunication, fatigue, lack of situational awareness, 
indecisiveness, and confusion about who was in control.”292  
The events of the Mann Gulch, South Canyon and Thirtymile fires point to similar 
troubling themes, particularly with human dynamics and leadership. The mission 
command principles of trust, cohesion, shared awareness, disciplined initiative, and intent 
were not followed. It was these disasters that planted the seeds of change in the USFS 
leadership paradigm.  
E. THE SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE USFS  
As result of the tragedies at South Canyon and Thirtymile, there followed a 
number of investigations and reports and the call for deeper introspection on human 
factors from individuals like Ted Putnam. These activities spurred the formation of the 
Leadership Task Group by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) in 2000. 
The NWCG is an operational group designed to coordinate programs of the participating 
wildfire management agencies, including the USFS.293 The goal of the Leadership Task 
291 Ibid., 114, 135. 
292 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Thirtymile Investigative Report: Accident 
Investigation Factual Report and Management Evaluation Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, 2001), 30. 
293 The NWCG participating members include Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; four 
Department of the Interior agencies: Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); Department of Homeland 
Security, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and state forestry agencies through the National 
Association of State Foresters. “NWCG Membership,” accessed February 12, 2015, 
http://www.nwcg.gov/nwcg_admin/members.htm  
 93 
                                                     
Group was to analyze the current leadership training curriculum, identify alternatives, 
and make recommendations.  
The Leadership Task Group was frank in the assessment that its work would not 
be easy. In the 2001 Report of the Leadership Task Group to the Working Team, it is 
noted that leadership issues are “complex, defying simple explanation or easy 
understanding.” 294  A number of different types of organizations were examined 
including private sector, government, and military. The task group found that there was 
no such thing as a “military model” or a “corporate model” for leadership, but rather 
there are many different leadership concepts and practices. The challenge for the task 
group was to sift through these models and determine which concepts and practices 
worked best for the wildland fire community.  
The task group made note of the parallels between the military environment and the 
wildland fire response environment: “These organizations all operate in high risk 
environments where decisions must be made within compressed time frames, often by 
people under a great deal of stress.”295 In noting these similarities, the task group chose 
to use some of the military leadership concepts for application in the wildland fire 
response environment.296  
Another consideration of the task group was the ad-hoc nature of wildland 
firefighting response teams. Resources deployed to a wildland fire most often arrive at 
different times and from different home units and agencies. It is very common to see 
resources deployed from out-of-state, especially when certain regions experience high 
fire activity and local resources become overstretched. Before the blowup of the South 
Canyon fire, there were three leaders and three crews with firefighters from five different 
states deployed to the incident.297  
294 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Report of the Leadership Task Group to the Training 
Working Team (February 2001), accessed January 29, 2015, 
http://www.fireleadership.gov/committee/reports/February_2001_Task_Group_Report.pdf, 3. 
295 Ibid.  
296 Ibid. 
297 Michael Useem, James Cook, and Larry Sutton, “Developing Leaders for Decision Making Under 
Stress: Wildland Firefighters in the South Canyon Fire and Its Aftermath,” Academy of Management 
Learning & Education 4, no. 4 (2005): 471.  
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Division supervisors and incident commanders will often be responsible for crews 
and individuals with whom they have never worked previously. Useem, Cook, and Sutton 
refer to this as ambiguous authority, which undermines optimal decision making. 298 
Three sources help explain this lessening of authority: ad-hoc “crews are often 
undeveloped as teams; related parties bring self-interested agendas to bear; and leaders 
must orchestrate others that they sometimes scarcely know.”299  
This challenge to authority is repeated on many large-scale homeland security 
events where multi-agencies are working together in a common effort. The Incident 
Command System (discussed in Chapter III) helps to define ambiguous authority, but on 
tactical scale, a leader must work hard to gain the trust of an ad-hoc workforce. 
Ambiguous authority works against the trust that has been identified as a key to the 
implementation of mission command. The mission command principle of providing clear 
leader’s intent will help clarify such ambiguous authority.  
F. IMPLEMENTATION OF MISSION COMMAND BY THE USFS 
In response to these challenges, the Leadership Task Group recommended a series 
of steps to improve leadership development in the wildland service. Some of the 
highlights include: 
• Leadership Principles—Adopt a specific set of desired leadership 
principles and values that are common to all the wildland fire 
organizations.” These principles and values have been formalized and are 
located on the wildland fire leadership website and incorporated into 
leadership courses.300  
• Required Training—Revise the Fire Qualification System Guide to make 
specific leadership courses required training for certain key ICS positions. 
Up until this time, leadership and supervision courses were never 
emphasized, much less required. Develop a continuum of leadership 
courses tied to career development and increasing responsibility. 
• Self-Study Component—Develop self-study resources that allow 
individuals to study leadership concepts and principles outside the context 
298 Ibid.  
299 Ibid., 467.  
300 “Values and Principles Download,” Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program, accessed 
March 9, 2015, http://www.fireleadership.gov/images/V_P/values_principles_expanded.jpg  
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of formal classroom training.” This has resulted in a wildland fire 
leadership website with multiple avenues of educational exploration. The 
resources on the website include: a fire leadership reading list; multiple 
leadership and cinema reviews; and, several staff ride resources for fatality 
fire sites throughout the nation.301 
These components provide insight as to how a homeland security organization 
might implement the principles of mission command, which will be discussed further in 
the final chapter. Ultimately, the task group recommended the formation of a standing 
committee to continue the development efforts and implementation of the program. 
Since the report from the NWCG Leadership Task Group was issued, thousands 
of federal, state, and local wildland firefighters across the nation have completed some or 
all of the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program courses, commonly referred to 
as the “L” series of courses. The leadership ethos that forms the basis of these courses is 
contained in a publication entitled Leading in the Wildland Fire Service. In this reference 
handbook,302 the Army’s six principles of mission command (which are used to assess 
the IDF and USFS case studies) are interwoven. Other facets of the program involve 
practical exercises, tie-ins, and lesson plans for motion pictures that portray the 
leadership principles in action, and a self-development worksheet for continued learning. 
A series of staff rides have been developed for many of the significant, and unfortunately, 
fatal wildland fires. Staff rides are based on the practice of military commanders and 
staffs visiting a historic battlefield to gain a sense of the environment and decision 
making in order to enhance learning. Useem, Cook, and Sutton explain the educational 
benefit that a classroom cannot provide: 
By witnessing other settings, mentally reconstructing the decisions taken 
in those settings, and then drawing implications for one’s own settings, 
such out-of-classroom experiences can instill the principles of leadership 
more enduringly than classroom experience alone.303 
The final leadership course in the NWCG Wildland Fire Leadership Development 
Program is entitled L-580 Leadership is Action. In this course, a facilitated staff ride is 
301 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Report of the Leadership Task Group, 3–5. 
302 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service.  
303 Useem, Cook, and Sutton, “Developing Leaders for Decision Making under Stress,” 480. 
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conducted at the site of the Civil War battlefield at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Using the 
battlefield as a historical backdrop, experts in leadership and incident management 
discuss the sense making and decision making that Civil War leaders experienced. The 
Gettysburg staff ride focuses on individual and team decision making, successful traits of 
senior leaders, and incident management at a strategic level. A number of locations or 
stands are visited during the staff ride, many of them examples of the principles of 
mission command.  
The NWCG Leadership Subcommittee meets regularly to maintain the leadership 
or “L” series of courses and keep the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program 
moving forward. Participation by anyone from the wildland fire community is strongly 
encouraged. Interestingly, some of the work of the NWCG Leadership Committee seems 
to have preceded the development of foundational doctrine by the USFS in 2005. This 
suggests that the efforts to change the organizational thinking of the wildland fire 
agencies and the USFS in particular started out as a grass-roots effort. This ground-up 
(versus top-down) process is very much the type of evolution that the ethos of mission 
command is aimed at promulgating. The formulation of USFS doctrine is worth 
examining as it illustrates the shift that will be necessary for homeland security response 
organizations who wish to implement mission command.     
G. DOCTRINAL CHANGES IN THE USFS 
Further indications of a shift in USFS organizational thinking is evident in a paper 
entitled Defining Doctrine for Wildland Fire Suppression in the USDA Forest Service. In 
the 2004 paper, the myth of control is discussed, which is the misperception that 
 …command flows down and results in control of on-the-ground 
operations, even in highly chaotic environments. When in reality control 
of on-the-ground operations is in the hands of the ground forces, and feeds 
upward to command. Operating within this myth leads to the assertion that 
negative outcomes may be avoided by asserting more control, by 
establishing more rules. Effective command relies on the expression of 
clear intent, confidence in subordinate capabilities, acceptance of mutual 
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responsibilities, a specified objective, and freedom to act… all firmly 
rooted in shared and understood doctrinal principles.304 
The preceding quote could have been attributed to General von Moltke discussing 
the principles of auftragstaktik with the Prussian military in 1860s. In the previous 
chapter, the IDF eschewed rule-driven doctrine in favor of decisive and creative decision 
making. The need to consider doctrine as a dynamic process for learning and sharing best 
practices was also discussed.305 The following describes the path that the USFS took to 
arrive at a similar conclusion regarding doctrine.    
The Defining Doctrine paper traces the USFS organizational model to industrial 
age concepts and sociologist Max Weber. He is acknowledged for his study of 
organizations that managed large, dispersed work forces engaged in complex activities. 
Weber concluded that bureaucracy was necessary to “subdue human affairs to the rule of 
reason.” 306  He was convinced that bureaucracy was the dominant form of modern 
control—an “iron cage” that was highly rational, powerfully oppressive, and 
inevitable. 307  This thinking was the basis for the structure of many industrial age 
organizations and was the pattern on which the USFS structure was based.308 Yet, while 
the complexity of the work in the fire suppression has “increased exponentially” since 
Weber’s observations, many of these same bureaucratic principles have guided the USFS 
operations until recently. The paper, prepared by the USFS National Fire Operations 
Safety Office, called for a self-examination of the USFS organization with a focus on 
redefining doctrine.309     
304 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Defining Doctrine for Wildland Fire Suppression 
in the USDA Forest Service, 2004, accessed January 27, 2015, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/briefing_papers/2004-defining_doctrine.doc, 3. 
305 Alberts, “Information Age Transformation,” 122. 
306 Forest Service, Defining Doctrine for Wildland Fire Suppression, 1. 
307 James R. Barker, “Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 410.  
308 The USFS was created in 1905 with Gifford Pinchot the inaugural agency head. “Our History,” 
accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.fs.fed.us/learn/our-history  
309 Forest Service, Defining Doctrine for Wildland Fire Suppression, 1. 
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As a result, the USFS convened the First Pulaski Conference in 2005 with the 
purpose of establishing a wildland fire suppression doctrine. The conference notes state,  
Our agency’s current doctrine is fragmentary, confused and combined. 
And, it is unfortunately intuitive-rather than explicit. Furthermore, it can 
only be found—often with much difficulty and frustration—concealed in a 
mishmash of guides, manuals, and handbooks.310  
Another reference laments the reality that there are now 156 inviolate wildland fire 
suppression-related rules that have evolved over the last decade and though the 
environment has become more complex, “the wildland firefighter’s ability to adapt and 
react has ironically—and precariously—become even more constrained. Unfortunately, 
our agency’s probability of failure has, thus, increased proportionately.” 311  The 
conference was attended by representation from every level of the USFS organization and 
from each forest service region. The other federal wildland fire agencies sent 
representatives to support and participate in the process.  
As a result of the conference, the USFS Fire Suppression Foundational Doctrine 
was developed. One focus of the doctrine is the recognition of leadership down to the 
lowest levels of the USFS organization: “Our agency culture embraces mentoring and 
continuous learning as essential to development of future leadership where every leader is 
a firefighter, and every firefighter is a leader.” 312  Additionally, empowerment of 
subordinates was also highlighted. A statement from the doctrine emphasizes, “(Leaders) 
will only order details regarding execution if measures … have to be harmonized or if 
political or firefighting constraints require it. They give the latitude to subordinate leaders 
in the execution of their mission.” 313 Many felt that the Pulaski conference and the 
resulting doctrine heralded the beginning of a new culture for the USFS.  
310 Forest Service, “The First Pulaski Conference: Taking the First Step: How We Did It” (synopsis 
paper from the First Pulaski Conference, Alta, Utah, June 2005), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/final_report_pulaski_conference
.doc, 4. 
311 Ibid., 5. 
312 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, USFS Fire Suppression Foundational Doctrine 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 2005), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/doctrinefinala.pdf, 14. 
313 Ibid., 16. 
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Mission command principles are interwoven into the USFS Fire Suppression 
Foundational Doctrine. Several papers on auftragstaktik are cited as source 
documentation in the formulation of the USFS leadership ethos and the influence is 
apparent.314 In a similar fashion to the IDF case study, the next section will examine the 
USFS experience in the implementation of the principles of mission command.   
H. THE USFS THROUGH THE FRAMEWORK OF MISSION COMMAND 
PRINCIPLES  
The six principles of mission command from the U.S. Army will be used to assess 
the USFS. These principles were introduced in Chapter I and consist of the following: 1) 
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust; 2) Create shared understanding; 4) Exercise 
disciplined initiative; 5) Use mission orders; 6) Accept prudent risk.315 They are the basis 
on which the U.S. Army has chosen to introduce the concepts of mission command and 
offer some practical steps in which to implement this philosophy. These principles 
provide a common framework in which to evaluate the case study from the previous 
chapter and the USFS experience.   
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust  
The wildland fire service recognizes the value of mutual trust and cohesiveness. 
As pointed out previously, several sources of USFS doctrine and leadership philosophy 
now advocate these values. Driessen studied the intracrew and intercrew cohesion of fire 
crews on three fatality fires: the Mann Gulch, the Thirtymile, and the South Canyon 
fires.316 His definition of cohesion is how closely tied together the individuals are as a 
group. Driessen remarked, “People in cohesive groups will openly speak of themselves as 
314 Faris R. Kirkland, Auftragstaktik” Leadership Ethics,1998, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest 
Service, accessed March 10, 2015, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/philosophy/source_materials/auftragstaktik-kirkland.doc; Michael M. 
O’Leary, “Auftragstaktik” Regimental Rogue, 2000, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/firesuppression.html; Silva, “Auftragstaktik: 
Its Origin and Development,” 6–8; Keithly, and Ferris “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and 
Combined Operations.”   
315 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2.  
316 Jon Driessen, Crew Cohesion, Wildland Fire Transition and Fatalities, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, 2002, http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/pubs/pdfpubs/pdf02512809/pdf02512809.pdf, 1. 
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‘a little family.’”317 This interconnectedness or chemistry enables the group to operate at 
a higher level and have a “special kind of strength.” Interestingly enough, accident rates 
are inversely related to cohesion in crews; the greater the cohesion the fewer the 
accidents. Driessen observed that the three fatality fires involved groups of firefighters 
that had little crew cohesion, either intracrew, as in the case of the Mann Gulch fire, or 
intercrew, as seen in the South Canyon fire.318 The Thirtymile fire was a combination of 
both intracrew and intercrew failures. 
Furthermore, Driessan postulates that it takes from six to eight weeks for seasonal 
wildland fire fighters to “click” into crews.319 Team cohesion is a focus in the previously 
mentioned L-series of courses, with emphasis on teambuilding exercises. A crew 
cohesion assessment tool is available on the fire leadership website.320 The assessment 
provides criteria for a number of categories, include ratings on trust, conflict, and 
learning. The assessment can be utilized by crew leaders or wildfire engine personnel to 
benchmark the cohesion of the crew and look for ways to improve.  
Trust implies direct and honest communication between leaders and followers. 
The Fireline Leadership Course (L380) workbook offers a number of techniques for both 
leaders and followers to engage in direct and honest communication without 
antagonism.321 Unhealthy conflict can develop when feedback turns to criticism and the 
focus is on the “who” rather than the “what.” Clear leader’s intent, active listening, 
feedback, and humor are offered as ways to de-escalate tension and prevent unhealthy 
conflict. However, the instruction in the workbook does not downplay the significance of 
conflict, “…any organization with more than one person has conflict—guaranteed. 
317 Ibid., 7. 
318 Ibid., 4. 
319 Ibid., 7. 
320 Tool can be found at: 
http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/documents/Crew_Cohesion_Assessment.pdf 
321 Mission-Centered Solutions, L380 Fireline Leadership (Franktown: Mission-Centered Solutions, 
Inc., 2007), 157.  
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Furthermore, a little conflict can be good… a positive sign that the crew is learning, 
growing, and trying new things.”322  
2. Create Shared Understanding 
All the leadership and position courses taught through the NWCG emphasis 
situational awareness, briefings, and communication. Situation awareness is not static but 
more of a dynamic and fleeting process that is constantly updating as conditions change. 
The flow and filtering of data from both a technological and human perception standpoint 
was discussed in Chapter III by Shattuck and Miller. 323 The following excerpt from 
Leading in the Wildland Fire Service describes the process on how people process 
information: “People gather information through both observation, which includes input 
from the senses, and communication, which includes face-to-face conversation, written 
communication, and radio or telephone exchanges”324 These inputs are then processed by 
individuals in different ways, which is further described in Leading in the Wildland Fire 
Service as: “All perceptions are subject to filtering and focusing: people constantly filter 
information and shift focus. People also produce a lot of internal inputs such as thoughts 
about what to do next, stress, memories of similar experiences, fear.”325 
Weik discusses the basic idea of sensemaking—that reality is an ongoing 
accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of 
what occurs. Sensemaking emphasizes that people try to make things rationally 
accountable to themselves and others. Weik describes sensemaking in the context of the 
Mann Gulch fire tragedy (discussed in this chapter):  
Sensemaking is about contextual rationality. It is built out of vague 
questions, muddy answers, and negotiated agreements that attempt to 
reduce confusion. People in Mann Gulch did not face questions like where 
should we go, when do we take a stand, or what should our strategy be? 
322 Ibid., 157.  
323 Shattuck, and Miller, “Extending Naturalistic Decision Making to Complex Organizations,” 4. 
324 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, 31. 
325 Ibid. 
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Instead, they faced the more basic, the more frightening feeling that their 
old labels were no longer working.326  
In addition, Weik describes the role that effective leaders can take and the type of 
conversation that leads to shared understanding According to him, the conversation that 
should have occurred at the Mann Gulch and South Canyon incidents would have 
sounded like this: “1) Here’s what I think we face; 2) Here’s what I think we should do; 
3) Here’s why; 4) Here’s what we should keep our eye on; 5) Now, talk to me.”327 The 
missed communications during the Mann Gulch and South Canyon fires raise the issue of 
how best a leader can convey what is to be done. The third mission command principle 
provides a format in which to convey this message even when direct communication is 
not possible.  
3. Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent 
The need for leaders (or commanders) to translate vision into clear intent is 
emphasized in the NWCG leadership principles, curriculum, and the leadership ethos 
captured in Leading in the Wildland Fire Service. Moreover, leader’s intent is at the heart 
of the Wildland Fire Leadership Development program. This philosophy is based on the 
understanding that competent subordinate leaders who are at the scene of action 
understand the current situation better than a senior commander some distance removed 
does.328 A warning is provided in the Leading in the Wildland Fire Service for those that 
might misinterpret intent as a license for independent action; subordinate actions must be 
coordinated toward the common objective. 
Clear leader’s intent is composed of the task, purpose, and end state or how it 
should look when complete. Conspicuously left out of leading by intent is “how” the task 
326 Karl Weik, South Canyon Revisited: Lessons from High Reliability Organizations, Technical 
Report 9951-2855-MTDC (Missoula, MT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 1995), 42–53; 
Karl Weik, “The Collapse of Decisionmaking and Organizational Structure on Storm King Mountain,” in 
Findings from the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop (Missoula, MT: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, 1995), 
https://www.iaff.org/hs/LODD_Manual/Resources/USFS%20Findings%20from%20the%20Wildland%20F
irefighters%20Human%20Factors%20Workshop.pdf, 63.  
327 Weik, South Canyon Revisited 43.  
328 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, 15. 
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needs to be done, which is a component of detailed command. In mission command, 
“how” a task is accomplished is left up to the initiative, innovation, and imagination of 
the subordinate leader, who, in turn, will provide leader’s intent to lower echelons within 
the chain of command. Silva posits that the result of this framing of direction is to 
encourage participation and unleash the collective wisdom of the entire organization 
down to the lowest levels. A secondary effect is that subordinates have a sense of “buy-
in” when their perspectives are considered. Silva adds, “The subordinate had a personal 
stake in the outcome…..because he knew he contributed to it intellectually and 
independently.”329 
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative 
Initiative is encouraged but not at the expense of coordination and collaboration. 
A “bias for action” is a concept that is found throughout the NWCG leadership literature 
and is described as the empowerment of wildland fire service leaders to act on a situation 
that is within their power to influence. Leaders are encouraged to take the initiative and 
are “duty-bound” to act. The literature acknowledges the chaotic nature of wildfires and 
that there are times when one person may be the only one to see what needs to be done 
and to make it happen. It also advocated taking action prior to informing the chain of 
command may be necessary due to time pressure and need. Initiative by subordinate 
leaders also frees the leader to focus on higher level tasks and decisions.  
Discipline is discussed in the literature in regards to initiative, especially where 
time pressure and circumstance dictate immediate action. Under these circumstances, fire 
leaders are admonished to use judgment, work in concert with others, act within the intent 
of their leaders, develop and communicate a plan, and then inform leaders of actions as 
quickly as the situation allows.330  
329 Silva, “Auftragstaktik: Its Origin and Development,” 6.  
330 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, 27. 
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5. Use Mission Orders 
Mission orders are directives that should align with the leader’s intent. Of the six 
mission command principles, mission orders and how to give them, are discussed the 
least in the Wildland Leadership Development Program literature. Brevity and 
maintenance of subordinate freedom of action are discussed but only in the context of 
leader’s intent. Wildland fire service leaders are taught to utilize SMART objectives 
(specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-dependent). Mission orders should 
contain all that the subordinate must know to carry out the mission but nothing more. 
Otherwise, the orders infringe on the prerogative of the subordinate, and the leadership 
style becomes authoritarian and potentially micromanaging.331 As discussed in Chapter 
III, micromanagement works against the trust and delegation needed for mission 
command to be successful in an organization.  
6. Accept Prudent Risk 
The risk and complex nature of the wildland firefighting environment is explained 
in Leading in the Wildland Fire Service: 
We are asked to make tough decisions under a compressed time frame, 
given limited information in a complex and high-risk environment. This 
operational environment routinely brings together people, machinery, and 
the destructive energy of wildfire in the close, three dimensional space of 
the fireground and its airspace. ...Wildland fire operations have inherent 
risks that cannot be eliminated, even in the best of circumstances.332 
It is in this context that much of the command philosophy of wildland fire service 
is based. While fatality fires have been the catalyst for many of the rules, operating 
procedures, and organizational controls in the wildland fire service, there is greater 
recognition that the interpretation of the word “safe” has come to mean a zero defect, full 
compliance, and unattainable condition of operation. This dilemma was recognized in the 
2006 USFS Fire Suppression Foundational Doctrine: “(S)afety and performance 
reliability are seen as proactively managed through alignment with principles of risk 
331 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2-4. 
332 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, 10.  
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management ….The doctrine views safety as the active process of managing risks than 
trying to manage outcomes (or compliance with rules).”333    
There are individuals in the USFS advocating for a “just culture.” According to 
Reason, a “just culture” is a safety management system within an organization that 
acknowledges human factors and risk management.334 Holdsambeck proposes that in a 
mature organizational just culture, information is the lifeblood of safety and learning.335 
All employees must disclose unsafe conditions and individual mistakes, but will only do 
so with the knowledge that they will be held to account for their mistakes in a fair and 
reasonable manner.  
Holdsambeck describes how risk is viewed differently and how this disparity is 
perceived in a “Just Culture.” According to him, this disparity might be most evident in 
the risk acceptance “between an office -trained administrator and a highly experienced, 
battle hardened firefighter. A just culture recognizes this as a human factor, not an error 
or a causal factor.”336  
This framing of risk complements the mission command ethos where mistakes 
made in the earnest attempt to meet the leader’s intent are treated as a learning 
opportunity rather than a disciplinary action. The USFS is attempting to move towards a 
just culture through the use of after-action reviews and facilitated learning analysis 
(FLA). An FLA is an investigation of an unintended outcome (close call or near-miss 
incident) with an eye towards learning rather than placing blame.337  
333 Steve Holdsambeck, “Just Culture Part 2: Understanding Why Accidents Happen,” Fire 
Management Today 71, no. 1 (2011): 23.  
334 James Reason as quoted in Steve Holdsambeck, “Just Culture Part 2,” 23. 
335 Ibid., 27. 
336 Ibid., 26.  
337 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Facilitated Learning Analysis Implementation 




                                                     
I. MISSION COMMAND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES IN THE 
USFS EXPERIENCE 
While the USFS leadership changes are aligned with the principles of mission 
command, there are several challenges that may hinder full implementation. These 
challenges are discussed in an effort to provide insight for other homeland security 
organizations that may look to introduce mission command principles as their leadership 
ethos. These shortcomings are not intended to denigrate the USFS, but to rather point out 
that these issues or others like them may exist in any organization.  
1. Liability 
As a result of the political reaction to the Thirtymile fire, federal statutes were 
passed requiring that all fatality fires be investigated by the Department of Agriculture’s 
Office of Inspector General (OIG), which had no experience investigating wildland fires. 
Criminal proceedings were initiated against the incident commander, Ellreese Daniels, 
who was charged with: “eleven felonies, including four counts of manslaughter. The 
charges were later reduced to two counts of making false statements, to which Mr. 
Daniels pled guilty,” according to Gabbert, and served three years of probation.338  
Subsequently, charges were brought against the incident commander on the 2003 
Cramer fire, where two firefighters were entrapped on a fire on the Salmon-Challis 
National Forest in Idaho. The legal precedents set after these two fires sent an ominous 
message throughout the firefighting community and especially to those who were looking 
for increased leadership responsibilities. These actions worked against the organizational 
trust that is critical for mission command to be successful. 
 The criminal proceedings against Daniels had a “chilling effect” on the 
willingness of firefighters to operate in positions of responsibility on fires. In a joint 
statement of  the International Association of Wildland Fire and the Federal Wildland 
Services Association, which together represent a broad spectrum of firefighters: 
“Firefighters have been coming forward stating their unwillingness to accept the 
338 Bill Gabbert, “Thirtymile Fire, 10 Years Ago Today, and the Consequences,” Wildfire Today, July 
10, 2011, accessed March 10, 2015, http://wildfiretoday.com/2011/07/10/thirtymile-fire-10-years-ago-
today/, 2. 
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responsibilities of making the sometimes split-second decision, only then to find their 
decisions reviewed with 20–20 hindsight (after) more than five years.”339 
Dick Mangan, who retired from the USFS Missoula Technology and 
Development Center and investigated more than 20 fire entrapment and fatality incidents, 
commented on the negative impact of the Thirtymile fire litigation:  
Unfortunately, four people lost their lives. There were obviously mistakes 
made at a number of different levels. But the way it was (before 
Thirtymile), everybody else gets the benefit of learning from it, because it 
is free and open and everyone admits to it. Now there’s always the threat 
that when an investigation or review team comes in, if I tell them 
something it may be held against me.340  
This unease about liability will stifle the mission command principles of 
organizational innovation and willingness to lead. A homeland security organization that 
implements mission command may want to consider making personal liability insurance 
available to its personnel.     
2. Preparedness 
The effectiveness of mission command is dependent on the preparation of 
subordinates. In addition, training must include leaders who need to understand and 
implement mission command principles and thus represents a significant investment for 
an organization. Training subordinates to assume greater responsibility in their efforts to 
act within their leader’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, and accept prudent risk 
requires funding and commitment. Stewart makes note that decentralization of authority 
requires extensive training and education of subordinate personnel. These personnel will 
also need the ability to coordinate efforts with adjacent forces in order to attain 
synchronicity. Furthermore, Stewart offers that the investment costs of mission command 
will be offset in theory by smaller staff organizations at the central headquarters level and 
improved work performance.341  
339 Maclean, The Thirtymile Fire, 218. 
340 Dick Mangan as quoted by Gabbert “Thirtymile Fire, 10 Years Ago Today,” 2. 
341 Stewart, “The Evolution of Command Approach.”  
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The continued work of the NWCG Leadership Subcommittee and the ongoing 
delivery of the L series of courses is a testament to the commitment of the federal 
wildland firefighting agencies to leadership development. The coursework does require a 
significant investment of time and funding. While these efforts are preparing individuals 
to be better leaders, the return on investment is not easy to quantify. However, as Stewart 
points out, effectiveness might be measured by other indicators. 342 The challenge of 
shifting an organization towards a different leadership ethos will be in defining and 
measuring success.    
3. Morale 
Despite the internal leadership efforts and the introduction of mission command, 
the USFS has been subject to several external issues that have caused frustration agency 
wide. Low morale in the last number of years has been caused by budget cuts, employee 
retention issues, ever increasing administrative and political pressures, and selective 
promotional practices. Chojnacky muses: 
What happened to the USDA Forest Service?...Once heralded as among 
the most respected and effective government agencies, the Forest Service 
has become a case study of bureaucratic red tape and low morale. 
Employees give it low marks for leadership, ranking it 198th out of 229 
agencies in a recent survey (Partnership for Public Service 2011), and 
describe a stressful and demoralizing work environment.343  
Fukuyama also ascribes the USFS decline to increasing bureaucracy. He notes:  
…many regard the Forest Service as a highly dysfunctional bureaucracy 
performing an outmoded mission with the wrong tools… It operates under 
multiple and often contradictory mandates from Congress and the courts 
and costs taxpayers a substantial amount of money while achieving 
questionable aims. The service’s internal decision-making system is often 
342 Ibid. 
343 Cindy C. Chojnacky, “Leadership Impact on Forest Service Operations: Intriguing Ideas from 





                                                     
gridlocked, and the high degree of staff morale and cohesion that Pinchot 
worked so hard to foster has been lost.”344  
Retention of qualified individuals, especially in the firefighting ranks, has been an 
issue for the USFS. Pay disparities and better benefits cause many experienced USFS 
firefighters to leave and go work for state or local fire agencies. The problem has been 
especially acute in states like California where the cost of living is high and salaries of 
state and municipal departments can be almost double the amount paid by the USFS.345 
Local and state firefighters working the same fire as their federal counterparts are paid for 
24 hours in a day while the federal time clock stops at 16 hours in a day. These issues 
will work against the innovation, trust, and camaraderie that mission command requires 
to be effective. 
Despite these issues, the vast majority of USFS firefighters take great pride in the 
work that is accomplished in managing wildland fire in the nation’s forests. There is a 
strong heritage in the USFS and the symbols such as Smokey the Bear and smoke 
jumping have attained a certain iconic status. The national forests are treasured by many 
as places of beauty and recreation. The latest Partnership for Public Service ranking 
shows the USFS making modest gains in leadership empowerment and overall ranking 
(moving up 2.9 points in overall rating from 2013).346 Hopefully, the adoption of the 
USFS Fire Suppression Foundational Doctrine and the emphasis on leadership 
development will continue this trend by preparing USFS leaders to be more effective in 
fighting fires and addressing organizational issues.    
J. SUMMARY 
The USFS experience brings perspective to the issue of how mission command 
principles can be implemented by a homeland security organization. Fatal fires, such as 
344 Francis Fukuyama, “America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction,” Foreign Affairs 
(September–October 2014), accessed February 7, 2015, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141729/francis-fukuyama/america-in-decay?nocache=1  
345 Erica Werner, “Forest Service Studying Loss of U.S. Firefighters to California Force,” Santa Ynez 
Valley Journal, February 14, 2008, accessed January 27, 2015, http://syvjournal.com/archive/6/7/1333/  
346 Partnership for Public Service, “The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government Rankings 
2014,” accessed February 14, 2015, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/detail/AG1 
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the South Canyon, Thirtymile and the Mann Gulch, are the catalyst for organizational 
self-reflection and the search for doctrinal changes by the USFS. The influence of 
auftragstaktik on the USFS doctrine, the bottom-up approach of how the doctrine was 
formulated, and the extensive leadership educational resources through the Wildland Fire 
Service Leadership program are positive signs that the mission command principles are 
being adopted. Leadership, crew cohesion, and sense making provide several lines of 
inquiry in which to assess the degree to which mission command principles have been 
adopted. The challenges to implementation were discussed with the prosecution of 
supervisors associated with fatality fires eroding organizational trust. The low USFS 
morale is another issue that works against trust and initiative; however, there are signs 
that these organizational issues are improving.    
In the next chapter, an analysis will be conducted using the two case studies and 
the issue specific perspectives outlined in Chapter III. The IDF and the USFS differ in 
several ways, including the length of time that each has employed mission command 
principles and why such an ethos was adopted. Additional benefits and challenges not 
discussed in the case studies, such as the problems with mentorship programs and how 
mission command prepares subordinates for leadership responsibilities, will be examined. 
This analysis will compare several organizational attributes in order to further define how 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE IDF AND USFS EXPERIENCE WITH 
MISSION COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The experience of both the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the U.S. Forest 
Service (USFS) using the principles of mission command indicates varying success. The 
IDF has utilized its precepts since formation in 1948 and has had a number of military 
engagements in which to develop the philosophy. The USFS has advocated mission 
command precepts only since 2003 and has yet to fully institutionalize all of its elements. 
Both organizations have experienced challenges in the process of implementation: morale 
and distrust in the case of the USFS; political scrutiny and its involvement with 
asymmetric warfare in the case of the IDF. Table 1 summarizes mission command 
implementation in the two case studies and a homeland security response organization 
using several factors. This summary will be used to compare and analyze the extent to 
which each organization has been successful in the use of mission command principles. 
This analysis will consist of a series of observations regarding important facets of the 
case studies and how they relate to a homeland security organization.  
B. ANALYSIS 
This analysis will consist of a series of observations regarding important themes 
of the case studies and how they relate to a homeland security organization. These themes 
were chosen because they have come up repeatedly in the case studies and are key factors 
in the implementation of mission command. 
1. Trust as the Cornerstone of Mission Command 
Trust seems to be the one value that has the greatest impact on the successful 
implementation of mission command. As indicated in the U.S. Army’s first principle of 
mission command, trust builds the team cohesion that is necessary between superior and 
subordinate. For a superior, this means trusting subordinates to act within the leader’s 
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intent as the local situation changes.347 For a subordinate, this means trusting that actions 
taken in the name of initiative and adherence to intent will be supported by the superior 
and the organization. Silva further explains this trust dynamic: 
Mission oriented command was based on the idea that undue criticism, 
after the fact, of the man on the scene—who was in a confused, dangerous, 
and pressured situation and who had the best command of immediate 
information—was unwarranted. Anything beyond a constructive critique 
would only destroy the subordinate’s willingness to act and might even 
lead him to withhold adverse information or provide falsely optimistic 
reports simply to avoid his superior’s wrath.348 
 
 
347 Silva, “Auftragstaktik: Its Origin and Development,” 6–9. 
348 Ibid. 
 114 
                                                     
Table 1.   Organizational Comparison Based on Mission Command  
 
 
IDF USFS Homeland Security Organization (ex. fire department) Notes 
Trust Trust is valued, support of subordinates if mistakes are made 
Trust is valued, ad-hoc teams are an 
issue, Morale may affect trust 
Trust is valued, 
Inter-organizational trust can be an issue  
Leader Subordinate trust is developed over 
time. Swift trust building is discussed in 
Chapter VII.  





“Just Culture” and the treatment of error is 




(less so than others) 
Military, 
Minimal doctrine supports initiative 
Hierarchical, 
Semi-militaristic, 




Rule and policy driven doctrine 
Pressures on organizations to become 
heterarchical or networked (Ch. III). 




Mission orders and leader’s intent 
are practiced but politics and 
insurgencies have led to 
centralization 
Leader’s intent is being practiced, 
Mission orders not as widely practiced 
as detailed orders  
Some awareness of leader’s intent, 
Detailed orders are the norm  
Leader’s giving intent and mission orders 
as well as subordinates reception of them 




Traditional training and educational 
methods, Emphasis on practical 
experience versus formal education 
Traditional training and educational 
methods, Trainee development through 
task- book system on incidents 
Traditional training and educational 
methods, Mentorship opportunities 
restricted by civil service rules and 
discrimination policies  
Leadership related training has only 
recently been emphasized. The Wildland 
Fire Leadership Development Program is 
a good example. (Ch. V) 
Creativity Creativity and innovation encouraged 
Creativity and innovation somewhat 
encouraged but restricted due to 
bureaucracy and tradition 
Creativity and innovation somewhat 
encouraged but restricted due to 
bureaucracy and tradition 
Adherence to organizational norms may 
preclude bottom-up creativity as discussed 
in this chapter. 
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IDF USFS Homeland Security Organization (ex. fire department) Notes 
Risk and 
Liability 
Not an issue during conventional 
warfare, 
Insurgency warfare has led to closer 
scrutiny  
Risk is being addressed through “Just 
Culture” practices, 
Liability is an issue that has surfaced 
Risk and liability are assumed by the 
organization, Discipline for errors is the 
norm 
All organizations operate in high-risk 
environments where rapid decision 
















Other reasons may include subordinate 
development and empowerment as 









(Has varied due to nature of conflict, 
officer education, e.g., First Lebanon 
War) 
Some Alignment 
(Trust, mission orders, tolerance of risk 
are issues) 
Not applicable 
These principles seem to build on one 













Other challenges include authoritative 
norms, micromanagement. These are 
discussed in Ch. III & VI. 
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In the USFS example, trust in others may come at great cost. Both environments 
are high risk with the potential for loss of life. As the USFS experience at the Mann 
Gulch fire suggests, if there had been better trust between smokejumpers and their leader 
perhaps others would have survived the fire in the safety of Wag Dodge’s burned-out 
safety zone. The experience of the South Canyon fire suggests that the cohesion (and 
trust) of the ad-hoc crew had not been developed to the point where anyone was willing 
to speak out against a risky tactic of cutting a downhill fireline with potential fire down 
below. Some of the crew had expressed concern about the tactic, but none strongly 
enough to challenge the direction from the jumper-in-charge or change the course of 
events. The ambiguous authority described by Useem, Cook, and Sutton in Chapter V 
could have been a factor in this circumstance. They describe the results of ambiguous 
authority as “reduced flow of information to the fire leader, a weakened commitment by 
the leader to exercise authority, and diminished team compliance with the leader’s 
instructions.”349  
Without superior and subordinate trust, innovation, creativity, and prudent-risk 
taking are stifled. Organizational trust is important too. This is the knowledge that the 
organization will tolerate the errors that will invariably result due to increased innovation 
and expanded leadership authority at lower levels of the organization. The experience of 
the USFS in the aftermath of the Thirtymile and Cramer investigations was that 
individuals were not willing to assume incident leadership due to liability concerns. This 
distrust of organization and leadership was the impetus for the implementation of a 
leadership development program by the USFS.  
The IDF case study provides further example of the influence of trust on mission 
command principles. Captain Orde Wingate was able to gain the trust of the Jewish 
settlers in Palestine at a time when the British military was perceived as being indifferent 
to Arab aggressions towards the settlers. Not only did Wingate inspire the settlers, he 
practiced the mission command principles of decentralization of authority, commander’s 
intent, and independence of action within his organization. Wingate also set the example 
349 Implied by Edmondson and Watkins in Useem, Cook, and Sutton, “Developing Leaders for 
Decision Making Under Stress,” 467. 
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for his subordinates by participating in missions with his squads and sharing their 
hardships. 
Moshe Dayan trained with Wingate’s Special Night Squads, which may have 
influenced Dayan in later years as a commander, chief of staff for the IDF, and Defense 
Minister in Israel. Dayan’s support of his subordinates, especially those that showed 
initiative in the face of danger, was discussed in Chapter V. His trust and backing of his 
subordinates, even when they made mistakes, has had an influence on the fighting ethos 
of the IDF ever since. 
Lack of trust also plays a significant role in organizational effectiveness. The 
USFS experience, as discussed in Chapter V, provided several examples of leaders thrust 
into positions of command over subordinates who had not worked together. The ad-hoc 
nature of these events restricted the ability of the leader or subordinates to build trust 
beforehand. As a result, team cohesiveness suffered and the efforts resulted in tragedy. 
While the potential for an ad-hoc crew deployed to fight a wildfire or conducting a 
military assault against an enemy position will always exist, leaders and subordinates 
must recognize this circumstance and take steps to overcome it. Building trust quickly in 
ad-hoc teams will be discussed in Chapter VII.     
For a homeland security response organization considering the implementation of 
mission command principles, trust will be the cornerstone. This trust must exist at a 
personal, unit (such as a crew or team), and organizational level in order to be successful. 
Laine notes, “High reliability organizations often relate to emergency situations where 
you need to have absolute trust in your partner or team. Firefighters, police and aircraft 
crews are a few examples of organizations where trust is a necessity.”350 While many 
emergency response organizations have high levels of trust and camaraderie, there will be 
some for which trust will need to be improved.  
Inter-organizational trust can be an issue especially at large-scale, all-hazards 
events that require increased collaboration. Nahmod describes the challenge that response 
350 Nina Laine, “Trust in Superior-Subordinate Relationship: An Empirical Study in the Context of 
Learning” (dissertation, University of Tampere, 2008), 26. 
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agencies in New York City experience in the preparedness, response, and mitigation of 
large incidents.351 He points out several factors that work against collaboration, including 
organizational culture, different operating norms and values, and lack of collaborative 
capacity. Nahmod also offers several recommendations to increase collaborative 
capacity, including: increased interagency training, joint duty assignments, and preparing 
first-line (initial response) supervisors to become more collaborative.352   
Blomqvist and Stahle discuss both inter-personnel and inter-organizational trust 
from a business setting. They mention that researchers are not in agreement whether trust 
can be created intentionally, and “the link between personal and organizational trust is 
not been clear. It would seem that logical to say that it is always the people and not 
organizations that trust each other.”353 The authors conclude that it is possible to enhance 
the conditions for trust-building within an organization. The leader of an organization can 
set the tone in this regard and should have the most influence on the conditions that build 
trust in an organization. In order for a homeland security organization to embrace a 
leadership ethos, such as mission command, trust will need to be examined. Further 
recommendations on building organizational trust will be provided in Chapter VII.      
2. The Influence of Organizational Culture and Mission Command  
Culture has a significant influence on the ability to implement change within an 
organization. Watkins explains that while there is little consensus on what organizational 
culture is that “Culture is consistent observable patterns of behavior in organizations.”354 
Formalities, communications, and procedures—or organizational norms—dictate these 
patterns of behavior and thus must be considered as a part of an organization’s culture. 
These norms abound in organizations that are generally hierarchical and stratified, such 
351 Abdo Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City: A 
Focus on the First Line Officer” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 3.  
352 Ibid., 40.  
353 Kirsimajara Blomqvist, and Pirjo Stahle, “Building Organizational Trust,” in Proceedings of the 
16th Annual IMP Conference (2000), accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/37.pdf, 4. 
354 Michael Watkins, “What is Organizational Culture? And Why Should We Care?” Harvard 
Business Review (May 2013), accessed February 9, 2015, https://hbr.org/2013/05/what-is-organizational-
culture/  
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as those found in the military and homeland security response environments. However, 
these norms also act as roadblocks on the path toward decentralization. Barney notes that 
older and larger organizations may have less flexible organizational cultures than 
younger and smaller ones, but cultural change is still possible. Organizations that are 
simultaneously loosely and tightly coupled typically have a culture with a strong set of 
core values (one that encourages creativity and innovation).355  
The organizational culture of the IDF allowed commanders to operate with a 
mission command ethos in general but to be authoritative or detailed when the situation 
warrants. As discussed in Chapter V, General Ariel Sharon’s actions against the fortified 
Egyptian positions at Abu Agheila during the initial stages of the 1967 Six Day War 
provided an example of a situation where the synchronicity of resources required detailed 
orders. This organizational flexibility to be mission-based or detailed-based, depending 
on the circumstances, must start with a culture of mission command precepts in order to 
be successful. Shamir provides further detail by stating, “You can move from mission 
command to detailed command… this is easier. But it is almost impossible to move from 
detailed command, if your culture is detailed command…it is almost impossible to move 
to mission command.”356 Based on their experience and capability, subordinates will 
need varying degrees of control and attention from a leader, but all direction should begin 
with a leader’s intent and mission command principles. 
This flexibility is important for a homeland security organization, such as a fire 
department, where the bulk of work day responses, such as building fires, heart attacks, 
and traffic accidents, are handled in a highly scripted and highly routine fashion. It is the 
crisis response such as an active shooter incident, earthquake, or terrorist attack where 
innovation and “out of the box” thinking will be important. Like all capabilities, a 
mission command mindset must be practiced and can be repeated on routine incidents. 
355 Jay B. Barney, “Organizational Culture: Can it be a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage?” 
The Academy of Management Review 11, no. 3 (July 1986): 659.   
356 Eitan Shamir in a video of a talk given on October 13, 2013 and posted online entitled: “Dr. 
Shamir discusses the philosophy of mission command. He is the author of the book Transforming 
Command, a study on the implementation of the philosophy of mission command in the American, British, 
and Israeli Armies.” The talk can be found at http://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Mission%20Command/ 
Comments made starting at 40 minutes. 
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Just as the Incident Command System is implemented (though not a necessity) on any 
incident with the potential to grow, so should the practice of mission command 
principles, if for no other reason than to practice. After all, leader’s intent, mission type 
orders, shared understanding, and initiative (hallmarks of mission command) define a 
style of organizational control. The principles of mission command guide a relationship 
between superiors, subordinates, and peers within an organization regarding how to set 
about accomplishing the work that is to be done. There is no reason that these principles 
could not be practiced even in administrative or non-emergency settings. Further thoughts 
on the implementation of mission command by a homeland security organization are 
contained in Chapter VII.  
Leaders who emphasize the principles of mission command as organizational 
culture risk being judged by their subordinates and peers by those very same principles. 
In the previous section, trust and the need for leaders to set the example was discussed. 
Chatman and Eunyoung Cha describe the potential hypocrisy when they note, “Over 
time, an event inevitably occurs that puts leaders at risk of being viewed as acting 
inconsistently with the very values he or she has espoused.” 357  Honest and open 
communications, acknowledgement of mistakes, and a just-culture approach to correcting 
errors needs to be practiced by all echelons of an organization. The IDF’s approach to 
lesson learning (with the leader discussing their own mistakes first) was noted in Chapter 
IV. The USFS has embraced the after-action review (AAR) as a lesson learning process, 
and there are several supporting documents on the leadership development website 
describing how an AAR can be successfully conducted. An online Wildland Fire Lessons 
Learned Center was established in 2002 and provides best-practice information on how to 
derive and communicate the correct lessons learned from an incident.358  
These feedback actions are generally practiced by homeland security 
organizations at least at the crew or unit level. Lessons-learned processes and 
dissemination become less effective in larger organizations due to issues of shame or 
357 Jennifer A. Chatman, and Sandra Eunyoung Cha, “Leading by Leveraging Culture,” California 
Management Review 45, no. 4 (2003): 29.    
358 “Home,” Wildfire Lessons Learned Center, accessed March 9, 2015, 
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/home  
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blame and must be handled appropriately. How mistakes are treated varies from 
organization to organization, and this disparity can be addressed through the use of 
mission command principles. As discussed in the previous chapter, the online Wildland 
Fire Lessons Learned Center provides a template for homeland security organizations 
that wish to learn from unintended outcomes and move toward a just culture.  
3. Organizational Support and Mission Command 
Organizational support is necessary in order for a mission command culture to 
flourish. Adoption of doctrine that supports mission command, such as the USFS Fire 
Suppression Foundational Doctrine, is just a beginning. Moving a hierarchical 
organization to one that is more decentralized requires considerable effort. It is possible 
for any leader to individually initiate a mission command style of leadership with 
subordinates, but organizational acceptance is the goal. Vassiliou points out that 
personnel at all echelons will need to think and act differently. He remarks, “Higher 
levels of command must become accustomed to delegating and not over-specifying or 
micromanaging missions. Lower levels must become accustomed to taking initiative and 
not receiving highly detailed orders.”359 Stewart notes that subordinates conditioned to 
detailed command “will expect and prefer to receive detailed direction, even in high-risk 
situations.”360 It is this mindset that must be changed. On an organizational scale, the 
example of the IDF in the 1982–2000 South Lebanon Conflict suggests that the principles 
of mission command must be continually reinforced or centralization and 
micromanagement will prevail. 
Organizational support may extend to rooting out leaders who abuse their 
authority. Benson and Fontenot claim that due to misinterpretations of mission command 
within the U.S. Army, a “cult of command” has surfaced and that cohesive thinking or 
groupthink have manifested. 361  Rather than producing an environment where open 
discourse and critical feedback are encouraged, the Army’s adoption of mission 
359 Vassiliou, The Evolution towards Decentralized C2, 12.  
360 Stewart, “Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?” 51.  
361 Ibid., 34. 
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command has led to a dark side, where commander-centric ideas and cohesion of 
command staff has produced groupthink. As similarly discussed in Chapter III, the 
authors propose that the solution is not to abandon the philosophy of mission command, 
but to ensure that commanders do not act cavalierly under the guise of initiative.362  
Micromanagement and toxic leadership were discussed in Chapter III, and while 
both issues have received recent attention by the U.S. military community, neither the 
IDF nor the USFS is immune. As defined by Reed, three elements of toxic leader 
syndrome could describe more than a few leaders in organizations as large as the IDF or 
the USFS. These elements are: “1) An apparent lack of concern for well-being of 
subordinates; 2) A personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects 
organizational climate; 3) A conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated 
primarily by self-interest.”363 Nelson notes that the organizational support is important 
for mission command to be successful. He elaborates, “Broad acceptance (of mission 
command) is particularly important since any Auftragstaktik-like approach must be 
implemented from the top downward in the chain of command. Implementation can be 
blocked by any commander who wishes to operate in a centralized fashion.”364 Toxic 
leaders, cults of command, and micromanagers—any one of these elements will negate 
the mutual trust, identified as a principle of mission command, and from an 
organizational standpoint must not be tolerated.  
The morale challenges within the USFS have impeded the implementation of 
mission command. Issues of wages, cost-cutting, attrition, and liability dampen the spirits 
of employees who are being asked to innovate and take risk. The USFS foundational 
doctrine changes are a promising sign that, with time, risk and error will be placed in the 
proper perspective in the wildland fire suppression environment. Their focus on 
leadership development will help hasten the solutions needed to address these 
organizational issues.  
362 Fontenot, and Benson, “The Conundrum of Mission Command,” 28–35.  
363 George Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” Military Review 84, no. 5 (July–August, 2004): 67.  
364 Nelson, “Auftragstaktik,” 32. 
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Issues of morale, organizational support, and poor leadership are applicable to any 
homeland security response organization. Leaders will need to ensure that organizational 
support exists for a shift towards mission command. This will require clear understanding 
and training regarding the concept. Case studies from the military may help illustrate the 
principles of mission command to a homeland security agency, but examples from 
similar organizations, such as other law enforcement or fire service agencies, would be 
better received and comprehended. Unfortunately, the literature on such examples is 
lacking, as noted in the literature review of Chapter II. Organizational and supervisor 
feedback surveys are tools that could provide senior leaders with a better sense of the 
organizational culture and potential problem areas, and other suggestions will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
4. Mission Orders and Leader’s Intent 
Mission orders must be utilized and practiced by leaders. As discussed in the IDF 
case history in Chapter IV, military leaders such as Wingate, Sharon, and Talik gave 
mission-style orders and communicated their intent to subordinates. This resulted in 
understanding and action even when direct communications could not be maintained. 
While the USFS case study provided no specific examples, its evolution towards leading 
with intent was reviewed. Had the crewmembers on the South Canyon fire been given the 
latitude through leader’s intent to think of better ways to control the west flank fireline, 
perhaps the tragedy could have been averted. Prior to engagement, an open discussion 
between the leader and the various crew members might have covered the following 
points: 1) The intent is to control this flank of the fire in a safe manner 2) Building 
fireline downhill is a risky tactic 3) We have not worked together before 4) What are 
everyone’s concerns and suggestions? This process would have empowered the 
collaborative creativity and experience of the group as a whole. Unfortunately, a 
discussion like this never took place; the piecemeal fashion in which the various 
firefighters arrived might have been one reason why and the need to “get to work” may 
have been another.   
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The framing of direction in terms of intent and mission orders requires practice. 
The Kriegsakademie was the Prussian military’s war academy and intellectual center for 
general staff officers during the 1860s. The manner of how orders were written was given 
a high priority in the officer corps at the academy, and the training emphasized clarity 
and conciseness with consideration of maximum latitude for discretion by the 
subordinates that were to carry out the orders.365 Orders below the brigade level were 
verbal. Bucholz describes the expectation in the Prussian military for giving direction: 
“Simplicity, brevity and lucidity were the watchword of orders.”366  
The leader’s intent was the most important component of the order in the Prussian 
military. Nelson elaborates on the importance of intent:  
In carrying out their tasks, the subordinates were to always focus on the 
intent. It was virtually sacrosanct. Subordinates using initiative in response 
to the unexpected had to conform, insofar as possible, with this intent. 
Thus, the commander’s intent promoted unity of effort in fluid situations 
which failed to conform nicely to plans and expectations. The intent, 
therefore, both circumscribed and focused the exercise of initiative in 
subordinates.367  
Intent took precedence over detailed planning, which often became irrelevant as 
the situation changed. When subordinates altered a task or did not carry it out, they were 
to inform their superior; the subordinate was held responsible for the consequences.368 A 
bias for action over inaction was highly encouraged. When mistakes occurred, leniency 
was granted for those acting within leader’s intent and displays of initiative.  
A visual representation of the communication of intent is shown in Figure 4. This 
figure illustrates how a remote supervisor can direct the subordinate (local agent) through 
intent-based direction. Following the work-flow from left to right, the remote supervisor 
has communicated both detailed-based direction (in the form of task, order and mission) 
and also intent. In carrying out this direction, the local agent follows a procedural or 
365 Shamir, Transforming Command, 40. 
366 Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars 1864–1871, 58. 
367 Nelson, “Auftragstaktik,” 25. 
368 Bungay, “The Road to Mission Command,” 7. 
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canonical path using the detailed based direction, which is adequate to meet objectives 
one, two and three. If these directions become invalid due to an unanticipated event or 
condition (as shown by the jagged line at “f”) the local agent has the authority to create a 
“work-around” or alternate path of action (“g”) by following the supervisor’s intent.  
Through conveyance of intent, the supervisor allows the local agent the freedom 
to react to an unforeseen event within the bounded solution space. The desired end state 
is still reached but perhaps in a novel or better way than initially planned. The path 
labeled “h” represents a course of action that is outside of the bounded solution space or 
leader’s intent and may not be acceptable. Both the USFS literature and IDF experience 
suggest that when a deviation or work around occurs, it is incumbent that the local agent 
communicates the change to superior and impacted peers. 
 
Figure 4.  Communicating Intent: Path versus State369 
Communication of intent and utilization of mission orders are skills that must be 
practiced and utilized in order for mission command to become effective. Subordinates 
must be receptive to listen for and understand intent as a part of this process. Techniques 
that can be utilized to practice communicating intent and issuing as well as receiving 
mission orders are reviewed in Chapter VII.   
369 Lawrence Shattuck, email to author, December 13, 2013. 
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5. Personnel Development and Mission Command 
What better method to prepare subordinates for leadership than by allowing them 
to assume responsibility, make interdependent decisions, and act decisively? Mission 
command provides a framework to “lean forward” in regards to subordinate 
development. It also requires subordinates to think creatively and anticipate leader’s 
actions. Furthermore, the mission command dynamic also allows leaders to provide intent 
but yet become more detailed in direction depending on the experience and capability of 
each individual subordinate. Thus, subordinates in need of greater coaching or seasoning 
can be given the extra attention while the more experienced subordinates can be trusted 
and empowered to act within the bounds of the leader’s intent. 
Mentorship programs are when certain individuals within an organization are 
paired with a more experienced individual in order to provide career guidance. These 
programs, especially the informal ones, can be perceived as favoritism unless applied to 
every subordinate equally. Clutterbuck elaborates on the difficulties with mentorship 
programs: “Resentment from people not included is common (along with) …gossip, 
especially with cross-gender pairs.”370 Mentorship within a government agency that is 
governed by civil service rules and grievance procedures may draw complaints or worse 
by those not given the same opportunity. In comparison, mission command prepares all 
potential leaders as a byproduct of the intent-based process. 
The Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program, used by the USFS and 
described in Chapter V, is an example of a tiered educational program. This program 
contains curriculum designed for multiple echelons of personnel, from entry-level 
wildland firefighter to leaders of leaders. The L-series of courses are also aligned with 
leader positions (squad, unit, supervisor, general staff section chief, command staff 
officer, and incident commander) within the Incident Command System (ICS). The 
trainee position designation within ICS also allows hands-on training and leadership 
development through incidents. As an additional training tool, the USFS has embraced 
370 David Clutterbuck, Why Mentoring Programmes and Relationships Fail (Burnham, IL: 
Clutterbuck Associates, 2011), 4. 
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the “staff ride,” a concept developed and refined by Moltke in the 1800s.371 In addition, 
sand table exercises are also a component of USFS training, much like the military’s use 
of sand tables for decision making in simulated terrain.  
A high priority is given to subordinate development by homeland security 
organizations. Yet, the training and educational focus is usually on skill-based tasks. 
Leadership courses are not prevalent in the homeland security enterprise, as the 
experience of the USFS prior to 2001 revealed. Recently, more attention is being placed 
on the role of leadership education by response organizations. In order for the concept of 
mission command to be understood, some sort of educational program and material must 
be introduced.   
6. Unleashing Organizational Creativity through Mission Command 
Under mission command principles, instead of relying on the wisdom of a few 
hierarchical leaders, individuals at all levels of an organization become engaged to solve 
problems. The tradeoff for organizational creativity is the loosening of controls. As 
discussed in the IDF experience, military leaders and their subordinates came up with 
several innovative methods to overcome obstacles. The use of “swarming” techniques 
against a Palestinian insurgency in Nablus by the IDF was one example. The USFS 
experience indicated several occasions where innovation and creativity might have 
prevented tragedy. An example is the hypothetical discussion with the leader and 
subordinates about concerns and suggestions on the west flank fireline of the South 
Canyon fire.  
Creativity is not an easy quality to promote within a traditionally hierarchical 
organization. Vego elaborates on the obstructions to creativity in an authoritative 
organization such as the military:  
Like any other large organizations, military institutions are often heavily 
bureaucratized. They force their members to apply numerous fixed 
techniques and procedures in the erroneous belief that this would enhance 
effectiveness. Yet it has just the opposite effect because the rank-and-file 
371 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies,” 
Parameters 26, no. 2 (spring 1996): 91–99.  
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relies on a fixed routine instead of judgment and experience. The mission 
of the institution is increasingly forgotten or ignored. The chiefs of various 
departments or sections create veritable fiefdoms of power and influence 
and try to devise ways to protect and expand their authority and power. 
They are also often resistant to any change because change is considered a 
threat rather than an opportunity. Hence, any novel idea is usually 
dismissed as impractical, irresponsible, or absurd. The existing rules and 
regulations become the ends in themselves.372 
Another obstruction to creativity in a hierarchically dominate organization is the 
concern that superiors may look bad. The effect of this worry is described by Vego:  
The highly centralized and hierarchical command organization reinforces 
the authoritarian tendencies on the part of higher commanders. 
Authoritarianism is a major obstacle to the creativity of both individuals 
and the military institution as a whole. Often, higher commanders are 
reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge their own failings openly or tacitly. 
They try to keep the image of infallibility. They also often refuse to learn 
from their errors. Finding someone to blame for errors and accidents is a 
common occurrence in a military organization. Authoritarian structures 
allow pressure only to be applied top-down, not bottom-up. Yet in practice 
it is from the bottom that creative ideas are usually generated.373  
The shift from hierarchical norms is apparent in both the IDF and USFS, even 
though they operate in environments that are typically regimented and tightly controlled. 
Creativity and innovation are a result of this shift and increase organizational 
effectiveness is improved, at least in the case of the IDF. The USFS experience with 
mission command principles is more recent and changes in organizational effectiveness 
may take some time to develop. In the homeland security response environment, 
hierarchical thinking is discouraging creativity and innovation. The fire service, for 
example, is being challenged to improve its delivery of emergency medical services 
(which represents 80 percent of their incident responses) in the face of competition from 
private medical service companies. Creativity and innovation through mission command 
might be useful in this circumstance.     
372 Milan Vego, “On Military Creativity,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 70, no. 3 (2013): 84.  
373 Ibid., 84.  
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7. Risk, Liability and Mission Command 
Both the IDF and USFS operate in high-risk work environments where mistakes 
can be fatal. The tolerance for fatalities in these organizations is different, however, with 
wildland fire suppression, as a civilian occupation, which operating under higher safety 
expectations and less tolerance for casualty. Yardley and Kakabadse describe mission 
command as “…inherently a risk-taking management methodology which empowers 
individuals to analyze directives, question their relevance as the situation unfolds and to 
take executive decisions when required.” 374  While neither organization would 
intentionally sacrifice the lives of their personnel, the element of risk is an ever-present 
reality and must be managed. Mission command addresses the risk of subordinate 
personnel making command decisions through the use of prudent or calculated risk. This 
requires reasonable estimation, analysis, and mitigation considerations by subordinates 
prior to execution of an action. Clancy acknowledges that human factors play a role in the 
assessment of risk in the wildland firefighting environment and remarks, “There will 
always be variability in judgments when people are involved in the risk assessment 
process.” 375  He advocates an assessment model that consists of two components, a 
simplified risk- rating matrix, which limits the choices available in assessing risk, and a 
decision model that highlights cognitive biases. 
Liability is a concern for both IDF and USFS. Legal precedents in both homeland 
security response and military environments are placing individuals operating in these 
conditions under increased pressure to perform without flaw. Krulak’s article entitled 
“The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” described in Chapter IV, is 
an example of the pressures on those who must perform under increasing scrutiny.376 
Hopefully, future legal decisions acknowledge the difficulties of decision making in these 
environments. A concern about liability will be an obstacle towards the innovation and 
374 Yardley, and Kakabadse, “Understanding Mission Command,” 74.  
375 David Clancy, “Can Acceptable Risk Be Defined in Wildland Firefighting?” in Proceedings of the 
Second Conference on the Human Dimensions of Wildland Fire (April 2010): 1.  
376 Krulak “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.”  
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willingness to lead that mission command requires. As discussed in Chapter V, personal 
liability insurance offered by an organization to personnel may be a solution. 
C. CONCLUSION         
The comparison of both the IDF and USFS experiences in the use of mission 
command principles provides insight for any homeland security organization considering 
the adoption of a similar leadership ethos. Several observations were made based on this 
comparison with trust, culture, and organizational support recognized as the key 
components in order for mission command to be successful. Creativity and subordinate 
development were two organizational facets that would be enhanced through the use of 
mission command principles. In addition, risk and liability were discussed and these 
issues may hinder the implementation of mission command if not addressed. The success 
of the IDF in using these principles was discussed; however, the success of the USFS 
may not be as apparent. This could be attributed to the fact that the USFS has only 
recently (since 2003) attempted the requisite organizational shift, as compared to the IDF, 
which has utilized mission command principles since its inception in 1948.  
In the next chapter, a conditional recommendation will be proffered that mission 
command should be adopted by response organizations within the homeland security 
enterprise. In addition, an implementation plan will be provided for those organizations 
that choose to implement this leadership ethos. Within this plan will be strategies for 
ways to market such a philosophy, identification of influential groups within an 
organization, and the circumstances that can lead to organizational change. Finally, a 
conclusion will be drawn as a summarization of the key elements within this thesis.       
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VII. MISSION COMMAND: RETOOLING THE LEADERSHIP 
PARADIGM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The IDF and USFS experience with mission command indicates that a homeland 
security response organization can benefit from this leadership ethos. However, this 
recommendation is conditional, and the nature of these conditions will be discussed in 
this chapter. Both the IDF and USFS encountered difficulty in the implementation 
process and their experience is useful for an organization that is looking to follow suit. In 
addition, a plan for implementation from both a policy and a marketing perspective is 
suggested in this chapter. A Department of Homeland Security policy on mission 
command does not currently exist; however, several resources are provided that most 
closely mirror the mission command precepts.  
The IDF and USFS each have adopted mission command principles out of 
circumstance—the IDF due to a need for a rapid, flexible response in a geo-politically, 
constrained security environment, and the USFS due to a need for leadership 
development in an accident intolerant environment. This chapter also reviews 
circumstances that favor an organizational shift by a homeland security response agency 
and the potential challenges. Finally, the chapter conclusion highlights remaining 
questions and issues, avenues for further research, and the key elements within this thesis.  
B. RECOMMENDATION TO ADOPT MISSION COMMAND  
The research and analysis for thesis leads to the recommendation that homeland 
security response organizations should consider the implementation of mission command 
principles in order to respond to crises more effectively. This recommendation is 
conditional and is based on the ability of an organization to train personnel to accept and 
apply these principles, to address liability issues as a result of potential error, and to 
garner the trust and willingness of operational personnel to operate in a new paradigm. 
Since crisis response (as defined in Chapter I) is not an everyday occurrence for an 
organization, the mission command precepts will need to be practiced during non-crisis 
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events and even while performing daily administrative functions. Shamir recommends (in 
Chapter IV) that an organization’s operating policy be based on mission command 
principles as the norm with the flexibility to move to a detailed-style of command as 
circumstances dictate. 377  This requires a paradigm shift in a homeland security 
organization’s leadership ethos.   
Mission command relieves superiors from some of the decision-making pressure 
in chaotic conditions. From a psychological and practical standpoint, it also serves to 
empower subordinates to lead upwards, and it can increase organizational nimbleness, 
effectiveness, and innovation. The leadership burden of centralized control and the 
resulting power of decentralization are described by Wheatley:  
The personal impact on leaders’ morale and health is also devastating. 
When leaders take back power, when they act as heroes and saviors, they 
end up exhausted, overwhelmed, and deeply stressed. It is simply not 
possible to solve singlehandedly the organization’s problems; there are 
just too many of them! One leader who led a high risk chemical plant 
spent three years creating a highly motivated, self-organizing workforce. 
He described it this way: ‘Instead of just me worrying about the plant, I 
now have nine hundred people worrying. And coming up with solutions I 
never could have imagined.’378 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the flexibility of moving from a hierarchical 
organizational model to one that is more collaborative and networked should be helpful 
to a response agency, especially in the event of a terrorist or catastrophic situation. 
Homeland security crisis response demands that organizations become more heterarchical 
(and less hierarchical) due to the widespread impact of these events and the increased 
number of agencies that will be involved. 
Mission command provides this flexibility and allows for more detailed and 
authoritative direction when necessary. Hierarchical norms, such as rank, position, and 
377 Eitan Shamir in a video of a talk given on October 13, 2013 and posted online entitled: “Dr. 
Shamir Discusses the Philosophy of Mission Command. He is the author of the book, Transforming 
Command, a study on the implementation of the philosophy of mission command in the American, British, 
and Israeli Armies.” Comments made starting at 40 minutes. 
http://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Mission%20Command/ 
378 “How Is Your Leadership?” Margaret Wheatley, accessed February 19, 2015, 
http://www.margaretwheatley.com/articles/howisyourleadership.html 
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approval, are still maintained within an organization, but command becomes intent-based 
rather than detail-based. Mission command simply changes the dynamic of how direction 
is given, received, and acted upon.  
The results of implementing mission command principles will be limited, 
however, unless there is organizational support and cultural acceptance. The training 
expense, uncertain liability, and organizational trust are conditions that must be addressed 
by an organization. These are not easy issues to overcome as both the IDF and USFS 
have demonstrated. While the IDF example shows success with these principles, the 
effectiveness of the USFS experience is yet to be determined. This disparity might be 
explained based on the shift to a mission command paradigm and the time required of an 
organization, steeped in a detailed-command culture, to move towards mission command.   
Sinek suggests that leaders in successful organizations are able to communicate 
why the organization exists or why a change is needed.379 This aligns with the mission 
command precept of giving clear leader’s intent by describing the task, purpose, and end 
state. There must be shared understanding (another mission command precept) within the 
organization about the need to embrace mission command or it risks being perceived as 
the latest leadership fad.  
C. MISSION COMMAND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
A comprehensive plan is needed to prepare a homeland security organization for 
the actions necessary to implement mission command. Training and education is a major 
component, as General Martin Dempsey has indicated in his directive to the armed 
services (and mentioned in Chapter I):     
Leaders must be taught how to receive and give mission orders, and how 
to clearly express intent. Students must be placed in situations of 
uncertainty where critical and creative thinking and effective rapid 
decision making are stressed. Training must replicate the chaotic and 
uncertain nature of military operations. Training must place leaders in 
situations where fleeting opportunities present themselves, and those that 
see and act appropriately to those opportunities are rewarded…Training 
379 Sinek, Why Start with Why, 6. 
135 
                                                     
must reinforce in commanders that they demonstrate trust by exercising 
restraint in their close supervision of subordinates.380 
Based on the experience of IDF and USFS, the following steps are directed at any 
emergency response organization (or leader) that wishes to move from a hierarchical, 
directive command philosophy to one that is mission-based: 
1. Analysis  
Examine historical organizational effectiveness during crisis management through the use 
of after-action reviews or by an independent audit. Several questions should be asked: 
Are there deficiencies or areas where improvement is needed? Would the use of mission 
command principles increase the effectiveness? Would the culture of the organization 
allow such a change? Does the organizational doctrine support such a concept as mission 
command or does it need revising? If the answers to these questions are affirmative, then 
a leadership shift to mission command should be considered.  
2. Case Studies  
Examine how others have implemented mission command through case 
studies.381 For example, the IDF experience provides a number of examples that can be 
used organizationally. Additionally, the U.S. Army has adopted mission command as 
doctrine and has established the Mission Command Center of Excellence to provide 
further information. 382  Historical accounts of military operations and how mission 
command has been used are available in the book; Sixteen Cases of Mission Command, 
edited by Donald Wright. As explained in the forward “This collection of historical 
vignettes seeks to sharpen our mission command philosophy and practice by providing 
examples from the past in which mission command principles played a decisive role.”383  
380 Martin Dempsey quoted in Michael Flynn, and Chuck Schrankel, “Applying Mission Command 
through the Operations Process” Military Review 93, no. 2 (March–April, 2013): 31.   
381 Vandergriff, “Misinterpretation and Confusion,” 11.  
382 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2. 
383 Donald P. Wright, ed. Sixteen Cases of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat 
Studies Institute Press, 2013), iii.   
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3. Decision Point 
The organization or leader must make a conscious decision to shift to a mission 
command ethos. Optimally, this would be decided with the support of organizational 
personnel or key players. In order to transform an organization, Kotter recommends that a 
powerful guiding coalition should be formed that can lead the effort and overcome 
barriers.384 In addition, several influential groups within and around an organization will 
need to be convinced. These groups are discussed in the implementation strategy section.  
4. Educate, Train, and Practice 
If the decision is made to implement mission command, several aspects need to be 
considered. Organizational awareness, personnel education and training, and practice of 
the skills needed for mission command are essential in order for mission command to be 
effective. Decentralization of authority in an organization requires significant investment 
towards training and education of both leaders and subordinate personnel. These 
subordinates need to be proficient in their normal responsibilities and prepared to take the 
initiative as the opportunity arises. 385  From the U.S. Army doctrine on mission 
command: “Commanders at all levels need education, rigorous training, and experience 
to apply these principles effectively.”386  
For example, communication of intent and use of mission orders are techniques 
that must be practiced for proficiency. Opportunities for practice by a homeland security 
organization can be as simple as a discussion at the morning line-up or shift briefing. 
Additionally, leader’s intent can be added to any detailed-based direction as an added 
clarification. Subordinates can be empowered to ask for clarification if the intent is not 
clear. As in the Prussian Kriegsakademie, what-if scenarios or table-top exercises can be 
utilized to practice potential events and the issuance of mission orders.  
384 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review 
OnPoint (March–April, 1995): 59–67, accessed March 2, 2015, 
http://www.sykehusapoteket.no/Upload/Topplederprogrammet/Litteratur/2.1%20Leading%20Change%20-
%20Why%20Transformation%20Efforts%20Fail%20by%20JP%20Kotter.pdf    
385 Stewart, “The Evolution of Command Approach.”   
386 U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 1-4. 
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5. Maintain the Focus 
As the IDF and USFS experiences demonstrate, there is a need to maintain the 
focus on mission command principles. The establishment of a standing committee within 
the organization would serve this purpose, much like the NWCG leadership committee 
efforts discussed in Chapter V. Not only would a standing committee work to ensure that 
mission command principles are being practiced, but it could be utilized as the conduit to 
provide organizational feedback. Additionally, oversight of “just-culture” practices such 
as facilitated learning analysis and after-action reviews could be another responsibility.  
Other mission command focused efforts might include benchmarking 
organizational trust and the development of “swift-trust” awareness. As an example, Fahy 
describes swift trust as a solution for the dilemma of ad-hoc teams working towards 
specific tasks under time constraints.387 The USFS case study in Chapter V provided 
several examples of ad-hoc teams that met with tragedy when trust was diminished 
(amongst other contributing factors). From the book Building Trust in Diverse Teams: 
The Toolkit for Emergency Response, there are four criteria for establishing swift trust: 
competence (based on a perception that team members are competent), openness with 
information (team members share information), integrity (team members maintain 
promises, are team oriented and respectful), and reciprocity (team members are trusting 
and cooperative).388 Swift trust awareness and other exercises could be conducted through a 
leadership program administered by the standing committee.    
While there are no mission command training programs specifically for first 
responders, there are several other programs that can be used for curriculum development 
or as a basis for training. These programs and resources are discussed in the following 
section.  
387 Michael J. Fahy, “Understanding ‘Swift Trust’ to Improve Interagency Collaboration in New York 
City” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 4. 
388 Emergency Capacity Building Project, Building Trust in Diverse Teams: The Toolkit for 
Emergency Response (Oxford, U.K: Oxfam Publishing, 2007), 9. 
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D. MISSION COMMAND PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES  
Several resources and programs contain some or all of the precepts that define 
mission command, and though designed for a different environment, they can be adapted 
or modified by the homeland security enterprise. The list is not exhaustive but may be 
used as a starting point for a homeland security organization that decides to implement 
mission command.  
1. United States Army Mission Command Resources 
While the IDF’s experience with mission command is useful, there is limited 
open-source material regarding implementation of mission command. The U.S. Army’s 
effort to operationalize mission command has produced a number of resources and 
discussions that might prove helpful to a homeland security organization looking for 
insight. While the military environment may not translate entirely to a homeland security 
setting, there are many similarities, many of which have been discussed in this thesis. 
Several references are available include: the Army doctrine on mission command, journal 
articles from Military Review, online books from the Combat Studies Institute Press at the 
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, and a mission command website that contains 
several videos and study guides. 389 Another responsibility of the standing leadership 
committee (recommended in the previous section) could be to coordinate with the Army 
on training methods and curriculum. 
2. Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program 
The Wildland Fire Leadership Program has been mentioned several times in 
reference to the USFS experience. Sponsored by the National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group (NWCG) of which the USFS is a part, the program provides an impressive array 
of tools for an organization to orientate, educate and train its members. This program and 
the course curriculums are closely aligned with the mission command ethos and are 
accessible to any homeland security response organization. Only the military branches, 
such as the U.S. Army, have more invested in teaching the principles of mission 
389 “Maneuver Self Study Program,” U.S. Army Fort Benning, accessed February 19, 2015, 
http://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Mission%20Command/ 
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command, but the military courses are not currently available to the homeland security 
enterprise. Wildland fire suppression is the setting for the instruction and coursework, 
however the lessons on intent, communication, crew cohesion and leadership transcend 
organizational disciplines.  
An example of this is the L580 “Leadership is Action” course which is conducted 
at the Civil War battlefield at Gettysburg. An all-hazards responder version of these 
leadership courses is provided through certain approved vendors. In addition, grant 
funding through the Department of Homeland Security has been utilized to sponsor these 
courses through regional Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) groups. The NWCG 
document, “Leading in the Wildland Fire Service” expresses the fundamental leadership 
concepts of the wildland fire service and provides practical guidance regarding leader’s 
intent. 390  Furthermore, this document captures the essence of the mission command 
philosophy in an easy to read format, is applicable to all homeland security organizations, 
and is available online at no cost.  
3. Leader-Leader Model  
On an individual leader level, Marquet describes a type of mission command 
philosophy that he utilized to transform a poorly performing crew in the book: Turn the 
Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders.391 While he was assigned 
as the captain on the nuclear submarine USS Santa Fe, Marquet empowered his crew to 
become the most improved ship in the Pacific Fleet. His method of encouraging decision-
making authority among his subordinates and the resultant change in performance and 
culture on the submarine are chronicled in the book. Marquet bases his method on a 
leader-leader relationship with his entire crew rather than the hierarchical leader-follower 
model. Essentially, this was a command-by-negation technique (discussed in Chapter II) 
taken to the subordinate level. An example of this crew transformation over time is the 
conversation below based on Marquet’s three pillars of control, competence, and clarity: 
Traditional leader-follower pattern: 
390 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Leading in the Wildland Fire Service. 
391 Marquet, Turn the Ship Around.  
140 
                                                     
Captain: “Submerge the ship” 
Subordinate: “Submerge the ship, aye” 
To push Control down in the organization, Marquet began using the 
following speech pattern: 
Captain: “What do you think we should do?” 
Subordinate: “I think we should submerge the ship, sir” 
Captain: “Then tell me you intend to do that” 
Subordinate: “Captain, I intend to submerge the ship” 
Captain: “Very well” 
Giving control without an assurance of competence could lead to disaster 
on a nuclear submarine, and so over time, the pattern evolved to include 
an assurance of technical Competence, becoming: 
Subordinate: “Captain, I intend to submerge the ship.” 
Captain: “What do you think I’m concerned about?” 
Subordinate: “You’re probably concerned about whether it’s safe to do so” 
Captain: “Then convince me it’s safe” 
Subordinate: “Captain, I intend to submerge the ship. All crew are below decks, 
the hatches are shut, the ship is rigged for dive, and we’ve checked the bottom 
depth.” 
Captain: “Very Well” 
The final evolution of the language added the third pillar—Clarity of 
mission, becoming: 
Subordinate: “Captain, I intend to submerge the ship. All crew are below decks, 
the hatches are shut, the ship is rigged for dive, and we’ve checked the bottom 
depth.” 
Captain: “Is it the right thing to do?” 
Subordinate: “Yes sir, our mission requires that we submerge now in order to 
…(classified reason)” 
Captain: “Very Well”392  
The final evolution captures the leader-leader pattern that soon became the norm for the 
crew of the USS Santa Fe. The effect of this communication was to shift authoritative 
control by “emancipating” subordinates and creating thinking leaders.  
Marquet’s leader-leader model provides a practical method to promote the 
mission command principles of initiative and decentralization of authority. It also 
provides a pattern of interaction that ensures the leader’s intent is understood and being 
followed. Additionally, the subordinate’s learning development is enhanced by changing 
392 Peter Green, “Agile and Leadership—Turn the Ship Around,” accessed February 19, 2015, 
http://blogs.adobe.com/agile/2014/10/10/agile-and-leadership-turn-the-ship-around/ 
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the leader-subordinate dynamic. The model provides a way of interacting that any 
homeland security organizational unit, crew, or division could implement.    
4. “Just Culture” 
A “just culture” provides a solution to the issue of liability created by 
subordinates taking prudent risk (a mission command principle). The term “just culture” 
(discussed in Chapter V) provides a solution to the dilemma of error and discipline. 
Reason posits, “the problem of human error can be viewed in two ways: the person 
approach and the system approach.”393 Franklin, Leonard, and Denham explain, “A ‘just 
culture’ is about fair, enlightened, and reasonable assessment of behavior and produces a 
work environment that supports high reliability.” They point to Reason’s unsafe acts 
algorithm and give the example from Kaiser Permanente, which adapted the algorithm 
using four simple questions: 
Did the employee intend to cause harm? 
Did the employee come to work drunk or equally impaired? 
Did the employee knowingly and unreasonably increase risk? 
Would another similarly trained and skilled employee in the same situation act in a 
similar manner (Reason’s substitution test)? 
 
If the first three answers are “No” and the last “Yes” the origin of the unsafe act lies in 
the organization, not the individual.394 
The adoption of a “just-culture” approach to error would bolster the 
organizational and individual trust, which is necessary for a mission command ethos to be 
successful. It would also assist in the creation of shared situational awareness, another 
mission command precept. Finally, a “just culture” would encourage subordinate 
initiative and willingness to assume greater responsibility by removing the disciplinarian 
approach to error.  
393 James Reason, “Human Error: Models and Management,” West Journal of Medicine 172, no. 6 
(June 2000): 393. 
394 Allan S. Frankel, Michael W. Leonard, and Charles R. Denham, “Fair and Just Culture, Team 
Behavior, and Leadership Engagement: The Tools to Achieve High Reliability,” Health Services Research 
41 (August 2006): 1697.  
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E. MISSION COMMAND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
An organizational implementation strategy is necessary once a decision is made to 
move forward with mission command. The influence from groups within and outside of 
an organization must be considered in order to enact this change. The following is a 
perspective regarding these groups and potential avenues of support.   
1. Group Influence  
The “rules governing how people rule” 395  were discussed in reference to 
hierarchical organizations in Chapter I. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith elaborate further 
by pointing out that all organizations contain a mix of interchangeable, influential, and 
essential groups. These groups, and how they intersect, unlock the political puzzle of how 
those in power maintain power.396 This framework is worth discussing in light of the 
implementation of mission command as a policy within an organization.  
The interchangeables are the individuals who are the followers in a homeland 
security organization. This group includes supervisors, who have supervisors, and work 
in a followership mode as a part of their job responsibilities. Generally, these individuals 
constitute the majority of the work force within an organization. Patrol officers within a 
police department would be considered interchangeables, for example.  
The influentials are those that are in positions of leadership or in supervisory 
roles. These individuals are key to implementing mission command although this group 
may not have decision-making authority regarding adoption of the policy. Watch 
commanders and lieutenants are examples of the influentials within a police department.  
The essentials are those that are in positions of authority that can effect change in 
an organization and have direct influence on the leader. Examples of individuals in this 
group are the deputy police chiefs or deputy fire chiefs, the union president, or one who is 
motivated enough to bring change to an organization. Essentials may be those that are 
outside of an organization such as a city manager, local news reporter, or the police 
395 Bueno de Mesquita, and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, 17. 
396 Ibid., 7. 
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chief’s spouse. Ultimately, the customers or the community served has a voice in a 
democratic society. It is to their benefit that a more efficient means of conducting 
business should be pursued and their influence must be considered. 
2. Policy Changes, Rewards, or Punishments 
The interchangeables (subordinates) have experience greater opportunities to 
influence decision making and improve the effectiveness of their homeland security 
organizations. They have increased opportunity to interact with other organizations, 
especially during crisis response, and are looked to for innovation and initiative. The 
basket of goods increase for this group and thus ultimately benefits the organization as a 
whole; however, there are be some in this group who will not benefit.397 Organizational 
culture, inexperience, concern about litigation or failure, and peer pressure may be 
reasons why certain interchangeables are not willing to assume greater responsibility 
under a decentralized organizational model. As much as the leaders’ trust of followers is 
a key component of mission command, follower trust in the leader and the organization is 
equally important.  
The influentials (supervisors) experience the greatest change if a policy of 
mission command is implemented. The shift in decision making will require this group to 
relinquish some of their authority. Their directive communication to subordinates must 
become intent-based rather than authoritative. This is a shift from detailed command, 
where subordinates are told what to do and how to do it. As mentioned previously, intent 
based direction opens up the opportunities for subordinate innovation, especially in a 
dynamic environment when a change in plan is necessary. The influentials have to build 
greater trust between themselves and their followers. Their focus evolves to serving the 
purposes of the lower echelons or layers in order to support organizational resiliency.398  
The essentials (decision makers) also need to relinquish some of their decision-
making authority and to support their subordinates when mistakes occur. As van der 
397 Houghton, and Yoho, “Toward a Contingency Model,” 65.    
398 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), Kindle location 1505.   
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Heijden posits, “organizations in fast changing environments tend to decentralize, with 
top management acting more as a coordinating body than as a setter of strategy.”399 Their 
reward is in leading an organization that will perform better in crisis response by being 
resilient, flexible, innovative, and nimble. 
3. Opportunities for Implementation of Mission Command 
Unfortunately, the impetus to change often only follows on the heels of tragedy, 
as the USFS experience suggests. Another example is the genesis of the Incident 
Command System, which was designed after the 1970 wildfire siege in California 
described in Chapter III. While tragedy provides a strong incentive to change, it is hoped 
that the implementation of mission command can be promulgated before the next crisis 
event occurs.  
Organizational leaders will need convincing that mission command has a benefit. 
“Essentials” and “influentials” can have a role in convincing leaders and identifying 
needed improvements. The challenge will be to gain support and effect change 
throughout the entire HSE. As mentioned in Chapter I, the homeland security enterprise 
is vast. Along with the 22 federal agencies that work under the Department of Homeland 
Security, the homeland security enterprise consists of 18,000 law enforcement agencies, 
30,000 fire departments, and thousands of public health, hospital, and other response 
organizations. To enact change in such a large and widespread industry would be a 
monumental task. However, there is precedent—the Incident Command System and the 
National Incident Management System, which were mandated through presidential 
directive and implemented through the Department of Homeland Security in 2004.400    
It took decades before the Incident Command System (ICS) was adopted as a 
nationwide standard after being validated by the California wildland fire suppression 
community. ICS was born out of a local need (the southern California fires of 1970) and 
adapted nationwide after other disasters in true bottom-up fashion. Like ICS, the policy 
399 Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (West Sussex, UK: Wiley, 
2011), Kindle location 1397.  
400 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–5: Management of Domestic 
Incidents (Washington, DC: General Printing Office, 2003), 229.  
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of mission command should be ground truthed at a regional level. If the principles of 
mission command are determined to be successful, then a wider audience will follow.      
F. CONCLUSION 
Wheatley captures the challenge of leadership during crisis, when she states, “I’m 
sad to report that in the past few years, ever since uncertainty became our insistent 21st 
century companion, leadership has taken a great leap backwards to the familiar territory 
of command and control.”401 The authoritative and hierarchical approach just does not fit 
well in the current crisis management environment described by Waugh and Streib as one 
of “shared authority, dispersed responsibility and collaborative networking.”402  
A new leadership paradigm is needed, one that recognizes chaos and complexity, 
yet has the flexibility to be either loosely guided or tightly controlled. Encouraging 
subordinates at the point of action to be creative and opportunistic can be a force 
multiplier in terms of organizational nimbleness and effectiveness. According to Yardley 
and Kakbadse, mission command “enables an organization to achieve unity of effort, 
focus and momentum whilst empowering individuals to use their own discretion and 
initiative in the implementation process.”403  
While the intent of this thesis is to establish a nexus between military mission 
command and potential use by a homeland security response organization, there are 
several areas or themes that were only touched upon and require further research. One 
area is the means of measuring the effectiveness of mission command principles, which 
currently is anecdotal at best. Another area is quantitative research on the impact of 
mission command on critical decision making during crisis (faster, simpler, less 
stressful?). A third area for research is the impact of technology on hierarchical 
organizations and a deeper look at private industry efforts to decentralize and collaborate. 
The thesis supposition from Chapter I was that if homeland security response 
organizations can become more decentralized and collaborative, they can respond to 
401 “How Is Your Leadership?” Margaret Wheatley. 
402 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership,” 131. 
403 Yardley, and Kakbadse, “Understanding Mission Command,” 69. 
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crisis events more effectively. A mission command ethos encourages this decentralization 
and collaboration. The case study experience indicates that by adoption of these 
principles the IDF was more effective than its adversaries from a military perspective. 
However, the case study experience from the USFS suggests that in order for mission 
command to be effective, it will take more than decentralization and collaboration. Trust, 
culture, support, training, awareness, and funding are all critical organizational facets that 
must be considered in detail.  
The nature of crisis in the twenty-first century with the added dilemma of human-
caused destruction through terrorism demands a reappraisal of response methodology. 
Flexibility is necessary to respond effectively to events that are complex in nature. 
Without a change, the lessons of past homeland security crises will be repeated and lives 
that could have been saved will be lost. Homeland security leaders faced with the 
possibility of managing these crises in the future would do well to consider the principles 
of mission command. 
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